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This thesis is an enquiry into political ordering under its four core attributes: the state, 
sovereignty, law, and politics. It advocates analysing ordering as a process, rather than 
‗order‘ as a static given, and introduces an interactive model of ordering, which takes 
into account both the creative and the limiting thrusts in political communities. This 
thesis is informed by the theories of Benedict Spinoza and Carl Schmitt. 
The first chapter is dedicated to assessing the current debate around the four core 
concepts: the state, sovereignty, law, and politics. Although it is not aimed at 
providing a full and definitive account of the scholarly debate, some major trends in 
current political and legal thinking are overviewed. This exposition subsequently 
serves as both the context and the impetus for the dynamic model of ordering, 
constructed in the final chapter. 
The following two chapters are dedicated to the theories of Spinoza and Schmitt. In 
Spinoza‘s case, some metaphysical preconditions have to be explored beforehand: 
immanent causality, striving to persevere in existence, and the right as power doctrine. 
The thesis then moves to the role of the state, sovereignty, law, and politics as tools 
for ensuring communal cohesion despite a general lack of reason and for joint 
progression towards reason. As for Schmitt, the thesis first delves into his emphasis on 
the fallen nature of humans, based on his religious convictions. The state, sovereignty, 
law, and politics are then analysed as parts of an effort to establish order where 
actually there can be none (since human existence is groundless), necessitating order-
qua-theology. Thus, Spinoza and Schmitt both oppose and complement each other. 
Lastly, the final chapter proposes an interactive model of ordering as perpetual 
process by revisiting the four core elements from a Spinozist-Schmittian perspective. 
This model postulates ordering as animated by constant tension between and 
reciprocal reproduction of the constitutive and the constituted thrusts, both of them 
being creative and limiting in different respects. In this model, groundlessness is seen 
as the basic condition which is, nevertheless, constantly counterbalanced by a need for 
quasi-religious belief in a quasi-objective given, e.g. Spinoza‘s reason. Communal life 
is, therefore, constantly caught in-between these two poles. Consequently, ordering-
as-process is claimed to be the only way in which anything common can be posited. 
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This is a thesis about political ordering. It advocates ordering as a process, rather than 
order as an established thing, as the relevant level of analysis of communal human 
life. To that end, the final chapter of the thesis introduces a dynamic model of 
ordering that is characterised by perpetual movement between the constitutive and the 
constituted elements of a political community‘s2 life. In essence, it is claimed, 
although the constitutive and the constituted can be separated conceptually, in 
practical terms they are inseparable: one is being constantly reproduced, remoulded, 
and reshaped by the other while at the same time reciprocally affecting the other. This 
reciprocal and simultaneous determination, then, forms the essence of the process of 
ordering and keeps that process in a state of perpetual movement. Ordering itself is 
seen here as composed of several core parts: its framework, comprising the state
3
 and 
sovereignty, and its content, comprising law and politics. In order to analyse the core 
elements and conceptualise ordering as process, the ideas of Benedict (Baruch) 
Spinoza and Carl Schmitt are employed (for reasons outlined below). The process of 
ordering is, therefore, revealed in the dynamic between the ideas of these two 
thinkers. 
Arguably, the question of authority and ordering has never been straightforward. In 
fact, disagreements over who has the ultimate power, what its source is, what 
constraints are necessary and/or natural etc. have animated political thought since its 
very inception. However, the modern condition is pronouncedly different: as will be 
seen in the first chapter, not only political communities are torn between the universal 
and the particular, between demands beyond and within their borders, but also the 
borders themselves have become less clear. Furthermore, the political public has 
become simultaneously more empowered and more disengaged, more active and more 
cynical about any form of authority (and ‗the authorities‘ in general) – that is the 
context, the precondition, and, to a large extent, the substance of the question of 
                                                          
2
 The term ‗political community‘ is used to stress the difference between the state, which is an element 
of ordering, and something that both underlies and constitutes the entire endeavour of ordering (i.e. the 
body of people). It is roughly synonymous with ‗the nation‘ or ‗the people‘ but, in the author‘s view, 
allows to better express the non-essentialist nature of this collective body and is free from connotations 
of something primordial. 
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 The position of the state in today‘s increasingly globalised world is admitted to be a precarious one. 




ordering as it applies to the conditions of today. And yet, these changes in political 
landscape and subjectivity are yet to be fully explored. Hence, this thesis is also an 
exploration of human communal life under both its prevalent (largely stable 
throughout time) and specifically modern attributes, simultaneously shedding new 
light on communal life (providing a representation and an analysis of it) and offering 
normative prescriptions for how it is to be conducted, of course, with specific 
reference to ordering. 
 
Ordering and the Conceptual Apparatus 
A crucial question must be asked: how can political order be produced and sustained, 
especially in modern pluralist democratic societies when no authority can be taken for 
granted and globalisation is threatening the very presence of integrated communities? 
The answer to that question, in fact, has to start with a negation: order, as such, is not 
possible under the circumstances described. Instead, one has to delve into ordering as 
a process. The very choice of terms here indicates a critical opposition: order, as 
something established and – actually or seemingly – natural, and ordering as a 
constant process in which any status quo is only temporary and negotiable. This is not 
to say that either one or the other is present or that they are is some way 
interchangeable. In fact, as argued in this thesis, one always lives under a particular 
order which must always represent something more than it actually is – e.g. a rational, 
natural or some other ideal – to be acceptable or, at least, bearable. After all, it would 
be terribly difficult to live under instituted contingency (as, it is claimed here, we do) 
and be conscious of the fact. Hence, there must be some sort of drive towards finality 
and false conclusion – an emphasis on order as singular and factual. And yet, this 
thesis endeavours to show that order as such cannot be the relevant level of analysis 
because the most it can actually aspire to is being a temporary interim conclusion of 
the process of ordering. Hence, an analysis of order would concentrate on an effect 
whilst ignoring the conditions that have produced and will ultimately overturn that 
effect. Meanwhile, political ordering, understood in the widest sense possible, refers 
to the establishment of rules and norms under which the common life is to be lived. 
That, in fact, is the ultimate issue that life in any political community boils down to. 
Those rules, however, are not permanent (or otherwise there would be no ordering but 
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just order). Rather, as it will be shown in this thesis, they are constantly renegotiated 
between the constitutive and the constituted elements of ordering (as they are defined 
below). The same applies to exclusion: the presence of rules already implies exclusion 
or sanctioning of those who do not comply, and the fact that ordering refers to 
political communities indicates that the application of rules is also based on inclusion 
and exclusion, i.e. membership and non-membership. This inclusion-exclusion 
relation will be shown to be a crucial element of the necessarily political character of 
human ordering. However, ordering being a process, this inclusion-exclusion, just as 
the corresponding rules, cannot be permanent: they are only momentary snapshots of 
constant movement. In short, as will be demonstrated, ‗ordering‘ still contains a 
reference to order in its root – order is an ever elusive aspiration, just like the infinite 
intellect of God is for Spinoza; and yet, since ordering is a process that always 
stumbles upon inconclusive outcomes, it simultaneously contains the kernel of 
Schmitt‘s groundless decisionism which cannot boast any incontestable telos. 
Next, one has to move to the two thrusts that are going to play a crucial role 
throughout the thesis: the constitutive and the constituted,
4
 which roughly correspond 
to the elements referred to in the thesis title: creativity and limitation. However, 
neither thrust has an exclusive relation to either creativity or limitation. Hence, it 
would also be erroneous to refer to one of the thrusts as active and to the other as 
passive: both are active, shaping the actual temporal manifestation of ordering 
accordingly, and passive in the sense of limiting the effect the opposing thrust can 
have. The constitutive thrust is bottom-up, as expressed through sovereignty and 
politics, referring to the political community‘s creation of ever new forms of itself, 
shaping its institutional and symbolic expressions accordingly. But once a momentary 
snapshot of the political community is established as its authoritative expression (e.g. 
through the establishment of a new or amended constitution, a plebiscite, an election, 
regime change through revolution and so on), the constitutive immediately passes into 
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 The distinction between the constitutive and constituted powers has received considerable attention in 
the recent literature. Several notable examples (although the terms themselves are not always 
completely explicit) include: Agamben (1998, 2005, 2011), Barshack (2006), Connolly (2005), Drake 
(2010), Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), Honig (2009), Loughlin (2010), Mouffe (1993, 2000, 
2002, 2005), Negri (1999, 2008 and most other writings), Rancière (1999, 2009, 2010), rua Wall 
(2012), Spång (2014), Tully (2008), Wenman (2013), and others. Shukaitis (2009) even stresses the 
necessary transition from the constitutive to the constituted and back again, somewhat similar to one 
proposed in the final chapter of the thesis. However, for him such transition implies a radical break and 
unavoidable weakness of radical imagination rather than being part of a process of ordering. 
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the constituted. Such transmutation happens because the political community 
constantly moves on, leaving any established form behind almost at the moment of its 
establishment. The constituted, then, refers to the quest for order rather than ordering, 
i.e. is symptomatic of the quest for stability (although, it has to be stressed again, 
stability is not only limiting but also creative, shaping the constitutive accordingly). 
The constituted is top-down, represented in this thesis by the state and law: it is the 
thrust in which the institutional-symbolic representation maintains its own illusion of 
finality, usually upholding the community as it once was but sometimes also 
establishing a community where previously there was none. To an extent, one could 
see this as a privileged default position: an entrenched structure of power and 
resources. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, the constituted 
always rests on a precarious foundation and is relevant only as long as it manages to 
maintain its grip on the constitutive. On the other hand, it will be seen that the 
constitutive also depends on the constituted because the latter lends it at least some 
form and definition. The community – the substance of the constitutive – cannot exist 
if it is amorphous; instead, it defines itself and is to be defined in relation to the 
constituted. As a result, there is constant interdependence and movement between one 
and the other – that is one of the central claims of the thesis, directly leading to 
understanding ordering as progress. 
Ordering, understood as a process, might, at first, seem primarily Spinozist (some 
kind of immanent self-creation or self-reproduction) but there is a sense of a process 
in Schmitt as well. Not only is the essence of his sovereign decision its authoritative 
nature in performing temporary stabilising actions but also entire history was, for 
Schmitt, a continuous movement towards Last Judgement and an unfolding of the 
redemptive struggle between the agents of Christ and the agents of Antichrist. In fact, 
as it will be shown, even when Schmitt writes about stasis, it is not the opposite of 
kinesis. In fact, as it will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4, stasis, understood as 
movement and plurality within a seemingly unitary entity is crucial in understanding 
Schmitt‘s political theology. Hence, the two authors only represent different faces of 
ordering-as-process. But in order to understand ordering effectively, one unavoidably 
has to read both simultaneously, seeing any present situation as permanently moving 
between the two theories. 
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Ordering, inasmuch as it refers to human activity, is presumed to always be political. 
This is so because human ordering is always partial, there always is a could-have-
been-otherwise clause attached. Ordering is about choices and preferences – and 
political activity is understood in this thesis as a process of deciding on preferences 
and struggling to institute (or uphold) a chosen principle as the ordering principle of a 
community. There is, of course, also natural ordering, as studied in natural sciences, 
but the latter is not the object of this thesis. Also left out is the issue of non-human 
animals. Although the philosophical and scientific debate as to whether or, perhaps, to 
what extent characteristics previously used solely to define human action are 
extendable to other beings is certainly interesting, the analysis of ordering here is 
limited to its political and human aspect for the sake of clarity and focus but also due 
to the limitations set upon a thesis-length study. It is also not immaterial that neither 
Spinoza nor Schmitt were particularly interested in non-human animals and, therefore, 
the expansion of scope to other living beings would be very difficult. 
Next, the process of ordering, as already indicated, is analysed through its four core 
elements: the state, sovereignty, law, and politics. Here another clarification might be 
useful: whether these are analysed as concepts in themselves or as concepts of the 
relevant referents. In fact, under a perspective adopted here, the question is seen as 
immaterial: one looks at both simultaneously. This approach could be called a reverse 
Platonist – or, perhaps, slightly Kantian – one: what can be known are only concepts 
or ideas of things and, therefore, when we talk about a thing, we only talk about our 
concept or idea of that thing. Things-in-themselves remain in themselves. This is not 
to say that ‗reality‘ is completely created through words and definitions only: the 
actual experiences of living do limit the field of possibilities; however, such field is 
never completely closed either. Again, it is not the intention of this thesis to delve into 
the natural world and analyse the applicability of this outlook to natural objects but 
only to the social-political world. And in the social-political world, there is a two-way 
relationship between concepts and things, processes, or practices: on the one hand, 
elements of the social-political world actively shape our experience (and, thus, 
concepts) of them, while, on the other, these elements are limited, enabled, and shaped 
by the relevant concepts held by the individuals participating in them. For example, 
the concept of the state is affected by the actual practices of living in an entity referred 
to as ‗the state‘, while such experience-based idea can then serve as a normative 
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criterion for what is ascribed to ‗the state‘. Hence, the constitutive-constituted 
dynamic is manifest here as well. 
Certainly, the process of ordering can be studied under many different aspects and 
attributes. However, the four abovementioned ones are seen as crucial, representing 
both the structural and the dynamic aspects of ordering: the state, sovereignty, law, 
and politics. The state and sovereignty provide a broad outline of the political 
community within which ordering takes place (a kind of exoskeleton) – hence, they 
constitute the framework of ordering, providing the latter with form (sovereignty) and 
structure to maintain that form (state). Meanwhile, politics and law provide ordering 
with content and give substance to it. Moreover, the first element in each pair refers to 
the constituted and the second one – to the constitutive side, thus giving insight into 
the constitutive-constituted tension within those elements as well. 
Hereby, the presumed answer to the question of ordering begins to take shape. Firstly, 
ordering, as a process, is a movement between established arrangements of order and 
their challengers that, once victorious, solidify into new political orders themselves, 
thus signalling a constant creative and limiting, constitutive and constituted, interplay 
in which inclusions and exclusions, although crucial, are always only temporary. 
Nevertheless, the openness that characterises such model does not advance to the 
cognitive level, at least not usually: and this is, as it will be demonstrated, the domain 
of political theology that masks the tragic underpinnings of ordering, i.e. the constant 
need to choose between the equally groundless options of order-as-it-is and order-as-
it-is-to-be by positing one of the alternatives as something more than it actually is – 
otherwise, communal life would become unbearable. And due to that groundlessness, 
the process of ordering is going to continue in a circular motion from the constitutive 
to the constituted to the constitutive and so forth. Not only contingency, temporary 
stabilisation, ever-renewed contestation, and belief are crucial in understanding 
ordering in general and the state, sovereignty, law, and politics in particular – they are, 
in fact, the defining features of political entities, and to aspire for more would only 





Spinoza and Schmitt: Not at all Incompatible 
The choice of Spinoza and Schmitt necessitates some grounding. The two authors 
belong to very different historical periods, profess different outlooks, and their 
agendas differ significantly. More often than not, they are seen as incompatible, even 
diametrically opposed, and therefore any serious scholarly engagement with the two, 
especially with a view to constructing a model that includes both is as yet lacking. 
Nevertheless, there are apt reasons for analysing them together, especially since the 
model of ordering to be developed in this thesis rests not on a dialectic synthesis of 
the two theories but on a productive tension that constantly reactivates the question of 
ordering while still resisting final conclusion – a process of continuous reproduction. 
When read together in this way, the two authors can be seen as exposing the blind 
spots in one another‘s writings but, nevertheless, are insufficient on their own. In fact, 
that is the first substantial reason for reading Spinoza and Schmitt and doing so 
simultaneously: by permanently holding one another in tension and constantly coming 
on top of each other (e.g. Schmittian groundlessness being superseded by Spinoza‘s 
emphasis on the rationality of order, which is ultimately undone by that same 
underlying groundlessness, only to be replaced by yet another quest for stability 
through supposed rationality and so on), they reveal the paradigmatic process of 
ordering as constant struggle between stability and contestability. This revelation, 
however, is not something internal to a reading of Spinoza and Schmitt. In other 
words, the process of ordering is not analysed in this particular manner because of the 
thesis being based on these particular authors; instead, the authors have been chosen 
because they complement the analysis, enriching the model of ordering as process 
with crucial insights into the drives behind the perpetuation of ordering, adding a 
historical perspective (by representing different historical periods), and manifesting 
very different outlooks. 
Of course, there also are Spinoza‘s and Schmitt‘s contributions to understanding 
political ordering and its elements that further justify the selection of these particular 
authors. Crucially, for Spinoza, ordering is an instance of indistinction between 
collective and personal conatus. The state, therefore, refers to a collective striving for 
satisfaction but is also simultaneously an aggregation of individual strivings. 
Correspondingly, sovereignty is all about control of that indistinction, and law is seen 
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as a prosthetic device that directs all strivings towards greater perfection. Moreover, it 
is important to note Spinoza‘s emphasis on political association as natural, which is 
based on everything partaking in one substance. In contrast, for Schmitt, the state is 
primarily about substantive content – ideas – that are only subsequently 
institutionalised. Hence, whereas Spinoza theorises about agreement in nature and 
everybody‘s objective best interest, Schmitt is about contestation on a groundless 
terrain. Any unity exists only because the political community has choosen to unite 
and established that unity through a sovereign decision. That is the tragic choice of 
politics, which confers significantly more agency upon the political community than 
Spinoza would allow (in fact, for Spinoza there can hardly be political choice as such, 
since he denies the existence of free will). Schmitt strengthens the contestation at the 
heart of politics even further through his friend-enemy distinction and the primacy of 
the political (and yet, one has to not that for Schmitt enmity refers to the existence of a 
specific political community, whereas Spinoza‘s political enemy is also an enemy of 
the universal standard of reason). Then, for Schmitt, sovereignty, as a borderline 
concept, is more existential than it is for Spinoza: in Schmitt‘s theory, it refers to 
fundamental groundless decisions, whereas Spinoza sees it as a natural occurrence – a 
means of translating everybody‘s objective best interest into political practice. And 
law, for Schmitt, can only be about a momentary codification of a particular political 
community‘s existence rather than promoting some objective ideal. Hence, Schmitt 
shows the groundlessness of ordering that cannot be seen, whereas Spinoza shows 
what must be seen. 
Moreover, Spinoza and Schmitt, instead of remaining merely particular instances in 
the history of ideas, have inspired some significant strands of current political thinking 
– a fact that adds further relevance of an analysis of their thinking in relation to 
political ordering. Indeed, the reputations of Spinoza and Schmitt have increased quite 
rapidly during the last several decades after a prolonged period of neglect, during 
which they were viewed as too scandalous or inadequate (or both). However, they 
have come to influence rather different strands of thought. Schmitt came to signify 
irresolvable political struggle, irreconcilable tension within any community 
(especially in various critiques of liberalism), the unavoidability of ultimate, usually 
arbitrary, decisions (in some currents of critical legal theory) and a longing for a 
multipolar world order (in critical international relations theory). Spinoza, meanwhile, 
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has become topical among theorists of radical democracy and, generally, those who 
emphasise the primacy of the constitutive power, signifying the fullness, incessant 
creativity and self-sufficiency of political community. To some extent, this difference 
is embraced. However, contrary to mainstream approaches (fixity and certainty in the 
case of Schmitt, fullness of self-creation in Spinoza), both are considered to be 
theorists of inadequacy or deficit of existence, and that provides for a common ground 
of analysis. For both of them, political life is about striving to achieve an absent 
fullness, and reading both as referring to the same issue but, nevertheless, holding one 
another in perpetual tension helps to elucidate different strategies of dealing with that 
core deficit: the constitutive and the constituted ones. Hence, a productive tension is 
set up. 
Nevertheless, the strategy adopted in this thesis is not to delve into particular 
traditions of interpreting Spinoza and Schmitt. Although secondary literature is 
undoubtedly valuable, the aim here is to return to the sources, i.e. the writings of 
Spinoza and Schmitt themselves, hereby enjoying the benefit of some critical distance 
from current theoretical debates and thus being able to take the broader picture into 
account. It is, in fact, this broader picture of overarching principles that is seen to most 
significantly contribute to the analysis of the process of ordering. Also, the objective 
is not to provide some explicit corrections to today‘s interpretations of Spinoza and 
Schmitt (although critical engagement with particular elements of such interpretations 
is a necessary part of the analysis) but, rather, to reflect upon the broader framework 
of top-down and bottom-up approaches as being not opposed to one another but, 
rather, constantly interacting with one another and setting the process of ordering in 
perpetual motion and, through that, to present an outlook that simultaneously 
accommodates creativity and limitation in political communities, 
Then, there are the circumstances of their writing. Both Weimar Germany of 
Schmitt‘s time and the Dutch provinces of Spinoza‘s time were experiencing 
instability and upheaval which can always be traced in the background of Schmitt‘s 
and Spinoza‘s theories. To a significant extent, their writings were attempts to 
ameliorate the status quo and to provide for more stable and better-organised political 
life. Certainly, different contexts and different outlooks led them to develop theories 
that are very difficult to think of simultaneously but, notably, signify the breadth of 
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possibilities of how to deal with relatively similar challenges. Also, Spinoza and 
Schmitt have lived through what could be seen as different ends of a distinct period of 
political ordering. At the time of Spinoza‘s writing, the Westphalian state reached its 
full recognition. Meanwhile, Schmitt‘s writing stretches the two world wars and 
beyond – the period when the state clearly started to decline. Here again a potential 
for establishing a productive tension between the two theories is ripe. 
In fact, the tension between groundlessness and belief in a singular order – one 
reflected in the Schmittian and Spinozist theories – is central to today‘s world. On the 
one hand, there is a notable – and increasing – scepticism about any grand narratives 
and ultimate truths, at least in the West. On the other hand, there is always the need 
for some form of belief: an awareness of living under mere contingency would be 
hardly, if at all, bearable. For this reason, one needs a framework that is both non-
essentialist and capable of providing certainty at the same time. Hence, Spinoza and 
Schmitt not only biographically and thematically represent the different thrusts of 
ordering but also contribute, when considered simultaneously, to the integration of 
what would otherwise be contradictory trends of today‘s life. 
Finally, it is crucial that the theory of ordering is not internal to a specific perspective 
but, instead, can be built across such perspectives. With this in mind, simultaneous 
reading of Spinoza and Schmitt, as it is developed in the last chapter, reveals one more 
inner tension in the dynamic of ordering. Spinoza is here read as a ‗hyperrationalist‘, 
someone who radicalised the Enlightenment rationalist tradition even further, 
especially as manifested by his Ethics – essentially, an effort to deduce both natural 
and moral philosophy through the geometrical method. Spinoza‘s is a completely 
mechanistic universe, fully determined by the relations of cause and effect, by which 
even God-qua-Nature was bound and, most importantly, ordered according to absolute 
reason towards which both individuals and communities must aspire. Schmitt, 
meanwhile, was someone who strove to reintroduce theological thinking into politics, 
and his ideas have deep religious (specifically, Roman Catholic) undertones. That left 
Schmitt both asserting the primacy of belief over knowledge and manifesting deep 
scepticism about the human condition more generally. This bipolar presence, it will be 
shown, displays the breadth of the spectrum of ordering and allows one to grasp the 
perpetual movement that characterises any particular political community. Hence, it is 
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beyond doubt that Spinoza and Schmitt professed very different outlooks. That 
difference, however, is a crucial contribution to the overall argument: even such 
different positions – in fact, it must be stressed, precisely because they are so different 
– allow for a framework of a continuous reproduction of ordering where 
groundlessness and the need for (and presence of) particular standards not only 
coexist but also complement one another. 
There is, admittedly, a potential issue as to the faithfulness of reading as the 
interpretations of Spinoza and Schmitt, especially in the final chapter, are not always 
entirely conventional. Most notably, Schmitt is seen to manifest a form of weak 
immanence whereas Spinoza is argued to have been concerned with stability and 
limitation of the infinite creativity of the multitude through an ultimate standard 
(reason). In other words, Spinoza is usually seen as a representative of the constitutive 
and Schmitt of the constituted.
5
 At first sight, therefore, it might appear that the 
interaction between the two authors is based on Spinoza who has been Schmittianised 
and Schmitt who has been Spinozised. That, however, is not the case: as the thesis 
demonstrates, especially through the discussion of their views on sovereignty and 
politics and the metaphysical preconditions thereof, such interpretation is simply a 
logical consequence of the ideas and thrusts already inherent in Spinoza‘s and 
Schmitt‘s writings. And such reconsideration only adds more impetus to reading the 
two authors together. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis, as already indicated, is centred on the four crucial aspects of political 
ordering: the state, sovereignty, law, and politics as conceived through a perspective 
informed by Spinoza and Schmitt, allowing an interactive model of political ordering 
to be formulated in the final chapter. The first part of this thesis assesses the current 
state of the debate around the four concepts, followed by an analysis of both the 
                                                          
5
 Among other representatives of the above interpretations, one could include, for example, Balibar 
(1997, 1998), Curley (1969, 1988), Deleuze (1988), Del Lucchese (2009) Gatens and Lloyd (2002), 
Hampshire (1978, 2005), Negri (2004, 2008, 2010 and his other writings) for Spinoza and Agamben 
(1998), Balakrishnan (2000), Bates (2006), Bendersky (1983), Gross (2007), Kelly (2003), Kennedy 
(2004), Marder (2010), Dyzenhaus (1999a), Salter (2012) for Schmitt. Notably, several other authors, 
e.g. Meier (1998, 2006) or Ojakangas (2006), take a more nuanced stance on Schmitt‘s supposed 
preference for the constituted. 
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Spinozist and the Schmittian accounts of ordering, and finally, providing a model of 
ordering as process. The present author‘s stance is that both the themes and the 
authors on whose writings the present research is based have to be accorded due 
respect. Of course, a degree of subjectivity through the framing of the question, 
selection of issues and viewpoints as well as prioritising some passages in the relevant 
writings over others is both unavoidable and necessary. Some subtleties of tone in 
presenting different viewpoints will, almost certainly, betray the present author‘s 
position as well, either intentionally or unintentionally. However, it is intentional that, 
in the first three chapters, the author takes a step back, only providing commentary 
and guidance where necessary for the integrity of the thesis. The fourth chapter, 
meanwhile, is intended to bring all the voices together into a theory of ordering 
through extensive authorial intervention. 
The first chapter investigates some of the existing literature on the state, sovereignty, 
law, and politics. It is not aimed at providing a full and definitive account of the 
scholarly debate but rather at giving an overview of some major trends. Generally, 
most of the theories outlined view sovereignty and the state as either doomed or, at 
least, undergoing significant change, with only a minority seeing major continuities 
with the past. Meanwhile, the theories of law and politics are presented in three 
clusters that see them either as shaped by occasional interruptions of everyday 
monotony, as engaging in a quest for stability and fixity, or as the site of perpetual 
struggle between deep-seated agendas and commitments. Such exposition not only 
helps to set up the problem of ordering as a process involving conflicting demands 
and thrusts but also reveals the partiality of the existing literature: although the major 
theories are not seen as incorrect in their entirety, they only reveal an aspect or one 
side of the whole complex process of ordering. 
The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of Spinoza. First of all, some basic 
issues of his natural and metaphysical philosophy have to be looked at. Crucially, this 
part of Spinoza‘s thought underlies and informs his political philosophy and, 
therefore, cannot be ignored. Only subsequently can Spinoza‘s political theory proper 
be analysed. Here, the two basic pairs – state and sovereignty, law and politics – are 
again paramount. Most importantly, the role of the state in ensuring communal 
cohesion and joint progression towards greater reason has to be elucidated. Crucially, 
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Spinoza made the state a core point of reference, which allows all other political 
elements to flourish. Sovereignty, meanwhile, acts as the highest authority, unlimited 
and unchecked in principle but limited in practice by the right as power doctrine. 
Then, Spinoza‘s understanding of law is important. By being a human convention 
only, law is a flexible and yet absolutely vital and authoritative tool of making humans 
act as if they were reasonable. Finally, politics, despite being curtailed by Spinoza‘s 
overreliance on reason, is a crucial way of ensuring the interrelationship between the 
multitude and the authorities or – in the case of democracy – constant immanent 
movement towards ever sounder reason. 
After that, an analysis of Schmitt‘s writings is provided. First, as in Spinoza, some 
metaphysical preconditions have to be enquired into. Then, the analysis moves to the 
state as the ultimate institutional-spatial locus of politics and its role in expressing and 
upholding the political community. Closely related to and even presupposed by the 
state is the concept of the political and the corresponding division between friends and 
enemies which animates political life and helps to define both the community and the 
individual. This division, coupled with the groundless nature of human existence, 
necessitates sovereignty as the ability to decide and establish order. Sovereignty, 
however, is far from straightforward and, therefore, the problems of where 
sovereignty lies, who is sovereign when conflicting demands arise, and the 
relationship between sovereignty and the tragic will have to be looked at. Then, the 
nature of law, as the expression of the political community‘s will and existence, 
contingent and mutable on the one hand, and necessitating quasi-religious belief on 
the other, is paramount. After all, Schmitt‘s ultimate concern was prevention of chaos, 
and law was a crucial tool for that. Finally, politics for Schmitt is the essence of 
communal existence, the expression of a community‘s lack of finality and closure. 
Political struggle would then only cease with the end of time. 
Lastly, the final chapter will revisit the four core elements of ordering from a 
Spinozist-Schmittian perspective with a view to producing an interactive model in 
which the constitutive and the constituted, represented, at various instances, by 
Spinoza and Schmitt, are holding each other in permanent tension while any status 
quo is only temporary and caught in the midst of a circular motion from the 
constitutive to the constituted, then back to the constitutive and so forth. The deficit of 
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existence, as evidenced in the preceding discussion, is the drive for this constant 
change, always putting individuals in-between the tragic moment of political risk and 
the quasi-theological structure of belief, thus simultaneously implying creativity in 
inventing ever new forms of ordering as well as limitation to such open-ended drive. It 
is argued that Spinoza and Schmitt, when read simultaneously but not in a synthesis, 
can provide an essential toolkit for conceptualising this movement. And that constant 
movement of continuous reproduction is at the heart of ordering. 
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1. The Four Elements of Ordering 
The tensions and transformations revealed in this chapter constitute the context, the 
preconditions, and the substance of the question of ordering. As already indicated, 
throughout this thesis, ordering is being analysed under its four core elements: the 
state, sovereignty, law, and politics that, between themselves, constitute the 
framework (the state and sovereignty) and the content (law and politics) of the process 
of ordering. The first step towards rethinking these four concepts is to evaluate the 
current state of the discourse surrounding them. It is not the aim of this chapter to 
provide an exhaustive outline of the entire debate. Instead, some key strands of 
thought, indicative of the spectrum of standpoints will be discussed. An attempt will 
be made to identify the key trends, or clusters of approaches, tentative as they may be. 
None of these theories and their groupings are to be discarded as completely incorrect 
and without use but, equally, neither is seen as adequate on its own. Instead, all are to 
be seen as partial, i.e. referring to some crucial aspect of ordering and yet missing the 
broader picture; nevertheless, the revelations of each still contribute to a theory of 
ordering through both the claims and the omissions of the particular standpoints. 
Hence, the chapter not only constitutes a preparatory ground for the Spinozist and 
Schmittian readings of ordering but will also inform the theory of ordering proposed 
in the final chapter. 
This chapter consists of four parts, each dedicated to one of the core concepts. First of 
all, the state – the institutional structure that upholds the political community as a 
particular entity – is looked at, and the core issue is the ongoing transformation of the 
global system. Quite naturally, then, the theories of the state can be grouped under 
three main banners: those seeing the state as obsolete, those seeing the state as 
surviving with some major changes, and those postulating the prevalence of the state 
more or less as it is. The same also applies to the second part, dedicated to an analysis 
of the current discourse on sovereignty. This correspondence comes as no surprise as 
these two concepts have traditionally been closely linked together. The three 
approaches to the state and sovereignty have clear implications to the analysis of 
ordering. If both the state, as the exoskeleton of the political community and of the 
latter‘s own process of ordering, and sovereignty, as an act through which a particular 
shape of that exoskeleton is established, are to become irrelevant, replaced by some 
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form of global humanity and/or global democracy, the entire process of ordering 
would lose its shape, no longer referring to a political community but rather to some 
amorphous and inertic universalist entity. Political communities then would no longer 
be able to fully determine themselves, being rendered subservient to global 
normativity. On the other hand, prevalence of the state and sovereignty in their earlier 
rigid forms, while certainly preserving a political community‘s right to determine its 
own process of ordering, would ignore the increasingly important interplay between 
local, translocal, and global norms, rendering any future analysis inadequate. In fact, 
the tension between those different approaches helps, in the final chapter, to construct 
a fuzzier, more dispersed model of political ordering which, nevertheless, is still 
concrete enough to act as a basic principle of communal life. 
The third part of the chapter looks at the different approaches to law – the instituted 
content of ordering and, perhaps, the clearest expression of a political community‘s 
self-determination. Again, three different clusters of ideas can be identified: law in 
context, law in itself, and law as secondary. All of those theories represent different 
ways of stabilising the content of ordering and, especially the first two, serve to 
provide their unique strategies to legitimise these temporary stabilisations. Theories of 
law in itself could be called true theologies of law, whence it suffices that law is as it 
is for it to hold ultimate normative value. Such theories leave the process of ordering 
moderately open, since even the fundamental norms can change, causing an overhaul 
of the entire system but, nevertheless, there is a strong element of limitation as well. 
Then, theories of law in context tend to see in law an expression of some higher value, 
thus seemingly conferring permanence upon present arrangements or, at least, setting 
forth an ultimate telos independent of the political community that particular laws 
relate to. Such theories tend to aspire towards order rather than ordering, severely 
limiting the creative role of the political community. Finally, theories of law as 
secondary, i.e. subservient to other processes and conditions within society, albeit 
coming much closer than others to revealing the contingent and power-laden nature of 
law, tend to, especially in the more critical approaches, instil a certain aura of 
helplessness, thus diminishing the drive for change. Hence, such theories are, in a 
way, less open than those preferring law in itself. The same tripartite division also 
applies to the discussion on politics in part four of the chapter. The three main groups 
of ideas, in this case, are the following: politics-as-consent, politics-as-dissent, and 
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politics as occasional. Politics-as-consent and politics-as-dissent represent two 
radically opposed thrusts in ordering: a drive towards limitation and stability (i.e. 
order) and unleashing of the creative potential of the political community at the 
expense of stability, respectively. The process of ordering is, hence, caught between 
finality and openness. Theories of politics as occasional, meanwhile, do show the 
structural obstacles that obstruct the free flow of the process of ordering while unduly 
limiting the principle of ordering itself by relegating real political action to the 
margins. 
 
1.1. The Framework: State and Sovereignty 
Sovereignty and the state are closely interrelated concepts that, according to the 
Westphalian understanding, constitute two sides of the same coin. They also represent 
different sides of the framework of political ordering, referring to the constitutive 
(sovereignty) and the constituted (the state) elements of it. Nevertheless, the current 
role and importance of both have become increasingly debatable. Therefore, in order 
to answer the question of ordering, one first needs to dwell into the current debate 
around sovereignty and the state, teasing out the main currents of thought on both 
concepts. That is especially the case because the state and sovereignty are seen to 
represent principles paramount to the very question of political ordering. Only when 
that stage is set, a Spinozist-Schmittian intervention into the question of ordering is 
possible. 
 
1.1.1. The Fading Away of the State? 
Admittedly, a general theory of the state seems hardly, if at all, possible to derive (see 
e.g. Lister and Marsh 2006). Still, there seems to be an agreement that the state is 
undergoing significant changes in the wake of globalisation, increasing 
interdependence, migration, advances in communication technologies, and other 
developments that characterise today‘s world. Increasing cooperation is now 
necessary in such areas as international commerce, environmental issues, human 
rights, global health challenges etc. (see e.g. Trachtman 2013: 253). However, the 
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degree of those changes is far from clear. The state has traditionally been seen as 
forming ‗a scheme of intelligibility‘, providing an authoritative interpretation of how 
things are to be perceived, simultaneously being an idea and its embodiment, a body, 
and a work constantly in progress, provider of both freedom and belonging (Loughlin 
2010: 208). Clearly, the standard definition remains that of Max Weber: ‗the state is a 
community enjoying a monopoly of legitimate power over a certain territory‘ (Weber 
1991: 78). The problem is that the exact nature and content of the community is far 
from self-evident. Moreover, it appears that, in the modern world, the state monopoly 
of legitimate power is, if not truly broken, severely challenged while the importance 
of territory has, arguably, declined with globalisation and the advent of cyberspace. 
Generally, three different degrees of suggested change can be identified: first, the state 
as generally maintaining its essential characteristics; second, the state as surviving but 
changing significantly; finally, the state as becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
 
Claiming the State’s Survival 
For some at least, one of the ‗most salient and enduring features‘ of the state is its 
ability to survive constant historical and political changes (Chernilo 2007: 160-161). 
Regardless of the constraints on the actual exercise of ultimate authority, the state is 
still seen by some as ‗the supreme law-making and enforcing agency for society‘, 
‗responsible for determining the rules which govern all power relations in society‘, 
thus being ‗the site of intense struggle‘ to control ultimate meaning (Beetham 2013: 
121). As such, ‗the state to a great extent retains its central position in selecting and 
legitimating policy goals‘ (Peters and Pierre 2006: 219). The state remains a ‗structure 
of intelligibility‘: a system of meanings which ‗collectively embody the various 
judgments that the citizens of the state have made about how things really are‘ 
(Steinberger 2004: 13). It stems from the people, describes the people, and also exists 
for the people, arranging their diverse worldviews in an orderly and intelligible 
manner. Essentially, there is something more to the state than territory, military might, 
or even population: an idea (Steinberger 2004: 13-14). And therein the power of the 
state is said to reside. 
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Even though cooperation and interdependency are on the rise, the state is still, for 
adherents of this perspective at least, rather firmly ‗in the driver‘s seat‘ and able to 
stand its ground. Furthermore, the argument goes, there is clearly no demos at the 
international level, hence global decision-making processes lack transparency and are 
made on a technocratic rather than political level, leaving the state the only truly 
legitimate and representative body (Sørensen 2006: 196). From a normative 
perspective, the survival of the state might be seen as a crucial counterbalance to the 
rising international normativity: the state, by being a concrete body representing a 
political community with its values and its own political choices, must check the 
abstract and essentially empty international community (Kalpokas 2015). And, despite 
all the talk about globalisation and production of a single global order, there has, 
arguably, never been a single-speed globalisation and the changes are not identical in 
all countries (Ukpere 2014). Clearly, these theories do put forward an important point: 
the need for a bounded structure of intelligibility and a core idea that provides 
structure for fidelity and orientation. As will be argued throughout the thesis, humans, 
being incapable of achieving absolute fullness and self-identity, cannot achieve global 
universality either. In fact, it will be demonstrated, universality as such is impossible 
but is, rather, a sign of a particularity posing as something more than it is or can be. 
Hence, the state represents a crucial principle of humanity‘s fragmentation and of 
particular groups being true representatives of their own identities and interests. 
Nevertheless, whether the state will retain its current form is a completely different 
matter. 
As is clear from the length of this overview, state-centric theories are in a minority. 
Nevertheless, they do express several crucial features that contribute to the principle 
of division, seen in this thesis as necessary: a uniting idea, an expression of 
humanity‘s diversity, a body of a demos, and a counterbalance to the global 
uniformity of ordering. 
 
The Changing Nature of the State 
The second perspective presumes that the state will change significantly, sometimes 
even beyond recognition, but, nevertheless, retain some important function. Clearly, 
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the role of states as independent actors has been constrained. Hence, significant 
transformations have to take place in order to adapt to the new, globalised, 
environment (see e.g. Marks 2000: 76; Tierney 2006: 3), in which the state‘s functions 
have been increasingly integrated into international regimes (Capps 2006: 73). 
Whereas traditionally state governments had exclusive power and authority within 
their territories, currently emphasis is on a mixture of local, national, and international 
levels, involving not only governments but also non-governmental organisations, 
international institutions, and other non-state bodies (Sørensen 2006: 194), supposedly 
leading to a ‗global polity‘ (Ougaard and Higgott 2002), even though we are not there 
yet. However, there might still be a caveat: certainly, the effect of globalisation and 
proliferation of norms has not been the same for the internationally dominant states, 
which are often the creators of norms, and for the weaker states, which are usually 
consumers of both global norms and culture. 
Internal matters of states have, according to many, become matters of international 
concern – clearly, states can no longer claim a monopoly of independent action 
(Schermers 2002: 186). The state is no longer the sole guarantor of rights – in fact, it 
now occupies a subservient position, with the international human rights regime 
taking centre stage, breaking up the traditional citizenship-rights nexus (Rosenau 
1997: 282; Sørensen 2006: 197). Even more so, usually, the picture is one of a world 
of states that only have rights as a reward for good behaviour, granted from outside 
(Tesón, 2014: 394). States, still being important in ordering their respective 
populations, are seen to have become tools for either implementing global strategies 
locally or achieving global ends. Under the former view, the state has a crucial role in 
implementing and guaranteeing human rights within their borders (Alston and 
Macdonald 2008: 84-85). But this function has to be strictly controlled: after all, it is 
argued, the global community has reached a point when ‗a violation of right in one 
part of the world is felt everywhere‘ (Alston and Macdonald 2008: 86-87). 
Nevertheless, the model of ordering proposed in this thesis suggests that the above 
position misses a crucial point: the state is not a body in and of itself but, rather, a 
collective body of a political community. And, although such communities cannot be 
imagined to lead completely monadic existences, they equally cannot be seen as 
supervised by an absent centre. If some common normative universe is to be 
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imagined, it would be characterised by free exchange of particularities rather than by 
dominance of a single particularity that poses as universality. 
Definitely, the new communications technologies allow for instant global connections, 
bringing forth grievances and enabling global rallying even behind causes that are 
both geographically and culturally remote for the supporters (Wenman 2009: 115). 
The state, therefore, remains a structure devoid of its exclusivity and dignity, 
struggling to maintain at least the appearance of its governmental apparatus and 
craving for clearly defined borders (Brown 2010: 24). In addition, the state is seen as 
hardly remaining the unitary integrated actor it once was. National and political 
identity has indeed been weakened by globalisation and migration, making it 
increasingly difficult to create a strong communal framework within state borders and 
calling into question the established practices of membership within a state (Benhabib 
2004: 4; Khan 2012: 149). The unity and identity of the state is often challenged by 
the presence of migrants with different traditions, cultures, languages, and lifestyles, 
putting in doubt the nature of the society that the state purports to embody (Castles, de 
Haas and Miller 2014: 18-20). Even within the traditional populations, demands for 
secession, autonomy, and greater recognition are on the rise, leading to further 
fragmentation (Castells 1998; Sørensen 2006). The state is also significantly affected 
by the movements of the ‗native‘ population, both within and outside borders. In fact, 
it ‗permanently faces crises that threaten to undermine its alleged homogeneity and 
severe its supposed unity‘ (Chernilo 2007: 160). Thus, the current processes of 
globalisation are seen to challenge the traditional assumption of the state as ‗the 
container of social process‘ and the presumption of the national and the global as two 
opposed levels (Sassen 2007: 1). A particular territory, although formally still 
delimited by state borders, is becoming increasingly ‗denationalised‘ and destabilised, 
thus losing its importance as an exclusive point of reference (Sassen 1997: 61). Since 
some of the crucial objections to such approaches will be laid out at a later stage, it 
perhaps suffices to indicate that far from signalling an end to the existence of decisive 
groupings, such changes in fact call for reinterpretation of formal and informal 




The ties that once linked the members of a state and simultaneously excluded them 
from other political communities are being challenged in a globalising world of 
increased transnational bonding of individuals and prevalence of universal or regional 
normative structures (Linklater 1998: 114) as well as international material and 
cultural flows and links (Benhabib 2004: 4). Generally, the state is no longer an 
equivocal centre of politics and power or a body that guarantees the collective good – 
instead, one can observe ‗a hollowing out of the state, decreasing legitimacy for 
collective solutions, and a marketisation of the state itself‘ (Pierre 2000: 2). Real 
power, instead, is seen as exerted through a multi-level of governance where different 
authorities – from local to supranational – interact (and compete) in decision-making 
(Smith 2006: 32). Because of this increasing global interdependence, one is urged to 
‗[s]top imagining the international system as a system of states‘: although the state 
still remains an important actor, it is ‗disaggregated‘ and better described through its 
parts, with those parts participating in networks of their own, creating a globe of 
crisscrossing connections that are deemed to be both more effective and more just 
than the earlier state-centred system (Slaughter 2004: 5-7, 31-33, 263). Such 
interconnectedness, supposedly, ‗could create a genuine global rule of law without 
centralized global institutions‘ (Slaughter 2004: 261). However, while the formal state 
structure is indeed being hollowed out in favour of transnational institutions and 
networks (as it will be argued later, this also necessitates embracing a more fluid 
understanding of sovereignty), the primacy of interacting autonomous governmental 
bodies has to be resisted due to being premised on relegation of the political 
community and primacy of autonomous bureaucratic structures that no longer bear 
any relation to a demos. In line with the fluid interrelatedness advocated in the final 
chapter, a more adequate (and normatively preferable) form of global 
interconnectedness would be one between particular demoi (or parts of them), 
participating in free exchange of norms and ideas, although without prejudice to the 
internal decisive capacity of such communities. 
 
Discarding the State 
Under the third, and most radical, perspective, the future of the state has become 
increasingly uncertain, with some even asserting ‗the imminent demise of the state‘, at 
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least in the sense we know it (Wissenburg 2009: 1). The future states are to be nothing 
more than ‗faceless institutions and organizations attributing or delegating rights 
within communities and territories‘ through impersonal bureaucratic procedures 
(Wissenburg 2009: 2). Moreover, traditional notions of solidarity are seen to have 
expanded from bounded communities to, potentially, global society where ‗the 
broadest inclusion possible‘ is the aim; such solidarity supposedly connects people 
across places and, therefore, traditional (including state-level) communities become 
things of the past (Coicaud 2008: 3-4). The state, for these authors at least, is not only 
incapable of sustaining itself but also undesirable: it is said to only entrench hierarchy, 
exert control and violence, and create false divisions not only between communities 
but also in individual life (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000). Even if there still is a 
particular role for states to play, it is perceived as completely subservient to a global 
telos. States, as long as they are democratic, are said to lead towards a more 
democratic global system and, in fact, global democracy (Peters 2009a: 265). But then 
again, the ultimate source of authority is in the people and, therefore, it would be 
illogical for people to be dependent on states as intermediaries – instead, they should 
be able to participate in international democracy directly (Peters 2009a: 265-266). 
Hence, states, having brought about international democracy, would have exhausted 
themselves (Peters 2009a: 298). 
Humans, seen by the proponents of the post-statist approach as finally breaking free 
from the institutional structures that had previously subsumed and ordered them, are 
supposed to themselves now take centre stage (see, for example, Kaldor, 2007 and 
2012; Martin and Owen 2010; Stahn and Melber, 2014). Consequently, human 
security becomes a fundamental priority of a modern state in both foreign and 
domestic policy – that includes not only the security of a state‘s own citizens but also 
that of the entire humanity (Axworthy, 2012: 4-5). As a result, the state cannot remain 
a viable object of defence any longer; instead, proponents of such a view would see it 
merely as an instrumental institution designed to facilitate human security (Weiss, 
2012: 26). States are not even perceived as the makers of international law: the latter 
would no longer be strictly international law but rather ‗humanity‘s law‘, of which 
‗the status of the human‘ is the cornerstone (Teitel 2011: 32). However, the above 
emphasis on universal humanity and universal democracy once again misses the 
relevant level of analysis. As it will be shown in the subsequent discussion of Spinoza 
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and, especially, Schmitt, one unavoidably must search for particular communities and 
their own modes of ordering. A drive for universality is, it will be argued, a quest for 
an impossible fullness, an attempt to cover the deficit of existence that lies at the heart 
of human subjectivity. Such imaginary finality might be necessary politically in order 
to rally support. At an analytical level, however, one must not succumb to the allure of 
some particular group, which tries to solidify its cause by reinforcing it with some 
added universalist dignity. 
Identities and lived environments no longer necessarily coincide and political loyalties 
become dispersed. In such an environment cosmopolitan norms ‗create a universe of 
meaning, values, and social relations that had not existed before‘ (Benhabib 2006: 72). 
As states fall into disarray and gradually dissolve, shared sensibility and a feeling of 
common belonging are said to take hold, paving way for global citizenship and global 
belonging. Moreover, it is claimed that the very nature of selfhood has changed, 
increasingly precluding stable and guaranteed identities pegged to a state-structure. 
The modern subject is often presented as liquid, lacking shape and form, devoid of 
any guidelines and benchmarks, lacking pre-given attributes and consumed by ever-
increasing speed and expansion (Bauman, 2000) or weak, fragmented and in a 
constant need to reinvent itself in a world of risk (Beck, 1992). No longer are people 
seen as bound by territorial patterns of control, thus paving way for increased 
pluralisation, freedom, and ability to choose one‘s self on a global scale: in essence, 
for world citizenship (Beck, 1999). Even local or national problems, then, are 
increasingly acquiring an international dimension, being addressed through global 
movements: the new level of politics would then be cosmopolitan activism or ‗global 
domestic politics‘ (Beck, 2012). Nevertheless, as it will be shown, such an approach 
would, just as well, concentrate on an imaginary closure only, locating the process of 
ordering on the wrong (integrated global) level. 
Others would replace the state as supreme authority and representative of the people 
with an ‗all-affected principle‘: those affected by an institution or phenomenon would 
be able to address their justice claims directly, independently of their territorial 
belonging (Fraser 2010: 24). Especially in the modern world, stakeholders are not 
necessarily limited to particular states but may be dispersed regionally or globally and, 
therefore, solutions to problems require global participation – one only needs to 
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consider environmental issues, global businesses, natural disasters, or human rights 
violations (Archibugi 2004: 443-444). After all, the theory goes, one‘s ability to live a 
good life is no longer wholly dependent on the state and, therefore, the state should 
not claim exclusivity. In a similar fashion, some deliberative democrats would suggest 
that not state borders but deliberative networks are crucial, and those have become 
increasingly transnational, shifting the locus of power itself (Dryzek 2002: 6-7). 
Internally as well, formal state structure is often seen as outdated or not up to 
standard. Still others, although proceeding from different premises, also reach a 
similar conclusion: modern communications media, and especially social networks, 
build communities that transcend state boundaries; although unstable and fleeting, 
organised around certain issues and grievances only, these communities, nevertheless, 
expand a state‘s citizenry across the globe (Stefanidis et al 2013: 116-117). 
The above arguments definitely have some value: human identities have become more 
fluid, especially since today‘s environment is characterised by fast-paced change and 
ever-increasing connectivity (physical, informational, and online), while at least some 
issues clearly accumulate global, or at least regional, interest. In fact, the very nature 
of being affected might need to be enhanced to include not only a direct physical stake 
but also an emotional stake, i.e. affection through being exposed to information. At 
the very least, the principle of bounded communities is imbued with fluidity: whatever 
combination a particular identity acquires at a particular moment (and the state still is 
an element of identity: a state of citizenship, a state of residence, or a state of 
affection), is a decisive one when it matters. That, essentially, is a way of reconciling 
modern fluidity with the potential for political action (the latter, as argued in this 
thesis, being about the ability to choose and not to merely float around). 
Some of the proposed ways forward include ‗autonomous movement‘ of the 
multitude, ‗new geography‘ characterised by ‗productive flows of bodies‘, 
cooperation across entire humanity, collective existence, communicative networks etc. 
(Hardt and Negri 2000: 397-402). As a result, denial of the very distinction between 
native and non-native is not inconceivable. In fact, then, ‗once the territorial 
dimension of citizenship is shattered by globalization, it becomes a cosmopolitan 
project‘ (Negri 2008: 118). The territorial dimension is, accordingly, being replaced 
by the global movement and creative potentiality of an (almost) indefinable multitude 
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(Negri 2008: 169). For others as well, ‗human life is based on and in movement‘ 
which characterises ‗life as potential‘ (Thrift 2008: 5). Certainly, a fixed and bounded 
state, requiring stability and fidelity, is very much at odds with this outlook. After all, 
the general mood is that the world has entered a kind of ‗postnational‘ stage (see e.g. 
Habermas 2001; Pensky 2008; Krisch 2010). This also corresponds to a plurality or 
legal orders which co-exist and overlap, delimiting plural and overlapping legal 
spaces and communities (Lindahl 2013: 102). Quite explicitly, this outlook is one of 
unbounded constitutive power, without the referent of the constituted. And yet, 
arguably, moderation is needed. Although movements and flows are vital in today‘s 
world, they do not take place in a single political community but, instead, between and 
within them. These communities may no longer strictly coincide with state borders 
and the market of identifications has indeed expanded beyond the state. As for the 
fictional nature of the state, that is nothing new either. In fact, the state has always 
been, first and foremost, an embodiment of a political community rather than an 
artefact in and of itself. As it remains to be seen throughout this thesis, changes in 
today‘s world have merely brought more diversity and fluidity into the principle of 
division rather than fundamentally challenging the premises of ordering. 
In the light of the broader assertions of this thesis, it is not absolutely crucial that the 
state as we know it survives. What is important is the survival of the principle that the 
state represents: one of political division and distinction. In essence, there needs to be 
a particular referent of ordering (the political community), distinguishable from other 
collective bodies and the wider context. It might be suggested, however, that what the 
competing theories of the state indicate is not a challenge to the process of ordering 
but merely a potential sign of multiplication of the loci of ordering: political 
communities may be expressed and upheld not necessarily by states only but also by 
other collective bodies, as long as the latter are not universal. And yet, at least one 
trend – the drive for automatic ascription of universal norms without the political 
community itself being able to choose – is a worrying one. As it is argued throughout 
the thesis, the constitutive and the constituted must permanently hold one another in 
tension; however, the aforementioned universalist drive clearly indicates something 
completely different, i.e. the primacy of the constituted. After all, as long as political 
borders and the bounds of humanity do not correspond (ant it is argued here that it is 
impossible for them to correspond), any conflict can be solved by political means; 
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meanwhile, once a common telos of humanity is presupposed and global normativity 
embraced, the dissenter not only becomes a political enemy (to use a Schmittian term) 
– in fact, the enemy loses the status of being human or, at least, membership in 
universal humanity. 
1.1.2. The Indeterminate Fate of Sovereignty 
Traditionally, sovereignty has been understood as the ultimate power to decide on the 
form of a political entity, initially signalling absolute power of the monarch and then 
self-determination of the political community and such; on the international sphere, it 
has come to denote a threshold beyond which no outside interference is acceptable. 
However, the modern world, arguably, is changing at a faster pace than ever before, 
and ultimate political authority, legitimacy of any ordering power, and the (perceived 
or real) democratic deficit at both national and supranational levels have increasingly 
become objects of concern. As ever, there are both those who regret change and those 
who feel that the changes are not radical enough, with innumerable positions in-
between. 
In what follows, some of the dominant theories will be outlined, with reformulation of 
sovereignty being left for the last chapter. Nevertheless, what is analysed here carries 
enormous weight for the entire thesis: after all, ordering, as defined here, refers to a 
political community‘s continuous act of self-determination through interplay between 
its own constitutive thrust and the constituted counterpart which, just as well, refers to 
that particular community only. Just like the state represents the principle of division, 
sovereignty refers to self-determination. Hence, it is crucial that sovereignty prevails, 
albeit in a somewhat modified form. Here, again, one encounters a certain anti-
globalist inclination of the thesis, although the final chapter attempts, among other 
things, to provide some reconciliation between sovereignty and the globalising world 
environment. 
 
Doing Away with Sovereignty 
More often than not, sovereignty has a bad name in contemporary political and legal 
thought. Taken to the extreme, the very tenets of sovereignty may be seen as 
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‗necessarily unjust, as they allegedly imply a power to abuse people with impunity‘ 
(Endicott 2010: 245). As a result, a weakening or demise of sovereignty is often 
welcomed. The general presumption appears to be, then, that ‗the rules of 
international law, based on the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, self-
determination, and domestic jurisdiction are anachronistic today, as is the frame of an 
international society of sovereign states‘ (Cohen 2012: vii). Instead a new, law-based 
global community ‗with its own sense of identity, values, vision, and solidarity‘ is 
supposedly taking root (Kritsiotis 1997: 409). Furthermore, the sovereignty-state 
nexus is perceived to be losing its privileged position vis-à-vis non-state actors, the 
latter playing an ever more important role in global politics and normativity 
(McCorquodale 2011: 424). In fact, some would easily trace the roots of non-state 
actor sovereignty within conventional sovereignty itself (see, notably, Barkan 2013). 
Inclusion of various movements and organisations is seen as a progressive move 
towards opening up new spaces for politics and freedom (Chandler 2007: 151). 
It is, then, not surprising that one is led to think of sovereignty as, for example, 
‗organised hypocrisy‘, a fiction sustained by the powerful states for their own sake 
(Krasner 1999; Krasner 2010) or as a discursive construction rather than an objective 
entity or quality (Malmvig 2006; Troper 2010: 133-134). In such rendering, 
sovereignty becomes ‗some metaphysical or, better, theological conception of 
absolute identity‘, no longer compatible with the modern world (Bates, 2012: 4). If 
one takes such view, sovereignty only ever came about because ‗a certain 
configuration of power has brought some variable features of a way of life […] appear 
to be ―necessary‖, or ―natural‖, and […] universal‘ (Guardiola-Rivera 2010: 187-188). 
And yet, these theories are only partly correct. What they succeed in identifying, is the 
void at the heart of sovereignty: it cannot be what it is supposed to be. Sovereignty as 
a completely objective essence is impossible; rather, it is about temporal fixity 
established through power relations. Even its connection with the state and the 
simultaneous exclusion of non-state actors might be contingent. But, instead of being 
a weakness of sovereignty, that lack of objectivity is, as it will be argued, the source 
of its adaptability. 
Sovereignty is, not uncommonly, reduced to ‗a legal concept […] in international law‘ 
rather than a specific quality of an entity (Peters 2009b: 184). This, in turn, implies 
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that both the external façade of the state and the internal developments within the state 
are legally determinable from outside, i.e. by the external corpus of international law. 
Moreover, real exercise of sovereignty is seen as doubly limited: from outside by 
international law and from inside by individual rights or claims for self-determination 
by parts of the population (Stauffen 2010: 172). In other words, sovereignty as control 
and autonomous exercise of power has given way to responsibility towards both the 
national and the international community (Focarelli 2008: 194). 
State sovereignty is made contingent upon certain presumptions of ‗a good state‘ and, 
therefore, any rights and privileges that are associated with sovereignty must be those 
and only those that are needed in order to reach that raison d’être of sovereignty 
(Besson 2006: 160, Endicott 2010: 254). Sovereignty then becomes dependent on the 
maintenance of ‗universal standards of global citizenship and responsibility‘ 
(Toumayan, 2014: 11-12; see also Ramos 2013: 3), and the universal international 
community is, allegedly, tasked with protecting and upholding the universal norms by 
all necessary means (McLoughlin, 2012: 142). Correspondingly, if previously the 
state only needed validation from within (its own people), then currently its 
(il)legitimacy, it is claimed, must be decided from outside (Tesón, 2014: 393). This is 
especially visible in the postulations of human rights that universally exist (or at least 
should exist) as an ‗unforced world consensus‘ in which people learn to understand 
and admire their differences (Taylor 2011: 122-123). Similarly, perceived progression 
towards a world of well-ordered peoples that in essence have nothing to quarry about 
and only have to submit to ideals of abstract justice and liberal values has been 
influential (see e.g. Rawls 1999), with the implication that ‗well-ordered‘ peoples 
have the duty to exercise benevolent correction vis-à-vis the less fortunate ones 
(Rawls 1999: 5-6, 126). Sovereignty, even in the popular sense, is being left with 
instrumental value only: ‗it is valuable and democratic precisely insofar as it promotes 
freedom and equality‘ (Goodhart 2011: 1055). Consequently, even popular 
legitimation by the political community is conceived as inferior not only to 
substantive international standard but also to more technical international norms, 
regulations, and directives (Müller 2008: 20-22). In essence, the outside determines 
what order and disorder, legitimate use of force and oppression, good and bad 
governance are (Drayton, 2013: 226-227). 
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The above more than clearly demonstrates a crucial flaw in many of today‘s theories 
of sovereignty: preoccupation with the external element of sovereignty, i.e. its façade. 
In fact, sovereignty cannot be reduced to a legally definable concept or an agent for 
implementing global norms. After all, one of the implications of ordering as defined in 
this thesis is that it is about the internal self-determination of a political community: if 
ordering is a process in which the constitutive and the constituted (the latter itself 
always being tied with a particular constitutive rather than something global) are in 
perpetual movement, being affected and affecting each other in turn, then the only 
legitimate source of norms is the permanent creative interplay between those two 
poles. The alternative to such internal normativity is not some universal freedom 
guaranteed by an ‗international community‘ but, rather, global dominance of a single 
particularity that presents itself as universality (see Kalpokas 2015). Definitely, 
sovereignty is similar in that it can only reflect one particularity at a time. And yetonly 
by mistaking the façade for essence can the theories above perceive sovereignty as a 
universally repressive attribute. And only the same mistake can allow for sovereignty 
to be seen as a stable concept – rather, as this thesis suggests, sovereignty is an 
attribute that can, potentially, be arrogated by any power. 
Cosmopolitan democrats, meanwhile, attempt to apply democratic norms and 
procedures to the global system. For them, democracy transcends borders and 
becomes the only legitimate source of power both nationally and internationally, 
channelling constitutive power from the local level directly to the global (see e.g. 
Archibugi 2012), the domestic-foreign boundary gradually becoming irrelevant 
(Rosenau 1998: 49-50). In the post-sovereign world, citizens would be able to 
participate in several transnational and/or subnational projects across different 
political arenas without the need to give preference to any of them, live under several 
political authorities simultaneously and shed away exclusionary identities, identifying 
with humanity instead (Linklater 1998: 130-132) and thus advancing towards a 
‗global civil society‘ (Köhler 1998). After all, according to cosmopolitans, ‗there are 
values which everyone in the world ought to accept, whatever their personal interests 
or community‘ – or, at least, ‗all reasonable people‘ would do so (Thompson 1998: 
191-192). As Held (2006, 2010a, 2010b) maintains, political communities no longer 
have exclusivity of bonding, integration and loyalty, but rather, attention has shifted to 
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individual human beings, universal human rights, and moral concern, based on what is 
common to human beings globally. 
Deliberative theorists, on the other hand, see a plethora of overlapping and 
interconnecting public spheres, from local to international and global, involving 
international bodies, governmental institutions, political parties, nongovernmental 
organisations, pressure groups, and various other participants (Johnstone 2011: 19). In 
this sense, once again, exclusive sovereign authority of the state is challenged by 
introducing channels for concerns and decisions that either do not involve the state or 
treat it as only one of many actors. Sovereign authority itself, then, becomes dispersed 
and context-dependent. After all, ‗the growing interdependencies of a world society‘ 
puts in question the adequacy of the national, territorially bound, level of action 
(Habermas 2001: 70). Instead, a level of ‗world politics‘ is said to be emerging, 
presenting a ‗dynamic picture of interferences and interactions between political 
processes that persist at national, international, and global levels‘ through new 
channels of communication and new ‗international negotiating systems‘, thus 
changing international relations into ‗world domestic policy‘ (Habermas 2001: 109-
111). Global deliberation would then be based on ‗universal moral respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity‘ and thus be entirely inclusive (Benhabib 2004: 13). 
Both cosmopolitan and deliberative theorists share important insights about the 
interconnected nature of today‘s world. Even a defence of sovereignty cannot ignore 
this trend. Nevertheless, as will be argued in the final chapter, while this 
interconnectedness might be challenging for states, it is not necessarily so for 
sovereignty. In fact, today‘s world should be seen as a peculiar mixture of local, 
translocal, and global concerns. Certainly, this market is not a free one: some 
concerns, ideas, and norms have more power than others as they represent the 
particularities of more powerful groups, thus making ideal deliberation not feasible. 
Nevertheless, an exchange of ideas must be presumed to be taking place on a global 
scale. As a result, these ideas must be seen to be impacting on the local and translocal 
concerns (that, in turn, can, and often do, influence the global ones). And yet, it is the 
sovereign power and responsibility of the political communities to decide on their 
internal and external form that acts as a gatekeeper, managing the symbolic border 
between the outside and the inside. As a result, the cosmopolitan ideal is not realistic: 
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instead of a single normative universe, one should see a pluriverse with some of its 
elements overlapping and some diverging widely – that, as remains to be seen, is an 
implication of ordering as process. But even in the case of overlap, one cannot expect 
some kind of general will. A pluriverse is only a proper pluriverse when it is 
characterised by a multiplicity of partial centres. 
Still, the power of the global community might not be enough to tackle the vestiges of 
sovereignty and, therefore, constitutionalisation of international law is offered as a 
solution (see e.g. Benhabib 2006: 72). It is claimed that, since international 
cooperation is only going to increase and become more complex, international legal 
regulation must develop accordingly, with greater emphasis and more resources being 
placed on international institutional and legal regimes (Trachtman 2013: 253-254). 
While for some, global constitutionalism appears to be a goal to be achieved through a 
broad cross-cultural coalition of states, non-state institutions, and civil society 
associations (Johnston 2005: 27), for others, it is already reality, resting on an 
enlightened rule of law (see e.g. Paulus 2009). Under a more rigid positivist view, all 
obligatory norms are inscribed in precisely defined documents and treaties, perceiving 
the ‗constitution of the international community‘ as a concrete and perfectly definable 
entity – the UN Charter – with no international law existing beside it (see Fassbender 
2009: 53-54, 181). Yet for others, such emphasis on one document and one legal 
regime is ungrounded. For them, although constitutionalisation of international law, at 
the expense of the national level, is a fact, the global order is too fragmented for a 
single constitution and, instead, there exist ‗partial constitutions‘ in different areas, 
such as international trade, environmental issues, international criminal law etc. 
(Walter 2008: 138, 140-141). The international constitution, according to this view, is 
rather to be seen as a matrix of norms, documents, and regimes that enable or 
constrain certain actions or support international processes (Trachtman 2013: 286). 
Nevertheless, the primacy of the international level is asserted, with national 
constitutions becoming only partial ones (Walter 2008: 142). And yet, this view 
encounters the same problem as the overly legalistic attempts to define sovereignty 
discussed earlier: only the external aspect of sovereignty is taken into account, thus 
leading to a dangerous attempt to force something amorphous to suddenly assume a 
form. Instead, it is argued in this thesis that sovereignty should be more adequately 




Sovereignty’s Sustained Relevance 
Even the empirically observable fact that (almost) any sovereign authority of today is 
limited both internally and externally to the extent that one could speak about ‗earned‘ 
and conditional sovereignty (see e.g. Elden 2006) does not provide any clarity as to 
the nature and extent of this crucial aspect of ordering. Crucially, to believe in a global 
community would require presuming a community without overarching authority (i.e. 
without sovereignty) and thus without any prescribed direction of movement, 
including protection of rights, so dear to the advocates of that community – after all, 
imposition of one particular agenda from the plurality of voices would signal 
imposition of a particularity as universality and, therefore, a sovereign act par 
excellence, i.e. a return of something the notion of global community was to exclude 
(Bartelson 2010: 87). The only real ordering sphere for the international community 
would be managerial governance, devoid of any politics. Therefore, sovereignty is 
often advocated as a democratic alternative to the bureaucratic-scientific management 
of the globalised world (Koskenniemi 2011). Arguably, the emphasis on externally 
imposed rights regimes does not empower people but denigrates them, making them 
‗objects of ―protection‖ or charity but rarely […] masters of their own lives‘ 
(Koskenniemi 2011: 68). Furthermore, the pretentions to universality attached to those 
claims are highly debatable: after all, ‗[c]laims to humanity are always infected by the 
particularity of the speaker‘ (Koskenniemi 2012: 3). Indeed, more legalisation could 
easily end up meaning more managerial-technocratic distance from any concerns of 
the people although, admittedly, purely political considerations cannot provide a full 
answer either (Savage 2007). In addition, it is claimed, the emphasis on international 
law rather than on state autonomy only serves neo-colonial interests of the powerful 
states (Anghie 2006). If this view is accepted, then sovereignty might, in line with the 
overall argument of this thesis, be an answer to international hegemonic projects, 
concentrating instead on responsibility for and answerability to the self (rather than 
others). 
Crucially, efforts directed against sovereignty are also efforts directed against political 
agency and the relationship between power and responsibility for having it (Bickerton, 
Cunliffe and Gourevitch 2007: 1). As long as the political community is responsible 
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for itself and for the management of its own affairs, it can be held accountable; but 
when ultimate normative authority belongs somewhere outside, the moral opening of 
could-have-done-otherwise disappears (Beckerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch 2007: 
11). Instead of preventative sovereignty as responsibility, sovereignty as supremacy 
carries a much more metaphysical responsibility but also is the only formulation at 
least potentially subject to ethics, since the authorship of an act in question belongs to 
the sovereign state and does not have to be countersigned by the international 
community (Cunliffe 2007: 39). Internally as well, sovereignty offers societies ‗a 
stable, recognized source of power that makes it possible to hold to account someone, 
an individual or a group of individuals, as responsible for particular political 
decisions‘ (Cunliffe 2007: 40). And, no less importantly, preservation of sovereignty 
prevents possible abuse of international normativity – after all, as Ayoob (2002: 81) 
puts it, ‗those who define human rights and decree that they have been violated also 
decide when and where intervention to protect such rights should and must take 
place‘. Thus, at least until moral disagreement persists on the global level, sovereignty 
as a tense standoff between incompatible ideas might even be a moral imperative: 
acceptance of the status and self-determination of a political community even if that 
status seems unacceptable from one‘s own standpoint (Roth 2008: 161). And, since 
the theory put forward in this thesis presupposes human existence as groundless (as 
per both Spinoza and Schmitt), disagreement and the resulting standoff can only be 
presumed to prevail indefinitely. In fact, this standoff also reinforces what in the final 
chapter will be referred to as the tragic nature of politics. 
Furthermore, there would also be those who see prevalence, if not even strengthening, 
of sovereignty through a permanent state of exception and emergency politics, leading 
to ‗total regulation‘ and ‗total regulate-ability‘ of life, ‗total politization of all human 
existence‘ (Berkmanas 2010: 117). Clearly, since sovereignty represents the political 
will and the political identity of a certain community, it is not something that could be 
easily subsumed under the authority and discipline of international norms (Walker 
2008: 27). The current order is, thus, not ‗post-sovereign‘, since ‗sovereignty plays a 
genuine part in the current changes of legal and political practices in international 
relations‘ (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 209). After all, even those 
critical of sovereignty are sometimes willing to admit that, contingent or not, it is 
likely to prevail as long as it is in the interest of the core actors – and those interests 
35 
 
often stem from the pre-modern world of (almost) uncontested sovereignty (Krasner 
2010: 108). 
Others would instead argue for a proliferation of different forms of sovereignty thus 
reflecting the current political-economic fragmentation (see e.g. Agnew 2009). After 
all, sovereignty might have an equivocal nature, combining the deplored tendency ‗to 
claim immunity for criminal bahavior, to oppress those with less power, to maintain 
power over life and death or to make the friend/enemy distinction‘ and the favourably 
received attribute of ‗cooperation with others in order to exist and […] self-
determination of free individuals‘ (Stauffer 2010: 167). The hope would be, then, to 
transform sovereignty minimising the former and maximising the latter. For example, 
sovereignty can be seen as no longer residing in singular individuals, institutions, or 
even the people-qua-sovereign but rather in the procedures of decision-making. For 
example, ‗effective deliberation‘ (see e.g. Dryzek 2002: 2) might be one such 
procedure qua locus and essence of (democratic) sovereignty. A different way of 
thinking would involve embracing ‗disaggregated‘ sovereignty, located not in the state 
as a unitary body but in its institutions, interacting with their counterparts 
internationally and globally (Slaughter 2004: 267). Such attempts, however, yet again 
are based on an inherent flaw: by conceiving sovereignty in purely formal terms, their 
proponents deprive political communities of any agency, relying instead on 
institutions and processes. And yet, agency and self-determination are precisely the 
qualities to be defended, as it is done in this thesis. 
Another way forward might involve separation of sovereignty and the state. 
According to this view, while the fate of the state lies in balance, sovereignty draws 
strength from new areas, primarily political economy and religious fundamentalism 
(Brown 2010: 23). After all, evidence of collective self-identification of people as 
‗citizens of the world‘ is lacking and, therefore, rallying around ethnic, religious, or 
any other bounded identities is more than likely (Miller 2013: 163). Another candidate 
to become the new referent for sovereignty would be the political – struggle for 
decision, finality, and closure wherever there is conflict, disagreement, and 
indeterminacy – in other words, an essential corollary to the incomplete and 
contestable nature of any social structures (Lipping 2010: 190). In other words, 
wherever there is fundamental political conflict, there also must be sovereignty, be it 
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on the state level or anywhere else. Others still would pursue less radical 
modifications of the state-sovereignty nexus, suggesting an expansion of entities 
formally considered sovereign to include various non-state actors without completely 
jeopardising the Westphalian idea (Walker 2008: 21, 30). As a result, the current 
phase of sovereignty‘s development might be a ‗late phase‘ but certainly not a 
‗terminal phase‘ (Walker 2008: 31). 
The disentanglement of sovereignty is, clearly, a crucial step forward in understanding 
today‘s world. The idea of sovereignty must indeed be expanded to include not only 
states but other actors as well. Also, the crucial importance of ideas as unifying 
referents must be emphasised. In fact, whatever manages to gather a community and 
make it decide for itself on its internal and external form, has become a necessarily 
political phenomenon and has assumed, at least for the time being, sovereign 
authority. Instead of challenging sovereignty, such transformation should only be seen 
as part of its adaptability. In fact, the final chapter develops a Spinozist-Schmittian 
interpretation of sovereignty as an attribute that can be arrogated by different actors in 
different proportions at different times. Such interpretation not only helps to better 
understand current practices – in fact, it also holds significant normative value, 
helping maintain plurality in the context of strengthening universalist tendencies. 
 
1.2. The Content: Law and Politics 
As it will be shown below, the content of ordering – law and politics – seems to be 
more secure than its framework – at least the continued relevance of both law and 
politics is not commonly questioned. And yet, the nature of these concepts is hotly 
contested. Here, again, core issues in the debates around the two concepts will be 
outlined and some basic tendencies elucidated. Certainly, law and politics are not 
always thought of as immediate counterparts (as opposed to the state-sovereignty 
nexus) and, therefore, are characterised by very different and distinct traditions of 
theorising. Nevertheless, this section does attempt to bring some of that otherwise 
disparate thinking together in order to open up a common space for confronting the 




1.2.1. The Contested Nature of Law 
Quite broadly, most theories of law could be grouped into three clusters according to 
their views on the (in)dependence of law, on the possibility of an objective and stable 
guarantor of order. The first cluster is of theories that analyse law in itself and treat it 
as more or less independent, notably, legal positivism and formalism. The second 
cluster comprises of theories of law in context: interpretivism, natural law theories, 
sociological, pragmatist, and economic theories of law. Theories in this cluster all 
employ some external criterion: political morality, economic rationality, societal 
norms, transcendent commands of reason, some sort of temporary paradigm of truth 
etc. Finally, the third cluster is that of theories that treat law as secondary to other 
considerations, notably, legal realism and critical theories of law. Deliberative 
theories, arguably, share traits with all three categories. 
What these theories represent are different ways of looking at the origin and purpose 
of law, which, in turn, means different ways of ensuring stability of the status quo, i.e. 
stabilising the content of ordering. Since law is here taken to refer to the constituted 
side of the content of ordering, a discussion of theories of law also reveals different 
strategies that the constituted power employs to justify a particular instance of 
ordering that prevails at a particular moment. 
 
Law in Itself 
In essence, for positivists, law is what a legitimately authoritative body creates 
according to applicable norms of validity (Summers 2000: 117-118), the content of 
law being independent of non-legal values, such as morality. Hence, the positivist 
outlook on law ‗is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims‘, making ‗no claim to 
identify the point or purpose of law and legal practices as such‘ (Hart 1994: 240, 248). 
There often is an overlap across legal systems but only because certain norms (the 
prohibition of violence, murder, theft etc.) are crucial if humans are to live in societies 
– but there is nothing more than that bare necessity in this overlap (Hart 2003: 83-84). 
One legal rule is dependent on another, higher, one and so on until the supreme rule, 
governing the inclusion/exclusion of norms in a given legal system, is reached: Hart‘s 
rule of recognition or Kelsen‘s Grundnorm. This norm is not created by any authority 
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– lawmaking only follows it – but simply is and, by merely being, conditions the 
entire legal order, rendering all other principles valid or invalid (Kelsen 1999: 116-
117). And yet, the Grundnorm is not unchangeable itself: once a radical shift happens 
in a society (e.g. from autoritarianism to democracy), the basic norm changes, since a 
new ordering principle must be presupposed for the new status quo (Kelsen 1999: 
118). 
Since lawmaking is a human activity and humans are fallible, law can easily fall short 
of moral perfection or even be patently immoral; nevertheless, as long as a law exists, 
both it and the institutions it creates are legitimate (Raz 2009: 4). Consequently, legal 
norms and decisions are necessarily legally binding, even if they are immoral (Raz 
2009: 4-5). And, since law differs across times and cultures, a unified concept of law, 
let alone any prescriptive criteria of its content, are impossible to formulate (Raz 
2009: 32) – rather, law is what it is. And yet, a back door for morality is not shut, at 
least by some positivists: law, by establishing what is deemed to be a project of a good 
society, still serves a moral end; moreover, normative validity (as opposed to bare 
legal validity) does require a conflation of legal and moral demands (Raz 2009: 178, 
189). And since, even for most positivists, legal norms do contain a penumbra of 
uncertainty, some scope for interaction with non-legal norms is still present, although 
no necessary connections are allowed (Hart 1994: 251-252, 268). Moreover, there is 
no point in looking at international normativity: law is a law of a certain territory and 
‗[i]ts contents can be uniquely ascertained by an objective method‘ through 
‗objectively verifiable facts‘ (Kelsen 1999: 49). 
In fact, those of a formalist persuasion are the most radical in asserting that the law is 
purely internally rational, intelligible, and coherent; the legal sphere is, for them, 
hermetical and matters of the meaning of law can only be solved from and within it 
(Weintrib 2003: 326). On many other issues, formalism is perfectly in line with 
positivism and, without gross overstatement, could be called its radicalised form. 
Again, the presence of the norm is purely dependent on a decision of a relevant 
authority and the (im)morality of law is immaterial from a legal standpoint (Weintrib 
2003: 327). As well, just like Kelsen‘s legal system can ultimately be reduced to the 
Grundnorm, for the formalists the intelligibility of a legal norm depends on another 
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legal norm and so on until an immanently intelligible core norm is reached (Weintrib 
2003: 331-332). 
The problem with both the formalist and the positivist affirmation of ‗pure‘ and 
independent law is its disconnection from the political community. Although, as it 
remains to be seen, they are not the only ones to commit this error, theirs is a true 
legal theology: one has to believe in the presence of law, and only through such belief 
the entire legal system can be validated. Such reading of law clearly privileges the 
constituted, providing an impetus for upholding the status quo. And yet, the positivist 
and formalist accounts of law cannot be easily discarded as inadequate. In fact, they 
are crucial parts of legal thinking precisely because they refer to an aspiration of the 
constituted. After all, as it will be argued later, there has to be some fixity that 
temporarily stabilises the protean change of the political community and expresses the 
content of its sovereign decision on its own form. As (it still remains to be seen) any 
content of a sovereign decision must accrue some added dignity by passing as 
something more than it actually is – i.e. as fullness that overcomes the groundlessness 
of existence – such objectification of the status quo is a necessary illusion. 
 
Law in Context 
Meanwhile, most interpretive approaches to law would assert that a single correct 
interpretation could be found if only the general legal principles are interpreted 
according to proper standards (Kratchowil 2001: 44). Following a premise, strongly 
biased towards common law systems, ‗the rule does not exist before the case has been 
decided‘ and, therefore, matters of principle are the determinants of the decision 
(Dworkin 2003a: 55). And in hard cases, when more than one strongly viable 
interpretation is available, it must be asked which of them ‗shows the community‘s 
structure and institutions and decisions – its public standards as a whole – in a better 
light from the standpoint of political morality‘ (Dworkin 1986: 256, 411). In other 
words, any decision must conform to ‗some comprehensive theory of general 
principles and policies‘ (Dworkin 2003b: 151) and must ‗show the best route to a 
better future‘ (Dworkin 1986: 413). In Dworkin‘s case, this is a rights-based morality, 
in which individual rights are seen as trumps, defeating any other considerations 
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(Dworkin 1977: xi). As a result, law is not seen as ‗pure‘ or absolutely independent – 
when the letter of law reaches its limits, legal practice becomes a moral exercise. This, 
admittedly, has put some other supporters of law as interpretation at unease – for 
them, interpretation is purely internal to statute (see e.g. Sunstein 1998). Yet other 
interpretive approaches tend to take a more open-ended view on single correct 
answers: for them, such objectivity is primarily a matter of convention, an agreement 
on the conditions of a correct answer (see e.g. Patterson 2001). As will be seen later 
on in the thesis, such interpretivist claims also serve to reinforce the constituted. 
The demise of sovereignty, discussed above, has also brought about a new interest in 
natural law, based on human reason as capable of discerning the natural content and 
purpose of law (Swiffen 2011: 76-77). Such products of rationality and logic would 
only lead towards the common good and a fully flourishing society (Murphy 2001). 
Natural law generally posits a very clear relation of law and morality: the essence of 
law includes the idea of the moral and is dependent on it (Feinberg 2003: 3). 
Consequently, certain rights and values are proclaimed as simply existing without the 
need for further justification and are impossible to be derogated from. In contrast to 
various culture-specific norms, ‗true morality‘ is then seen as a universal guiding 
principle even if it is not (as yet) recognised in a particular society (Feinberg 2003: 
38-39). And this morality is accessible if rationally deduced from ‗correct‘ and 
‗genuine‘ moral principles that are themselves so self-evident that they simply cannot 
be doubted by a rational individual (Feinberg 2003: 51-52, 54-55). 
Fuller and Finnis are, perhaps, the most important exponents of the natural law 
tradition. Fuller‘s, however, is a more procedural theory of natural law: instead of 
determining the content of law, he sets out to show its necessary attributes: they must 
be promulgated, non-retroactive, sufficiently general, non-contradictory, clear, they 
should not require the impossible, and be constant through time; also, official action 
must correspond with the declared rule (see, generally, McLeod 2012: 98-101). If at 
least one of those conditions is totally violated, a law ceases to be a law and there can 
be no moral obligation to obey it (Fuller 1969: 39). Moreover, since morality is 
essential ‗to make the best use of our short lives‘ (Fuller 1969: 17), law must also 
contain a moral kernel. As such, law has a double bond with morality: it must be 
moral in itself and it must lean on morality for support (Fuller 2003: 99). Meanwhile, 
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Finnis proceeds from an Augustinian maxim that the core principles of natural law are 
the distinction between good and bad and cannot in themselves be inferred or derived 
but, rather, ‗[t]he basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is 
good for human beings with the nature they have‘ (Finnis 1980: 34). This nature is not 
deduced but experienced from inside, allowing one to determine ‗the general form of 
good‘ by ‗a simple act of non-inferential understanding‘ (Finnis 1980: 34). Contrary 
to Fuller, Finnis establishes requirements for the content of law: it must provide what 
he sees as the basic goods, needed for humans to flourish: decent life, play, aesthetic 
satisfaction, sufficient knowledge, the opportunity to lead sociable lives, practical 
reasonableness, and some form of religion (Finnis 1980: 85-90). And yet, those goods 
are not moral goals by themselves: they are such only insofar as they are products of 
practical reasonableness (Finnis 1980: 102-103), which itself includes neutrality, 
possessing a coherent life plan, fidelity to the common good etc.  
Both the interpretivist and natural law traditions, again, are organised around the core 
principle of belief but, contrary to the positivists and the formalists, it is a belief in an 
external criterion which, in turn, conditions the content of law. In other words, it is as 
if the rule of recognition or the Grundnorm were taken outside of law and positioned 
in the place of a transcendent lawgiver. In terms of ordering, such theories restrain the 
political community by depriving it of its creative capacity and self-determination. In 
terms of providing the necessary constituted illusion that stabilises political life 
through belief, the interpretivists and, especially, the natural law theorists provide an 
exceptionally strong grounding: whereas even a Grundnorm can change in the light of 
fundamental transformations within the political community, natural law always 
remains an objective given. On the other hand, such theories also provide for a means 
of criticism not present in positivism or formalism: whereas in the latter two traditions 
it suffices that laws are internally coherent, both interpretivism and natural law offer 
an external standard against which the quality of the legal system can be measured, 
thus providing a banner for the constitutive as well. Nevertheless, as long as laws can 
be shown to conform to that substantive standard, the interpretivist and natural law 
traditions allow for the status quo to acquire added dignity conveyed through a 
transcendent ideal, thus favouring the constituted and serving a necessary but, as will 
be shown in the final chapter, partial function. 
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In addition, law can be seen as an institutionalised corpus of social norms: since 
humans are, fundamentally, norm-users and need predictability and mutual 
intelligibility in their interactions, law provides a clear and stable framework 
(MacCormick 2007: 20). Law is thus a solution to the challenges of coordination but 
simultaneously defines persons that fall within its jurisdiction, and promotes some 
reasonable concept of the common good (MacCormick 2007: 303-304). Law enables 
citizens and institutions to do certain things, entitles to certain rights and privileges, 
and protects from interference but simultaneously controls a person‘s behaviour and 
subjects him/her to routinised procedures (see e.g. Cotterrell 1995: 4-5). Law is, under 
this approach, produced in response to particular circumstances and pressures – ‗an 
aspect of society, not an autonomous force acting on it‘ (Cotterrell 1995: 8). If law is 
moral, then that morality emanates from communal relations that are moral per se; 
moral and legal responsibilities are, therefore, intertwined (Cotterrell 2006: 164). Law 
helps to ‗fix and maintain ―common sense‖ understandings of the nature of society 
and societal relationships in general‘ but is unable to produce such understandings 
independently – law only codifies underlying assumptions (Cotterrell 1995: 8). 
Others, in a somewhat similar fashion, see the linkage between law and community in 
a chain-like fashion. First, there is a normative point, integrating different positions; it 
then delimits the inside and the outside and thus creates a community of the ‗we‘, 
which is both normatively and spatially bounded (Lindahl 2013: 76). Such law is 
‗ubiquitous‘ because ‗its sources are to be found in all instances and contexts of 
people‘s association with each other without anyone being able to prescribe in 
advance where it will emerge‘ (Melissaris 2009: 152). Beliefs of various societal 
groups must matter in making law: pretending to ignore them only means giving 
priority to the dominant set of values (Calabresi 1985: 116). Communal norms and the 
reactions they condition in relation to certain acts can easily be seen as providing the 
basis for legal regulation which no amount of rationalisation can hide of displace (see, 
generally, Nussbaum 2004). 
Meanwhile, pragmatists reject any questions of ‗what the law ought to be‘ in favour of 
asking ‗what our concept of law ought to be‘ (Coleman 2001: 3-4). This is only 
natural given the pragmatist rejection of ultimate unchangeable truths and their 
interest in how the prevailing paradigms of truth come about and operate. According 
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to the pragmatists, some form of ‗common sense‘ must be preserved even if openness 
of interpretation is presupposed. Clearly, the frame of reference that conditions one‘s 
beliefs can change rapidly but at the same time even the (in)ability to prove a certain 
claim does not necessarily imply its incorrectness (Posner 1995: 5-6). Instead, the real 
question should be what beliefs are justified by social needs (Posner 2003: 181). Law 
is, in fact, only a matter of a dominant paradigm (as defined in Kuhn 1962). 
Therefore, again, it has to lean on external criteria for support. One of the most 
influential strategies in this respect has been the alignment of law and economics, with 
the latter‘s doctrines of ‗decision under uncertainty, transaction costs, cost-benefit 
analysis, risk aversion, and positive and negative externalities‘ serving as an 
explanatory framework (Posner 2011: xxii). Thus, economic rationality and rational 
choice theory are seen as potent analytical tools for understanding law as well as 
public and personal choices in legal contexts (Posner 2011: 4). Here, again, some 
useful insights are present. Pragmatists correctly identify the precarious – if not 
outright groundless – foundation of law (it being a convention, susceptible to changes 
in paradigm) and its role in bringing some kind of order in a community where 
widespread differences of deeply held beliefs prevail. Once again, this can refer to a 
more dynamic, constitutive-friendly account of law. Nevertheless, with introduction 
of external criteria, such as economic rationality or social needs, selective limitation 
becomes apparent – after all, these are not value-neutral concepts. 
 
Law as Secondary 
Meanwhile, moving to the third cluster of ideas, legal realists would assert that the 
boundaries of legal concepts are not clear-cut and, therefore, it is impossible to derive 
judicial decisions from rules themselves; rather, various idiosyncratic factors are at 
play (Kratchowil 2001: 44). Not least, the power to enforce a certain statute is crucial, 
for norms that are not observed remain empty (Holmes 2003[1897]: 10-11). Crucially, 
law, for the realists, is directed towards particular social ends and must be treated as 
such and not as a value-neutral body; both law and society are permanently changing 
and, therefore, reinterpretation is needed, value judgements are unavoidable, and 
universalist aspirations of legal norms are untenable (McLeod 2012: 137). Law is 
indeterminate in a sense that legal reasons and arguments cannot provide justification 
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for a single unique outcome: more than one decision is possible (Leiter 2007: 39). 
Although realists tend to disagree among themselves on which criteria exactly should 
be paramount, they are in unison in rejecting standard positive sources of law (see, 
generally, Schauer 2013: 754-756). Rather than proceeding from general rules and 
reasoning abstractly, judges ‗reach decisions based on what they think would be fair 
on the facts of the case‘ (Leiter 2007: 22). This does not mean that decisions are 
completely arbitrary: since judges live in a society, their decisions do fall into broad 
sociological patterns; also a common body of law as well as the need to justify 
decisions do limit the field of possible decisions (Leiter 2007: 30), although the 
system is still open-ended. In fact, realists do identify some crucial qualities of law: it 
being value-laden, lacking universality, and necessarily open to interpretation. Here, 
the foundation of law is even more precarious than in the pragmatist case. And yet, the 
realists arguably overstress this dynamism: after all, even something (almost or 
completely) groundless does not necessarily have to be unstable. Hence, what is 
lacking is an account of how and by whom dominant interpretations (and statutes of 
the civil law tradition) are formulated. 
Critical legal scholars, in turn, stress the abundance of contradictions among rules and 
principles that preclude a singular correct decision and embrace ambiguity, which 
means that decisions can be made only through interference of something external to 
the legal system (Kratchowil 2001: 44): power. Law is a tool for those in power to 
maintain their privileged position (McLeod 2012: 156). Indeed, ‗[p]ower relations are 
law‘, provided that the dominant groups are able to present their privileged position in 
a clout of legality – in fact, ‗law is everything that succeeds in calling itself law‘ 
(Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 9). Although for critical scholars there is a connection 
between law and values, those values are imposed by the dominant groups and reflect 
the dominant ideology, sustaining the subjection of others (Douzinas and Gearey 
2005: 8-9). Law is, essentially, a prize up for grabs. This often involves a somewhat 
romanticised view of human nature: if it was not for the oppressive structures, a fairer, 
more reciprocal society where humans are not alienated would be possible (Tushnet 
2011: 293). Law is seen as enabling the state ‗to maintain the legitimacy of collective 
powerlessness through the authoritarian control of public consciousness‘ (Gabel and 
Harris 1983: 411). In essence, ‗[l]egal forms and practices are political products that 
arise from the struggles of conflicting social groups that possess very disparate 
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resources of wealth, power, status, knowledge, access to armed force, and 
organizational capability‘ (Gordon 1984: 101). But law, in turn, not only structures 
and orders society but also provides meaning for the very definitions of order and 
disorder, virtue and vice etc. – the power of law is less in physical coercion than in the 
determination of the conditions for societal existence and its own application (Gordon 
1984: 109; Halliday and Morgan 2013: 3). 
Critical scholars provide an important input into the theory of law by emphasising 
power relations as determinant of what law is and how it is interpreted. Power over 
law is, essentially, the power to set and enforce norms, and any norms are always 
partial and refer to the views and interests of those who are able to establish them. 
And yet, the typical critical theory fallacy of seeing power in exclusively negative 
terms is also visible. Contrary to that point of view, power, are seen in this thesis, does 
have positive properties. First of all, when located in the constituted (dismissed as 
oppressive by critical legal scholars), power allows for stability and prognostication, 
helping the political community know itself by giving it a snapshot of its own form 
and shape at a certain moment in time. After all, some order must exist and any order 
is unavoidably implicated with power relations. Moreover, critical theorists tend to 
underappreciate the political community itself, seeing it as a blind submissive flock 
rather than an actor in its own right, possessing its own power. Any law that exists can 
only exist because of a conflation of the constituted and the constitutive powers, and 
both these powers are, in turn, affected by the existence of law. 
 
Deliberation 
Finally (in terms of this overview only), law can also be seen as a result of 
deliberation, allowing people, in principle at least, to be governed by norms of their 
own making and drawing legitimacy from general agreement and ‗logical deduction 
from reasonable principles and uncontroversial assumptions about how the world is 
and works‘ (Shiffman 2004: 89). The best-known account here is provided by 
Habermas (1996), for whom emphasis is, as ever, on argumentation and rational 
discourse: legal judgements are products of justification and free flow of arguments 
where the most reasonable one gains acceptance. In fact, the valid argument must not 
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only be accepted but ‗must be able to prove its worth against any future objections 
that might actually be raised‘ (Habermas 1996: 35; see also Habermas 2003: 247). In a 
sense, this is not far removed from the more modest interpretivist approaches: the 
meaning of law is open for interpretation. However, those interpretations are to 
coalesce, through communication, into rational agreement. Any striving towards a 
common understanding must, therefore, be based not on belief or conviction but on 
reasons only, thus making reasoning (legal or any other) a rather hermetic linguistic 
exercise structured around the rules of logic. As such, deliberation does bring the 
questions of form and content of law to relative closure: ‗Under the assumption of 
approximately ideal conditions, all available arguments are taken into consideration 
and all relevant objections are exhausted. Therefore, a discursively reached agreement 
entitles us to take a proposition to be true‘ (Habermas 2003: 257). However, such 
closure is always only relative because, should new evidence become available, the 
previous agreement might be dislodged. In a similar fashion, ‗a democratic people, 
which considers itself bound by certain norms and principles, engages in iterative acts 
by reappropriating and reinterpreting these‘, being a subject and an author 
simultaneously (Benhabib 2006: 49). This is especially the case when a democratic 
community faces new challenges or when predominant patterns of thought change. 
But communication also facilitates the acceptance – legitimation – of law and 
determination of its exact meaning (van Hoecke 2002: 203-205). Public justification, 
the need to give reasons, and the necessity for those reasons to pass public scrutiny are 
clearly signs of a norm-making activity. 
Certainly, deliberative theorists correctly identify law as an interpersonal product, 
arising from interactions within the relevant community. Law indeed should be seen 
as reflecting prevalent patterns rather than some transcendent essence. And yet, 
patterns do not necessarily denote agreement. In fact, emphasis on agreement is one 
more way to imbue law with added dignity of something more than law itself: by 
presenting the status quo as something that everybody (or, at least, all rational 
members of the community) must have agreed upon, the quasi-religious structure of 
belief in the source of law is objectivised and further entrenched as a normative 
principle. Law, as it will be argued in the final chapter from a Spinozist-Schmittian 
perspective, should be seen as a snapshot of positions within a conflictual field rather 




1.2.2. The Ungraspable Core of Politics 
Quite broadly, politics can be defined as an activity ‗in which purposive individuals 
interact, respond to incentives and constraints, and take instrumental decisions to 
promote their respective individual or collective objectives‘ (Austen-Smith 2005: 
427). One can definitely problematise this definition by questioning the exact nature 
of ‗purposive‘, ‗individual‘, ‗incentives and constraints‘, ‗instrumental decisions‘, 
and/or ‗objectives‘ – all of them can be unpacked and twisted, made anything but self-
evident. However, the basic structure of the definition seems appropriate: people react 
in a way at least partly conditioned by their environment to further some goals that 
they have or imagine to have; and since those goals can be, and often are, mutually 
exclusive, politics is also about managing that mutual exclusion. However, the ways 
in which this management is addressed differ significantly. Quite broadly, one could 
isolate three core trends: politics-as-consent, politics-as-dissent, and politics as 
occasional. In addition, there are some theories that stand in the middle between 
consent and dissent since they are concerned with transition from one to the other. 
 
Politics-as-consent 
For the theorists who emphasise politics-as-consent, ‗compromise, shabby or smart, is 
certainly the normal, and often the most desirable, condition‘ (Hampshire 1999: 39). 
Or, to put it even more strongly, ‗[p]olitics is an art of unification; from many, it 
makes one‘ (Walzer 1992: 66). The thrust to determine fixed rules, in turn, 
presupposes that if only correct procedures were set, conflict would be avoided. 
Most notably in the consensual trend of thought, deliberative democrats would 
emphasise communication and justification: ‗the decisions must be justified in terms 
those who are subject to them can accept‘ (Johnstone 2011: 16). Through deliberation, 
specific interests are turned into common ones as parties become more informed about 
the spectrum of opinions (Benhabib 1996). This, clearly, requires openness and 
detachment: one‘s position must be amendable and generally subservient to the 
common good and the perspective of the ‗we‘ (Habermas 1988). By participating in 
48 
 
joint deliberation, the speakers achieve ‗an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, thereby 
securing at the same time the horizon within which everyone can refer to one and the 
same objective world‘ (Habermas 1998: 315). This deliberation must, in turn, be 
based on rational discourse and impartial values, i.e. reach beyond self-interested 
statements and not be self-serving (Johnstone 2001: 17). In fact, even though at the 
first stage of deliberation parties may start with their own particular wills and 
interests, the need for further and further justification and argumentation would lead 
everybody to coalesce around an objective value-neutral programme (Habermas 1996: 
164-165). What is more, equal standing and equal voice of the participants is crucial 
(Cohen 1997: 74; Johnstone 2011: 18), thus prioritising public sphere as the locus of 
discussion and contestation over state institutions (Dryzek 2002: 163). Such 
egalitarian approach, it is said, ‗allows for dissent and for voices from the margins‘ 
(Dryzek 2002: 169). And yet, a strictly Habermasian approach would put more 
emphasis on rationality, meaning that groups that are not able to formulate their 
arguments according to accepted norms of rationality tend to be sidelined. In fact, if a 
norm is discursively established as being worthy of recognition, even the refusal of 
the world to ‗play along‘ cannot deny its validity (Habermas 2003: 258). However, 
other, more lenient, approaches acknowledge that even the most democratic state 
cannot feasibly accommodate all differences and all possible subject positions – some 
citizens will always find themselves living in systems that are at odds with their basic 
values (Gutmann 2003: 209-210). A more feasible strategy would then be to keep 
open the channels of deliberation that would set – and renegotiate as appropriate – the 
conditions of living together (Gutmann 2003: 210-211). In this sense, ‗[d]eliberation 
is not only a means to an end, but also a means of deciding what means are morally 
required to pursue our ends‘ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 4). In essence, 
deliberation would then be seen as morally valuable on its own.  
A noteworthy insight by the deliberative tradition is, once again, the openness for 
interpretation and interpersonal nature of the element in question, this time – of 
politics. Also, deliberation implies that politics is a continuous process, which is in 
line with the overall argument of this thesis. And yet, again, the emphasis on 
agreement limits the constitutive potential of the political community and minimises 
the likelihood of disruptive change that would challenge the status quo. Once the 
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conditions for and the nature of agreement are established, the arbitrary conditions 
that have led to a given arrangement are solidified and power relations are hidden. 
Another strategy for politics-as-consent would be to search for a supposedly value 
neutral position, in which ‗institutionalised fairness in procedures for the resolution of 
[…] conflicts‘ suffices (Hampshire 1999: 77). Most notably, for Rawls (1971: 53), 
‗each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others‘. This equality is 
definitely directly related with the nature of the Rawlsian social contract and the veil 
of ignorance, the latter being deliberately constructed in such a way that the 
negotiating parties do not have any other rational option than to agree with the equal 
treatment of all reasonable positions (presuming that rationality is, indeed, singular as 
Rawls thinks). The reasoning leading to this is simple: ‗[s]ince each desires to protect 
his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has a reason 
to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net 
balance of satisfaction‘ (Rawls 1971: 13). Although within the limits of reasonability, 
individual conceptions of personal good are expected to differ, it is not the case for 
conceptions of right (Rawls 1971: 393); hence, a Rawlsian citizen still has to 
acknowledge certain duties. After all, the presence of unconditional principles in such 
system is hardly surprising: ‗[i]t suffices to show that the parties in the original 
position would agree to principles defining the natural duties which as formulated 
hold unconditionally‘ (Rawls 1971: 100). As a result, despite outward plurality, 
Rawlsian politics is still a matter of singular (and even predefined) agreement, 
supporting what is seen in this thesis as the constituted. 
Furthermore, there is always the possibility of calling upon a higher third to mediate. 
Historically, this could have been God, but in secular politics that is usually some 
conception of morality. Even though a degree of conflict is present in such theories, 
ultimately there can only be one ‗correct‘ morality and, therefore, politics would lead 
to agreement if only the ‗real‘ norms could be established. ‗Good life‘ and ‗good 
society‘ would then be objectively determinable qualities, meaning that only societies 
organised in certain ways can produce ‗real‘ well-being (Gorski et al. 2012: 10). 
Emphasis would often also be on virtues, ‗understood as those dispositions which will 
not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but 
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will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good‘ (Macintyre 2007: 219). 
Those are not individual virtues but something that only has full force when related to 
a collective (Macintyre 2007: 220-221). Virtue, as a criterion for choice, it is claimed, 
can only be present in tradition (Macintyre 2007: 202) and, therefore, such politics is 
clearly embedded in a quasi-objective moral consensus within a community – i.e. that 
community‘s constituted aspect. 
The two above accounts, although very different in their premises, do nevertheless 
illustrate the importance of a central organising principle to bring the field of possible 
options together and establish a singular order out of the different possibilities. This 
supposedly rational or virtuous organising principle is ex post facto transformed into 
something more than itself – into a transcendent quality that has to be believed in and 
can only operate via this structure of belief. Evidently, both approaches do favour the 
constituted dimension, providing the status quo with added dignity. Hence, as it will 
be argued later on in the thesis, a counterbalance is needed, destabilising the ordering 
axis and introducing contestability into the account of political ordering – after all, to 
reiterate, ordering is a process involving two parts, not just dominance of one. 
Although it is important that both those contesting and preserving the present order 
believe in the ultimate importance and correctness of the viewpoint they promote, it is 
even more vital that neither of them gets entrenched in the process of ordering to the 
extent that it becomes seemingly unmovable. 
 
Intermediary Positions 
As already indicated, the work of Ernesto Laclau (partly with Chantal Mouffe) could 
be seen as being in the middle between politics-as-consent and politics-as-dissent. 
Although pluralistic in essence and agenda, his work also sheds light on the drive for 
and essence of stability or, in his own terms, hegemonic articulations. The premise is 
that there is no such thing as ‗society‘, at least as long as it designates an integrated 
totality: every such totality is necessarily incomplete (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111). 
In fact, it is only discursively that any centre can be established, meanings fixed, and 
stability created (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112). This is what opens up space for 
hegemony – aggregation and articulation of empty signifiers by one antagonistic force 
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against another, creating temporary condensations of meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001: 136-139, 142-143). Any identity, either as challenge or as allegiance to the 
status quo, therefore, requires real otherness which is equally constitutive of the self 
(Laclau 2007: 3, 27). But the absent fullness at the centre of the self and the 
community also operates as a political black hole, pulling various meanings towards 
itself: it has no form and essence of its own but has to be hegemonically filled with 
meaning, whence ‗a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent 
communitarian fullness‘ and thus the particularity of one group is presented as the 
universality of the whole (Laclau 2007: 42-44, 71; Laclau 2000: 85). But that 
reference to universality, albeit a false one, is crucial for politics since without it no 
common ground and no struggle would exist, only an aggregation of closed 
particularities that cannot designate a common sphere (Laclau 2007: 60-61). After all, 
the messiness of the world must be hidden behind the appearance of universal 
consent, albeit, in contrast to the pure politics-as-consent approaches outlined above, 
this consent is an artificial and unstable one. 
Similarly, even though finality and decisiveness may be the goal towards which 
politics aspires, this can be seen as an elusive goal, constantly plagued by 
‗contingency, indeterminacy, and plurality‘, leaving one with ‗partial, temporary, and 
disintegrating arrangements, even when they are not immediately visible as such‘ 
(Freeden 2013: 22). This view would posit any politics-as-consent approach as 
superficial, dealing with appearances only. Decision (which is always to be overturned 
by another decision) is, consequently, a fundamental attribute of politics and 
something that both individuals and societies are always under pressure to make 
(Freeden 2013: 23). Broadly speaking, then, the domain of the political includes 
power, arrogating a decision on boundaries, allocations (both material and symbolic), 
and policies, mobilising support, and staking a claim to illusionary stability, or 
contesting the above (Freeden 2013: 34-35). All politics is, then, underpinned by 
indeterminacy and contestability, requiring authoritative decisions decisions to mask 
those unstable underpinnings (Freeden 2013: 73). 
Arguably, there are significant similarities between the latter two approaches and one 
adopted in this thesis. The drive behind politics and decision is a lack of grounding 
which, nevertheless, needs to be filled with particular content. Laclau is certainly 
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correct in also enquiring into how the content of a particular political decision is 
maintained, especially concentrating on hegemonic articulations and the added dignity 
that they confer upon the existing order. And yet, there needs to be more emphasis on 
the creative side of politics, i.e. the constitutive ability to challenge or subvert the 
status quo, thus ensuring that change is possible. Freeden, meanwhile, manifests a 
completely opposite problem: by postulating a bare decision that has to be made, he 
for the most part ignores the subjective and structural reasons why a particular 
decision is upheld. 
 
Politics-as-Dissent 
For others, though, even if politics is about something that is in common, that 
‗common‘ is still full of internal incommensurabilities and cannot be reduced to some 
union (Nancy 2010: 50-51). Among the adherents of politics-as-dissent, many could 
be heard calling for ‗a (post)humanist politics with agonistic intent‘ (Honig 2010: 1). 
The ‗(post)humanism‘ refers to people not being seen as uniform rational machines, 
while simultaneously maintaining the humanist emphasis on the importance and 
dignity of the human being. The aim, thus, should be to reintroduce the ‗vitality in the 
self that exceeds all orderings‘ (Honig 1993: 39) and, to that end, agonism stresses an 
irreducible conflictual element at the heart of societies, rejecting any mediation via 
pre-set principles, seeing pluralism as the very condition of identity (Wenman 2013: 
29-30). In such a way, agonism might be seen as accommodating ‗post-secular‘ 
politics of conviction without the need of (supposedly) rational homogenisation (see, 
generally, Wenman 2014). As Tully (2008: 144) puts it, ‗agonism refers to any form 
of reciprocal interplay or interaction that disputation takes‘. Thus agonism is, 
crucially, about citizen participation, ‗having a say‘ on and negotiating the conditions 
of the exercise of power in a dialogic form (Tully 2008: 145-146). In fact, 
participation in such dialogues is seen to constitute the very essence of citizenship and 
civic bonds (Tully 2008: 146-147, 312-313). In a somewhat similar manner, Connolly 
(2011) sees the world in a constant flow of becoming, in which every instance of 
stability is elusive. Naturally, then, politics can only be an intermingling of various 
subject positions, beliefs, and passions so that everyone is simultaneously ‗friend and 
rival‘ (Connolly 2011: 177). Yet, this attitude does not lead to pure relativity since 
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partisanship is crucial to democratic politics – after all, the founding of the political 
order is an ever-present process (Connolly 2005: 131, 134). Mouffe, meanwhile, 
proposes a renewal of the conflictual domain of ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, ‗friend‘ and ‗enemy‘ 
(Mouffe 1993: 2-4; Mouffe 2002: 1-7). Drawing on Schmitt, she strives to revive the 
existential nature of this core division, albeit in a reduced form: the ‗enemy‘ or, rather, 
an adversary is, for her, an opponent in an agonistic game, somebody to be engaged 
with, but simultaneously also a constitutive part of the self and, therefore, not 
somebody to be destroyed (Mouffe 2002: 8-10). In such a way, it is claimed, politics 
is revived but without the destructive potential usually associated with enmity. It is, 
then, not common essence, but common concern, common participation in the 
agonistic struggle of the political community that provides the unifying bond of active 
citizens (Mouffe 1993: 67-70). And yet, there is a rather paradoxical limit to that 
pluralism: one has to first accept the fact of multiplicity and the ethics of plurality and 
open contestation, which are themselves seen as non-contestable (Mouffe 2005: 31). 
Undoubtedly, the agonists offer crucial insights by opening up the political process, 
perceiving it as a conflictual and tragic domain in which any fixities are artificial. 
Crucially, any status quo must be open for questioning and amendment while 
membership in the political community is determined through participation – this, 
indeed, points to revitalisation of politics as a high stakes game and signals the 
primacy of the constitutive thrust, constant innovation, and creativity that define the 
process of ordering. Hence, the political community is truly a protean entity, 
constantly shifting its form and always in the midst of self-determination. And yet, 
such unrestricted dynamism also calls for criticism: in order to be viable, a political 
community needs some stability, some form that it and others can refer to. And the 
case for stability is clearly undervalued by the agonists. In fact, living with 
contingency only (and with consciousness of such contingency) would be unbearable. 
As a result, a counterbalance has to be introduced – constituted fixity, a belief in the 
status quo through something more than it is by itself. As will be argued in the final 
chapter, such addition does not neutralise the conflictual nature of politics – rather, it 
only increases the stakes by attributive autonomous purposive action to both the 
constitutive and the constituted sides. 
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In a rather similar way, pragmatists would reject any ‗metaphysical realism about 
ethical and political value‘, refusing to acknowledge any arrangement as necessarily 
good (Festenstein 1997: 4). But this also brings a certain ethical imperative: one‘s 
own beliefs cannot be held as the ultimate criterion of truth but, rather, must be open 
for revision – this, in turn, opens a new space for coexistence (Festenstein 1997: 191). 
Characteristically, Rorty pictures a society of ‗liberal ironists‘, in which ‗one is 
content to call ―true‖ (or ―right‖ or ―just‖) whatever the outcome of undistorted 
communication happens to be‘ (Rorty 1989: 67). The ironists are constantly doubtful 
about their own views, do not expect their own standpoints to be or to become self-
evident and thus completely fixed, do not expect to have privileged access to truth or 
at least to hold views that could pass as neutral and objective (Rorty 1989: 73-74). In 
short, then, any status quo is what happens to be held as one at a certain time – and 
nothing more. Clearly, the realisation of the impossibility to adjudicate between value 
claims and the contingent nature of prevalent beliefs are crucial insights. Any political 
ordering is, indeed, a construct rather than reflection of some essence. Nevertheless, 
the pragmatists, just as the agonists, only see one layer of the process: constitutive 
contestation and the necessity of permanent change. In fact, the pragmatists of the 
Rortian type go even further than the agonists: while for the latter, despite the 
partiality of beliefs, politics is still a high-stakes game (because those who happen to 
hold certain beliefs, hold them strongly), the former cannot be absolutely serious 
about their beliefs. On the one hand, this contributes to what will later be analysed as 
the tragic nature of politics – unavoidably having to choose between equally 
groundless demands and consciousness of such groundlessess; on the other hand, 
without an overall signifying structure that holds meaning in place (or, alternatively, 
has to be opposed), one is tempted to see politics as a leisurely game rather than one 
involving questions of the political community‘s mode of existence. 
Next, for rational choice theorists, ‗people get involved in politics in order to further 
their own personal objectives‘ (Laver 1997: 1) and do so according to ‗their beliefs 
concerning the opportunities for action available to them‘ (Parsons 2005: 10). But, 
since those objectives tend to diverge, political action becomes a complex war of 
position, in which costs, benefits, and probabilities are carefully weighed. And, since 
action takes place under conditions of scarcity (this includes money, time, effort, and 
other resources), the struggle becomes yet more intense (Parsons 2005: 11). To some 
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extent, the inclusion of rational choice under the politics-as-dissent category could 
seem paradoxical because rational choice games are about reaching more or less 
stable equilibria in which collective action problems are solved through strategic 
decisions and political means in the most efficient way possible (Laver 1997: 153). 
And yet, any equilibrium is conditional (Laver 1997: 155) and as soon as the private 
desires of individuals change or other, more effective, solutions are envisaged, new 
equilibria are poised to be found. Of course, some of the premises of this theory, 
especially its reliance on conventional economic rationality, have been questioned. 
Perhaps the most interesting has been the suggestion to include commitment into any 
calculi, thus encompassing wider agendas than pure self-interest (see e.g. Sen 1992: 
135-137). However, the fundamental precept is the same: constant competition 
produces politics-as-struggle. In fact, the emphasis on competition and politics as a 
way to further own goals is very much in line with the overall argument of the thesis. 
And yet, challenge must be mounted against the supposed neutrality of economic 
thinking and rational calculation. Even the inclusion of commitment is not enough to 
ameliorate that. Criteria for choice must be seen as part of the game of politics itself: it 
fact, the control of such criteria, the ability to define what is rational constitutes the 
core of political struggle. Once a particular interpretation prevails, it becomes an 
object of belief, i.e. something more than itself – a standard of rationality. It is, of 
course, always open to challenge by alternative interpretations but does enjoy the 
privileged position of the constituted stabiliser, altering cost-benefit analyses not only 
of adherents but also of competitors. But here again an important observation has to 
be made: if it was purely for cost-benefit analyses, the dominant standard could 
remain unchallenged (the odds may simply not be favourable enough). There has to be 
something more: an element of belief, not only among the supporters of the status quo 
but also among the challengers – and here is where commitment kicks back in. This 
element of belief in some ultimate truth is capable of rewriting the perceived odds in a 
way that might be incomprehensible to an outside observer, thus opening even 
seemingly stable premises for questioning. 
Often, politics is also seen as concerning recognition, establishment of a favourable 
image in the eyes of the others and of the self – indeed a mirroring process between 
the self and society (Taylor 1992: 25). And, since ultimate criteria to judge the relative 
value of different standpoints are unavailable (Taylor 1992: 73), images and different 
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versions of those images are likely to be shifting constantly and indefinitely. To that 
end, one might imagine ‗a complex, many-levelled struggle, intellectual, spiritual, and 
political‘ (Taylor 1991: 120) – struggle as a lived experience, defining both the 
commonality of the group and helping constitute the authenticity of one another 
(Taylor 2011). This struggle leads to shared social imaginaries which, in turn, define 
both personal and group agency (Taylor 2004: 23, 189). Or, from a group-oriented 
perspective, politics must be about embracing the right and opportunity collectively to 
participate in decision-making, to have a voice and a veto on particular conceptions of 
social and political life, as opposed to blanket calls for universal inclusion and 
citizenship (Young 2003: 235-236). This constant innovation in which individuals or 
groups proceed to further their own interpretations of common existence and 
entitlements is part of the process of participation rather than a ready-made 
determination. Nevertheless, it must also be stressed that this creative participation is 
an open-ended process without non-negotiable criteria – something not always 
acknowledged by the theorists in question. But, as is stressed in this thesis, it is crucial 
to keep in mind that those group or individual strivings must always coalesce around a 
symbolic centre since otherwise they would go astray and the political community 
disintegrate. Some would be striving to uphold the status quo and some would attempt 




Finally, the third possible perspective is that of politics as occasional, as something 
that ‗ruptures or tears in the ruling distributions of sensing and making sense‘ 
(Väliaho 2014: 128), an ‗opportune moment that ruptures the monotony and 
repetitiveness of chronological time‘ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 165). In other words, 
real political activity only takes place in dramatic and exceptional circumstances 
(Barshack 2006: 186). Rancière is a very clear exponent of this view. For him, politics 
‗is the configuration of a specific space, the framing of a particular sphere of 
experience, of objects posited as common and as partaking to a common decision, of 
subjects recognized as capable of designating these objects and putting forward 
arguments about them‘ (Rancière 2009: 24). In short, politics is about what constitutes 
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the common and who is able to designate the common. Real politics happens when the 
usual designations are challenged, when those previously deprived of meaningful 
existence and speech take on the status quo aiming to introduce new subjects, objects, 
and experiences into the common (Rancière 2009: 24-25). Politics is thus action on 
the part of those who otherwise do not count (Rancière 1999: 123). Everything else is 
merely police:  perpetuation of the status quo whence seemingly no void is present; 
politics, meanwhile, is the return of the void – imposition of dissensus where there 
previously appeared to be a consensus (Rancière 2010: 36-38, 42). To be sure, 
Rancière‘s core insight is the emphasis on inclusion and challenge to the dominant 
modes of meaning and sensibility. Politics indeed is about generation of something 
new. And yet, as will be argued in the final chapter, this element of innovation must 
refer to a constant creative process rather than singular flashes. 
In a somewhat similar fashion, Agamben traces two theologies at work in the ordering 
of political communities: the political theology of sovereignty and the economic 
theology of governmentality (Agamben 2011: 1; see also Agamben 2009: 13). Thus, 
the mystique of the omnipresent all-powerful God and his actual plan for human 
history is mediated by the two theological aspects: abstract power above and 
governmental management below (Dean 2013: 176). In this way, ‗the Kingdom of 
providence legitimates and founds the Government of fate, and the latter guarantees 
the order that the former had established and renders it operative‘ (Agamben 2011: 
129). This separation, then, accounts for the removal of the political dimension and 
ties in well with Agamben‘s earlier work the exception as the only real political 
moment and the camp as the modern paradigm (Agamben 1998). Essentially, ‗[t]he 
only political action […] is that which severs the nexus between violence and law‘ 
(Agamben 1998: 88). But when the state of exception becomes the rule, the 
(concentration) camp becomes the paradigm for modern life (Agamben 1998: 168-
169). Exceptional measures and exceptional ordering for the sake of the state are 
normalised and thus bare life, instead of the qualified political life, becomes norm. 
What prevails then is an ‗apparatus‘ which ‗realizes a pure activity of governance 
devoid of any foundation in being‘ (Agamben 2009: 11). Consequently, real politics 
must be truly exceptional, which is rather clear particularly in relation to sovereignty 
as the ability to establish the result of the political process. 
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A common problem with the theories of occasional politics is that they take 
appearance for reality. In other words, politics is in its truly most visible form at times 
of fundamental change, when questions of the form and shape of the political 
community, inclusion and exclusion, are decided – at the moment of sovereign 
decision. What these theories do not appreciate is the fact that the sovereign power 
does not appear like Deus ex machina to overcome the aporiae of politics. That an 
exception is looming and that any change is about to happen signals that politics had 
been taking place in the background. Hence, politics is seen in this thesis an everyday 
occurrence, from giving the status quo tacit consent or challenging the constituted 
through some minor deviation to outright support or challenge. The scale might differ 
but not the presence of politics as such. Again, a Spinozist-Schmittian reading-as-
movement in the final chapter will reveal the permanent dynamic at the heart of 
politics. 
 
Epilogue: The Question of Ordering 
If there ever was a straightforward answer to the question of ordering (although 
perhaps there never was one), now is certainly not the time. None of the four elements 
is stable or uncontested enough for a durable and widely acceptable definition to be 
formulated. Nevertheless, there still are certain core trends in the contemporary debate 
that can be elucidated. First of all, in terms of the framework of ordering – the state 
and sovereignty – rapid changes in the global environment have provoked three forms 
of reaction, differing by the scale of acknowledged impact: there are those who say 
that the state and sovereignty are still viable in their traditional forms, those who call 
for significant transformation, and finally, those who no longer see the need and 
purpose for either. 
Those seeing the fate of the state in a favourable light, still treat it as the supreme 
norm-making authority, both the site of a struggle for and the guarantor of ultimate 
meaning, an idea itself and simultaneously an expression of it. And sovereignty for 
them is the guarantor of that idea and of politics, as well as enabler of real 
responsibility. The state is, then, the only embodiment of a demos. The national demos 
should not, the argument goes, need any validation from outside or some form of 
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patronising protection. Rather, the political community should be responsible for itself 
and that only happens through sovereignty. Hence, the state is seen as the only 
expression of norms and values that are particular to a certain society. After all, any 
global universality would only be seen as disguised particularity. This position clearly 
resonates with some of the arguments put forward in this thesis. First of all, the state is 
seen as embodying the principle of distinction, i.e. of there being a possibility to 
distinguish between particular political communities, conscious of their own presence, 
and capable of some sort of institutional embodiment. This embodiment is still 
capable of acting as a structure of intelligibility – an exoskeleton which provides the 
community with its form. And yet, the argument put forward in this thesis is 
somewhat more nuanced, as it takes into account the ever-increasing 
internationalisation of the previously state-centred system. Hence, the state‘s function 
as a structure of intelligibility is not an uncontested one, and to better understand this 
change, one also has to refer to the increasingly floating nature of sovereignty as 
outlined below. 
Meanwhile, the argument for significant change is based on many state functions 
being increasingly integrated into their global equivalents or made dependent on them 
to the extent that the global might already be replacing the national, thus leading to 
global participation. Furthermore, the rise of international normativity impedes the 
states‘ capacity to decide, with some of these norms not even requiring the consent of 
the states themselves. Consequently, state borders have opened up, with internal 
matters becoming an object of global concern. The state is clearly left devoid of 
dignity and exclusivity, reacting to the world and no longer shaping it. Sovereignty 
would thus only be preserved in a disaggregated way. The state is also no longer seen 
as a singular body or a structure of intelligibility. Sovereignty could then be seen in 
‗network‘ terms, flowing within and between different levels and bodies through 
multiple interconnections. While generally supporting the added fluidity of 
sovereignty, this thesis manifests scepticism regarding global integration. Indeed, the 
model of ordering proposed in the final chapter necessitates concrete, rather than 
abstract, referents: institutional structures through which political communities tell 
themselves what they actually are. The state in such model is an entity of and for the 
political community instead of being a separate structure, which often acts against the 
latter‘s interests. What one needs to take on board, though, is the emphasis on 
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increased competition, whereby global normativity is competing with that of the 
political community as expressed through the state. There is a significant degree of 
interaction between the two levels, and the state also has a gate-keeping function: it 
signifies the border between what the political community considers to be part of its 
own normative universe, and what is deemed to be outside it. Here, the Schmittian 
emphasis on the borderline between us and them, the own and the alien (essentially, 
therefore, friends and enemies) and the Spinozist notion of the state as an aggregate 
body determining a particular community‘s collective proceeding towards ever greater 
perfection are especially relevant. In both cases, one can clearly see the principle of 
distinction in action: particular communities with their own normativity (which might 
be, to a greater or lesser extent, overlapping with some international structures of 
nomativity), rather than universality. The inside-outside relation, showcased by the 
presence of the state, also clearly refers to sovereignty, which for Schmitt is, literally, 
a borderline concept. And, if sovereignty is seen, as it is in the final chapter of this 
thesis, to be a floating attribute to be arrogated in various proportions by the state and 
non-state structures competing for the status of the ultimate norm-making authority, 
quasi-objective particularity of an established order and permanent competition 
(which is an unavoidable corollary of groundlessness) can be combined. 
The third camp sees the state as superfluous while sovereignty is accused of standing 
for unaccountability, arbitrary power, and an unfeasible drive for exclusivity. 
Transnational solidarity is seen as strong enough to ultimately supersede any bounded 
identities, leading to universal inclusion. In this context, sovereignty is a thing of the 
past. It is being replaced by an international community and global democracy. All 
that, it is said, only further exposes the fact that sovereignty is deception only. 
Certainly, since human identity itself is seen as fractured and fragmented, no 
collective body can define it any more. Sovereignty, unsurprisingly, only remains as 
something ascribed by the global community, based on responsibility, and contingent 
upon the fulfilment of international requirements. Concurrently, any problem-solving 
is taken up by transnational networks of individuals or institutions while the global 
level would become the new dimension of identification – people, it is claimed, can 
now live under different, often competing and/or overlapping authorities 
simultaneously. All of that is even further underscored by projects for global 
constitutionalism, urging for ever greater global integration. The model of ordering 
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developed in the final chapter openly challenges such propositions. Although 
identities are perhaps indeed more fractured and less stable than ever before, they are 
still seen to be in need of a particular referent and of particular power to establish and 
uphold them. As already indicated, the Spinozist-Schmittian movement is, crucially, 
about competing particularities that cannot be fully incorporated into some form of 
global normativity. 
Then, in terms of the content of ordering, law and politics seem to be no less driven 
apart by competing outlooks and interpretations. However, there is also some common 
ground between the approaches towards these two concepts. Once again, three core 
patterns are identifiable: 1) theories of an independent domain of law and of 
occasional politics both portray seamlessly operating systems that normally do not 
involve a great degree of creativity and innovation, 2) theories of law in context and 
of politics-as-consent end up coalescing around some ultimate criterion, while 3) 
theories of law as a secondary phenomenon and of politics-as-dissent strongly reject 
any ultimate fixity. 
In terms of legal theory, the occasionalist trend is clearly embodied by positivism and 
formalism. Both reject any outside prescriptions – for example, moral ones – and 
instead rely on an incessant progression of rules and norms, whence one is grounded 
in another, which is grounded in still other and so on until the ultimate point of 
reference is achieved: Grundnorm, the rule of recognition, or some decision that has 
established an order. Only in exceptional circumstances, can the Grundnorm change. 
In a similar manner, seeing politics as occasional involves drawing a very clear line 
between everyday proceedings within an established paradigm and fundamental 
events that resist the mould and only become apparent in exceptional circumstances. 
Politics is about challenges to the status quo when impersonal objectification is 
shattered in an instance of exception. It is claimed in this thesis that both the legal and 
the political occasionalists err in only looking at the most visible manifestations of 
change, leaving latent processes unnoticed and limiting the agency of actors. In fact, 
by focusing on the status quo and the structures upholding it and seeing change as 
exceptional, these theories ignore the permanent tensions that motivate change in the 
first place. In fact, although for Spinoza some norm of ultimate reason always exists, 
it can only be constantly approximated. As for Schmitt, his well-known debate with 
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Kelsen leaves no doubt: as will be shown later, any emphasis on stable orders can 
only ignore their groundlessness and the permanent dynamic of the political 
community that underlies any sovereign decision on order. 
Next, on the legal side of the dependence/consensus trend, interpretivists strive for a 
single correct reading of law which best corresponds with a supposedly reasonably 
uncontroversial moral agenda. Similarly, natural lawyers coalesce around ultimate 
truths derived by reason as logically necessary. Certainly, these norms are non-
derogable, applicable across time and contexts. In a broadly similar way, for the 
pragmatists, the core criterion is what, in given circumstances, works as the most 
effective reflection of what law is. In terms of politics, meanwhile, perhaps the most 
straightforward example of consent is formulated by the deliberative theorists for 
whom politics is about striving for agreement through a process of equal unhindered 
communication. Other theorists, meanwhile, would lean towards some prefixed 
criterion, either a particular conception of justice or virtues that are embedded in 
tradition and thus enable a person to lead a ‗good life‘. Nevertheless, ordering, on all 
accounts, would be a one-directional process with final agreement and consent in 
mind. While this approach clearly favours the constituted, this thesis seeks to also 
introduce a constitutive counterbalance. In fact, from the perspective of the thesis, the 
emphasis on agreement and ultimate criteria can only be a strategy for legitimation of 
a particular instance of ordering – a particular structure of belief (a manifestation of 
political theology) that masks the groundlessness of any status quo. In short, this 
perspective shows ordering as it must look like (but not as it is). 
Finally, for the theorists who see law as ancillary, there always are some other, higher, 
stakes. For the realists, legal decisions are ultimately dependent on the wider political, 
social, economic etc. context. For critical legal scholars, meanwhile, law only seeks to 
symbolically end discourse and manage the inclusion/exclusion that prevails within 
the system. Correspondingly, the politics-as-dissent theorists treat the political 
struggle as expression of and competition between underlying identities and concerns. 
Among them, agonists put the strongest emphasis on perpetual struggle as the core 
attribute of politics with no final unity in sight. Rather similarly, the pragmatists reject 
any ultimate certainty for openness of multiple positions while for rational choice 
theorists, politics is about constantly making decisions in order to maximise 
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favourable outcomes. Contrary to the trend above, this camp downplays the role of 
constituted stability: its emphasis is on groundlessness, and groundlessness without 
belief, as it is argued in this thesis, cannot provide the basis for political life. 
Essentially, then, the above approaches present ordering as it is but cannot look like, 
and the model of ordering as process, i.e. continuous circular movement between 
contestation (groundlessness) and stability (belief) is intended to rectify this partiality. 
As this (again, non-exhaustive) outline indicates, although there are some roughly 
converging trends as far as the framework (the state and sovereignty) and content (law 
and politics) of ordering are concerned, significant differences are evident not only 
between but also within those trends. This is why the analysis will now turn to 
Spinoza and Schmitt and their interpretations of political ordering, intending to 
expand the conceptual apparatus. Although neither of them can provide the answer 
when considered individually and they do not come together in a neat synthesis, 
reading them together in the final chapter allows setting up a creative tension which 
helps accommodate disparate approaches. After all, if the above outline has provided 
some answer, it is that a synthesis of approaches cannot be an answer. 
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2. Spinoza: The Immanent Politics of State and Law 
In order to provide a Spinozist-Schmittian model of ordering, the thesis now has to 
move to interpretation of the respective authors‘ theories, beginning (in temporal 
order) with Spinoza. Starting with some core presuppositions of Spinoza‘s 
philosophy, this chapter then concentrates on the two summands of ordering: 
institutional/formal aspect (the state and sovereignty) and content (law and politics), 
as conceptualised in Spinoza‘s writings. Indeed, there is continuity within all major 
aspects of Spinoza‘s philosophy. As a result, both the need for the state, sovereignty, 
law, and politics and their characteristics are determined by his natural and 
metaphysical thought as well as by his theory of knowledge. 
Certainly, it is impossible to provide a full account of Spinoza‘s philosophy in this 
chapter. However, some of the key themes deserve special attention. First, in terms of 
basic preconditions, affective capacity and immanent causality, the paramount 
importance of desire, and the conatus principle will have to be elucidated. 
Transitioning into the social level, imagination as the basis for organic self-creation of 
the multitude will have to be analysed. Then, the focus will shift on the state and its 
order as upholding community and making people act as if they were rational, 
sovereignty and the instable balance of power that it establishes (as well as the right as 
power doctrine), law as a prosthetic device compensating for the inability of (most) 
humans to live in accordance with sound reason, and the interrelationship between 
politics, reason, and the general will. Finally, differences between the three forms of 
government that Spinoza analyses – monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – and 
Spinozist democracy‘s danger of implosion deserve special attention. All these issues 
will be of paramount importance whilst formulating a Spinozist-Schmittian account of 
ordering as process in the final chapter. 
In essence, this chapter aims to provide an interpretation of Spinoza‘s philosophy 
insofar as it pertains to the question of ordering. Hence, not all aspects of his thought 
are discussed, and those that are, are analysed to different degrees. It turns out that, 
although Spinoza himself never used the term ‗ordering‘ in the sense accorded to it in 
this thesis, he nevertheless made important contributions to understanding the 
elements of ordering and, through them, is vital to the dynamic model proposed later 




2.1. Life between Desire and Reason 
The key to Spinoza‘s politics lies in his natural philosophy and his metaphysics, both 
of which are seemingly amalgamated into one another. Spinoza clearly was a typical 
seventeenth century thinker in the sense that his outlook was based on natural 
philosophy and reason. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Spinoza saw 
nature in metaphysical and, occasionally, even mystical terms. And since, for Spinoza, 
there are no other laws (in the sense of stable unquestionable rules) than the laws of 
nature, his natural and metaphysical thought also permeates his political philosophy. 
Indeed, there is no human realm fundamentally distinct from nature and, therefore, the 
basic principles of nature underpin the core characteristics of human life in both its 
individual and social forms. As a result, the entire corpus of Spinoza‘s philosophy has 
to be read simultaneously. This section lays the ground for further enquiry into 
Spinoza‘s ideas on the state, sovereignty, law, and politics by concentrating on three 
major preconditions without which any explication of Spinoza‘s political philosophy 
is futile: immanent causality, the drive behind any human activity, and the possibility 
of humans agreeing with one another. 
 
Substance and the Nature of God 
As the first step towards understanding the basis of Spinoza‘s philosophy, one has to 
delve into his understanding of substance, particularly because of the role it plays in 
understanding causality and commonality. Substance for Spinoza is ‗that which is in 
itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that which does not need the concept of 
another thing, from which concept it might be formed‘ (Ethics Id3). At the 
fundamental level, there is no division in the world (e.g. between mind and body, God 
and nature), and everything equally partakes in the same substance. Clearly, then, 
‗each part belongs to the nature of the substance, and, without it, can neither be nor be 
conceived‘ (Correspondence, Letter XV). In fact, substance, God, and nature are one 
and the same, with particular things being only different manifestations. God is, then, 
‗an absolutely infinite entity, that is, a substance consisting of infinite number of 
attributes‘ (Ethics Id6) outside which there is nothing at all (ST, 30). Since God has no 
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outside, there can be no higher will and no mind external to nature and all natural 
objects. Spinoza‘s God, being the substance which underpins the entire world, can no 
longer be the external transcendent creator and ruler of the universe. Spinoza‘s God is, 
therefore, the immanent cause of all things (Ethics Ip18): ‗all he produces is within 
himself, and not outside him, because there is nothing outside him‘ (ST, 41). The 
effect of an immanent cause is and remains in it ‗no less than the cause remains in 
itself‘ and also has a crucial aspect of equality, since the cause is equally close 
everywhere and the result is no longer an image or likeness of anything (Deleuze 
1990: 172-173, 180). 
Wolfson (1934: 319-322), in his thought-provoking but often forgotten analysis of 
Spinoza‘s immanent causality, traces the Aristotelian and medieval roots of the 
distinction between internal (immanent) and external (transient) cause, whence the 
former is inseparable from its effect and, therefore, the whole is in its parts as the 
genus in the species. However, especially in the medieval tradition, an immanent 
cause is not the opposite of a transcendent one, since the latter also meant ‗logically 
greater and more general‘ (Wolfson 1934: 322). Hence, contrary to pantheistic 
interpretations of Spinoza, God would not be strictly present in all things; rather, it is 
the other way round: things are contained within God as the human species is part of 
the animal kingdom. This means that God (the sum or the whole) is logically distinct 
from all particular things (Wolfson 1934: 323-325). Although illuminating, this 
interpretation still fails to appreciate the radicalism of Spinoza‘s proposition. After all, 
since there is only one substance, all the attributes and modes are necessary aspects of 
it and (contra Wolfson) form a certain totality; moreover, that which has all things in 
itself, also exists through these things. Thus a two-way relationship is formed, which 
is necessary for true inseparability of cause and effect. Politically, then, immanent 
causality is not only a process of organic creation but also of containment of parts 
within the whole, which, as it will later be seen, could be rather forceful. 
Debate about the precise meaning of immanence notwithstanding, the very 
introduction of such principle was, as Kordela (2007: 31) notes, radical: what was 
once thought of as the first and independent cause now becomes ‗a cause that is itself 
the effect of its own effects and does not exist but in its own effects‘. This change of 
metaphysical orientation has profound implications for social and political 
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organisation: there can no longer be an outside decision, a miraculous fiat that 
establishes something out of nothing (the latter being Schmitt‘s preferred causation), 
or any higher ordering which exists independently and separately from humans, nor 
can government be justified by a divine mandate. All order, law, and will must, then, 
emanate from within the political community but, as seen above, also contained 
within it. 
The doctrine of God as an immanent cause follows directly from Spinoza‘s 
philosophy and from his radicalisation the Judeo-Christian tradition or, as for 
example, Hampshire (1978) would argue, from simply bringing the religious tradition 
to its logical conclusions. Keeping in line with scholastic and orthodox theological 
arguments of God as an entity that possesses infinite attributes, Spinoza merely 
radicalises the definition by equating God with nature (Hampshire 1978: 39-40). This 
equation also has roots in Spinoza‘s denial of the separation of body and mind. For 
Spinoza, extension (the spatial aspect) and idea (the mental aspect) are only two 
expressions of the same thing (Ethics IIp10s). Although there is a distinction between 
the creative natura naturans and the created natura naturata, it is not a clear-cut one 
because the created is always inherent in the creator (Ethics Ip29s) – God is the cause 
of all things, but an immanent one. There are clear implications to Spinoza‘s political 
theory: as will become evident in the subsequent discussion, the constitutive and the 
constituted elements, just like natura naturans and natura naturata, are neither strictly 
separate (because the created is always in the creator) nor absolutely identical 
(although there are clear differences in the degree of this identity between, for 
example, monarchy and democracy). The simultaneous thinking of the one and the 
many, unity and plurality enables Spinoza not only to allow for a multitude‘s organic 
self-organisation into a state but also to retain the former as a creative force even after 
the formation of the state – albeit, as will be seen later, not without significant 
restrictions. 
Although things cannot be said to be created or directly ruled if God is an immanent 
cause, there is still a causal link, since there is nothing contingent in nature; rather, ‗all 
things have been determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and operate 
in a certain way‘ (Ethics Ip29). This is also fundamental to the understanding of 
human nature, especially with regards to free will. It clearly follows that will cannot 
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be free in such world ‗but can only be called a necessary cause‘ (Ethics Ip32). Will is, 
in fact, ‗only a certain mode of thinking‘ and needs a cause which, in turn, needs 
another cause and so forth (Ethics Ip32s). The affective capacity of things is crucial to 
Spinoza: in fact, ‗[n]othing exists from which some effect does not follow‘ (Ethics 
Ip36). Indeed, any particular thing is inextricably associated with all other parts of 
nature and constantly affected by them; Spinoza‘s universe is, therefore, one of 
constant change and ‗infinite variations‘ caused by permanent interaction between 
things (Correspondence, Letter XV). The capacity to affect other things is thus the 
essence of existence. And if there is no free will, only infinite causal links, then there 
can also be no final ends, at least in nature. Indeed, as Forsyth (1972: 10) stresses, to 
act for an end is a sign of imperfection because it indicates some deficit of existence 
whereas God (or Nature) can only be perfect. That people sometimes perceive nature 
as acting towards a certain end, is a gross misconception whereby people impute 
nature with their own inclinations; rather, final causes are merely human inventions 
(Ethics IA) – after all, humans are, crucially, imperfect. These inclinations themselves 
are, however, also causally determined. 
 
Human Nature: The Primacy of Desire 
Regarding human nature, it must be stressed in advance that Spinoza strongly rejects 
any universal idea of a human being. Definitely, as it will be shown, humans share 
some basic preconditions, such as the primacy of desire and the faculty of reason (the 
latter often serving as a criterion of perfection); however, particularities do outweigh 
the similarities since any being is only an imperfect manifestation of substance. The 
discussion below has several crucial implications for the model of ordering. First of 
all, the necessarily imperfect and desire-ridden human nature is the basic precondition 
of any organisation and, hence, ordering; then, conatus refers to the central drive of 
both individuals and groups; and thirdly, Spinoza‘s equation of right, power, and 
virtue plays a crucial role in managing the process of ordering and attributing the 
impetus for a particular snapshot of ordering. 
The core term in understanding Spinoza‘s theorisation of a human person (or, indeed, 
of each thing) is the hardly translatable conatus, endeavour to persevere in being or 
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existence (Ethics IIIp6), which is ‗nothing other than the actual essence of the thing‘ 
(Ethics IIIp7). Here Spinoza‘s inseparable triad of perfection, power, and reality must 
be kept in mind. Reality and perfection are essentially one and the same thing for 
Spinoza (Ethics IId6). The more a particular thing has reality, or existence, the more it 
has power and the more perfect it is, the more it has reality and power, etc. (Ethics 
Ip11s). What is crucial socially and politically, ‗every natural thing has by nature as 
much right, as it has power to exist and operate‘ (TP, 292). Conatus is, therefore, a 
perpetual striving to persevere in perfection, reality, and power simultaneously: the 
more a thing or a person strives towards persevering in existence, the more reality 
(s)he has and the more (s)he approximates the infinite reality and perfection of God; 
simultaneously, the more (s)he is real and perfect, the more power and right (s)he has. 
Indeed, as Garrett (2002: 127) observes, conatus provides unified explanatory power 
to Spinoza‘s theory: it is a motivational power in psychology, a starting point in 
political theory (because it underlies motivation, power, and right), and the ultimate 
criterion in moral theory (because it helps equate power with virtue). 
Conatus is clearly related to having final ends and is, therefore, a sign of imperfection 
in finite things: to strive for something is to be imperfect, i.e. try to fill a deficit of 
existence. Since particular things are necessarily imperfect (only God is perfect), this 
deficit is unavoidably insatiable: whatever degree of reality, perfection, and power is 
achieved, it is never enough. From this constant deficit Spinoza also deduces a 
pessimistic view of human nature: because any status quo, by definition, cannot be 
enough, humans are inclined towards envy and hatred (Ethics IIIp55s). Some (see, e.g. 
Balibar 1998: 107) would object to the interpretation of conatus as deficit, instead 
seeing in it something ‗essentially positive‘. This is also partly the reason why the 
term ‗deficit‘ was chosen, rather than the much more loaded ‗lack‘. Nevertheless, 
‗deficit‘ still denotes a form of inadequacy, referring to the fact that, whereas God is 
the only perfect essence, no particular thing can reach that ideal. The fact that the 
existence of each particular thing has to be preserved and even increased presupposes 
an individual which is not sufficient in itself and not identical to itself in the sense that 
its ideal image – its perfect state of existence – exceeds any actual state of that 
individual. This constitutive deficit is definitely positive in the sense of producing an 
active striving rather than crumbling the individual under the burden of its own 
deficiency but humans, nevertheless, remain centred on a void, an absence. 
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Conatus is never an abstract striving – it is always a desire for something. This 
striving is, however, fundamentally anti-essentialist, since any object can become an 
embodiment of deficit, resulting in a transformation of conatus into a striving for that 
thing (see e.g. Hampshire 1978: 133). And yet, since the striving to eliminate the 
deficit is constant, no object can provide access to an absent fullness and thus conatus 
is also about constant displacement of striving. As far as conatus pertains to both mind 
and body, it becomes appetite and, when it is conscious, desire. Consequently, 
appetite and desire are ‗nothing other than the actual essence of the thing‘ (Ethics 
IIIp9s). In effect, whatever a person does, (s)he does out of desire. And what one 
desires or loves is something more than the thing itself – a thing as it ought to be 
according to one‘s imagination (ST, 73-74). 
Clearly, desire considered in itself, cannot form the basis of social bonds since not 
only different people could be affected differently by the same thing but even the 
same person can have varying experience of a single object at different times (Ethics 
IIIp51). Nevertheless, it is impossible to free oneself from desire: because human 
beings are by nature weak, it would be impossible to survive without the longing to 
unite oneself with something (ST, 78-79). There are, however, some things more 
worthy to be loved and desired than others. Ideally, a person should love, above all, 
‗eternal and infinite‘ things, since they are unchanging and bring only joy 
(Improvement, 5) and, because these things can only be grasped by reason and not 
through the prism of desire, love for eternal things can lead to human association. This 
is what Spinoza calls ‗intellectual love of God‘ (Ethics Vp32c) or, simply, love of 
absolute reason. Strauss (1997) clearly errs in ascribing to Spinoza an absolute 
distinction between reason and passion/desire: instead, they are both present in 
everyone, only to a different degree. And yet, Spinoza, admittedly, did not have much 
hope that most people would be able to achieve the goal of loving reason above 
everything, at least unaided by the state and its law. 
Desire is also crucial in understanding Spinoza‘s equation of power, virtue, and right. 
Crucially, an individual‘s power corresponds to his/her degree of perfection, hence, to 
the degree of his/her reality (see e.g. Garrett, 2008: 13). Since every person‘s right 
‗extends as far as his power and desire extend‘ (TTP, 11), whatever a person does, is 
done by supreme natural right because nature ‗forbids nothing but what no one wishes 
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or is able to do‘ (TP, 294; TTP, 197). Therefore, any action in order to satisfy one‘s 
desire and persevere in existence is right per se, if not having in mind ‗the true interest 
and preservation of mankind‘ then at least with regards to nature (TP, 294). As a 
result, Spinoza equates power and virtue (Ethics IVd8): desire – the essence of any 
individual – is a never-ending striving for pleasure, hence striving to persevere in 
being, and ultimately striving to extend one‘s power and virtue. This, it must be noted, 
requires self-sufficiency because ‗we act as something occurs either in us or outside us 
of which we are the adequate cause‘ (Ethics IIId2), an adequate cause here meaning 
‗that whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself‘ (Ethics IIId1). 
As a result, only the affections that a person is the adequate cause of are actions, while 
otherwise they are passions, i.e. lead to passivity (Ethics IIId3). Actions, however, 
must be based on an adequate idea (Ethics IIIp3) and the majority‘s inability to think 
adequately is the source of inconstancy and discrepancy. This is why an external 
structure to impose norms – the state – is needed: if people are generally not capable 
of thinking adequately and following the guidance of sound reason, then at least they 
have to be made to act and live as if they were capable of doing so. Hence, ordering is 
about collectively doing something that is impossible individually. 
 
The Illusion of Free Will 
As already indicated, there cannot be free will in Spinoza‘s philosophy. Indeed, 
‗human beings think themselves to be free in so far as they are conscious of their 
volitions and of their appetite‘ and mistake it for the primary cause of their action 
(Ethics IVpref). For Spinoza, the human perception of the world is unavoidably 
relational and relative. It is clear that the body is able to be affected by and perceive 
very many things, as is the mind (Ethics IIp14). However, since this perception is 
primarily a bodily one, there is no unhindered access to the thing in itself: on the 
contrary, ‗the ideas that we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our 
bodies rather than the nature of external bodies‘ (Ethics IIp16c2). Such illusionary 
freedom, clearly, can only lead to discrepancy and conflict, and can only be 
ameliorated through collective ordering. 
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Freedom, for Spinoza, means being determined by one‘s own nature and by nothing 
else (Ethics Id7). This applies not only physically but also, and most importantly, 
intellectually: it is ‗a firm reality which our understanding acquires through direct 
union with God, so that it can bring forth ideas in itself, and effects outside itself‘ (ST, 
148-149). Freedom, as the term is used in common parlance, in this case consists of 
falsity and ignorance only. Parkinson (1975: 24) offers a useful distinction: if freedom 
is understood in terms of causes, then no one could be called free (see Ethics Ip17c2); 
meanwhile, if freedom is understood as consciousness of reasons for an act and 
awareness of its inevitability, anybody could become free. In Spinoza‘s universe, 
where constant interaction is the norm, freedom is, first and foremost, the ability to 
consciously and without hindrance follow the causal chain which determines one‘s 
actions. This distinction also has significant influence on Spinozist politics: only 
somebody who has consciously internalised the political order and understands its 
internal necessity and rationality is able to actively partake in a political community 
and be an adequate member of it. Meanwhile, somebody who merely does what is 
required without giving it much thought, lacks adequate knowledge of the political 
order and its necessity and is simply acted upon. As a result, such person cannot be 
considered a citizen in the full sense of the term but, rather, a subject. 
The above also offers a new path to emancipation: one can become free simply by 
acquiring adequate knowledge even if otherwise one‘s situation remains completely 
unchanged (Scruton 1986: 82) – at least some consolation for the outwardly 
oppressed. Clearly, in Spinoza‘s philosophy, knowledge – and only knowledge – sets 
one free. However, a new limitation on autonomous action is simultaneously imposed: 
not only are humans causally determined to be as they are and to act as they do, but 
adequate knowledge and employment of reason also show the necessity of a single 
form of thinking and being, all other standpoints becoming inadequate and irrational. 
This is why, for example, Gatens and Lloyd (2002: 3) are completely mistaken when 
suggesting that in Spinoza ‗the flourishing of human difference, diversity and 
experimentation become the norm‘. Instead, social and political existence must follow 
a clear path determined by the norms of sound reason, providing a limiting thrust to 
the process of ordering. 
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Although people seek, or imagine themselves to seek, final ends, they only do what is 
determined by God or Nature (Ethics Ip26). God or Nature, however, knows no end; 
therefore, paradoxically, humans are determined towards an end by that which has no 
end. And yet, this is perfectly plausible keeping in mind that Spinoza‘s God is ‗the 
immanent but not the transitive cause of all things‘ (Ethics Ip18): the will of God 
comes into being only through its own effects and, whatever the action taken, it has 
always already been willed and decided by God (see e.g. Kordela, 2007: 18), thus 
adding extra dignity to the process of ordering. The subject is, therefore, a place where 
things happen, the causal chains and interactions of nature are played out against one 
another but not an autonomous self-sufficient actor. Politically, then, one cannot speak 
about individual or collective political will as some sort of objective given or an 
autonomous faculty. Insofar as it exists (and it must exist for any political process to 
be meaningful and purposeful), it is a complex set of interactions without any centre 
or essential content. And politics cannot be an autonomous sphere because any 
societal processes, decisions, or deliberations already add to the set of causal chains 
that affect the content of the will. Any political order is, therefore, always already a 
product of its own effects. This is where the circle closes: in the human domain, just 
like in the natural world, the logic of immanence prevails. 
 
The Morality of the Void 
The human ability to formulate universal – or at least universalisable – concepts has to 
be considered next, especially as it relates to morality. Here the void at the centre of 
human subjectivity and the general purposelessness of nature are once again of crucial 
importance. The understanding of a human person as primarily driven by desire not 
only has deep-rooted implications to the understanding of human agency but has clear 
ethical and metaphysical implications as well. Notably, it helps Spinoza disentangle 
the good from any universal essence: as Spinoza himself puts it, ‗we do not 
endeavour, will, seek after, or desire something because we judge it to be good, but on 
the contrary we judge something to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after, or 
desire it‘ (Ethics IIIp9s). 
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For Spinoza, something that helps to achieve the desired thing is considered to be 
good; therefore, utility is another criterion of goodness but, nonetheless no more 
universal than mere pleasure or desire because the same object might be good (useful) 
towards achieving some things and bad (hindrance) towards achieving other things 
(Principles, 133-134). Being good, then, is nothing else than the ability to satisfy 
desire thus leading to pleasure or even directly causing it. Similarly, perfection is no 
longer a universal quality but merely correspondence to a person‘s own individual 
idea of a thing, presumably, closely interlinked with a person‘s desire (Ethics IVpref). 
The same applies to any final causes that humans attribute to things: these causes are 
nothing else than human appetites (Ethics IVpref). Here pleasure leads mind to greater 
perfection while pain, on the contrary, leads to a lesser perfection (Ethics IIIp11s). 
This distinction is what grounds human judgement. For Spinoza, desire is not only an 
urge but also a source of active striving by which ‗we endeavour to promote the 
coming into existence of everything that we imagine to lead to pleasure‘ and, 
conversely, seek to destroy whatever we judge to lead to pain (Ethics IIIp28). It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that people love, hate, or desire not the things 
themselves but the mental images of those things that, to a greater or lesser extent, 
correspond to reality – again, this is why, in the final chapter, ordering is seen as 
fundamentally relating to appearance, objects passing for more than they are or can 
be. Certainly, people tend to differ to the extent that their judgements are based on 
emotions, especially since the things expected to cause pleasure or pain are nothing 
else but products of imagination (Ethics IIIp51s). For Spinoza, ‗men can be discrepant 
in nature insofar as they are harassed by emotions which are passions, and to that 
extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant‘ (Ethics IVp33) because these 
emotions are impossible to explain through the essence of the affected person. Still, 
remedy is available: ‗an emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as 
we form a clear and distinct idea of it‘ (Ethics, Vp3). This is where the question of 
power kicks in. If a human association is to strive for what it desires collectively, 
unanimity of the aforementioned mental images has to always already have been 
established. Regardless of whether this is done by one person, a collective body, or the 
community as a whole, this is where political power is at play the most. 
This power, however, cannot be arbitrary or contradict the interests of the people 
(although, in fact, there is, ideally, only one interest and pleasure – proceeding 
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towards ever sounder reason). After all, self-interest is, for Spinoza, so strong and 
impossible to overcome that ‗it may be included among the eternal truths‘: it is in 
human nature that people will not act ‗except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a 
greater good‘ (TTP 198). Since the existence of a successful state, it will be shown, 
depends on the support of its citizens, a prescription for an effective political process 
is clear: it must, ultimately, be about the production of desired things and destruction 
of despised ones (or, to put it more straightforwardly, production of pleasure and 
destruction of pain). Hence, Spinozist politics is, in essence, management of desire 
with a view to further collective proceeding towards pleasure, power, and perfection 
(all three being one and the same). 
Spinoza does admit that, despite his relativisation of the categories ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, 
they must be kept in order to maintain meaningful existence. What is more, Part IV 
seems to even introduce a quasi-objective criterion of distinguishing between the two: 
‗good‘ is ‗that which we know with certainty to be useful to us‘ (Ethics IVd1), 
namely, something which brings a person closer to becoming an ‗exemplar of human 
nature‘ (Ethics IVpref). However, these two notions are still inextricably related to 
affects: ‗[t]the knowledge of good and bad is simply the emotion of pleasure or pain, 
in so far as we are conscious of it‘ (Ethics IVp8). Here it must be remembered that 
power and virtue for Spinoza is one and the same. But power is also perfection (and 
therefore reality) and perfection is at the core of being an ‗exemplar of human nature.‘ 
Thus again, as with ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, a quasi-objective notion of perfection is 
introduced. Crucially, ‗the more each person endeavours to look for what is useful to 
him, that is, to preserve in his being, and is able to this, the more he is endowed with 
virtue‘ (Ethics IVp20) and, more particularly, ‗to act absolutely in accordance with 
virtue is simply to act, live, and preserve one‘s being (these three mean the same) in 
accordance with the guidance of reason, and on the basis of looking for what is useful 
to oneself‘ (Ethics IVp24). Such is the path to greater perfection, virtue, and power – 
in short, reality. This also introduces the possibility to normatively evaluate humans as 
beings ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘, more perfect or less perfect: whereas the good person follows 
the commands of reason and loves other human beings, thus actively partaking in the 
nature of God, the bad, or wicked, person, although acting from his/her nature no less 
than the good one, is merely a ‗tool‘, lacking perfection and power (Correspondence, 
Letter XXXII). Far from being a tribute to conventional morality, this distinction 
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clearly follows from the wider context of Spinoza‘s thought: love of reason, leading to 
perfection, reality, and power, is a core criterion of the good life. Therefore, it is 
natural that if human association is concerned with the good life (and it must be), then 
it must be concerned with reason. This is a fundamental prescription of Spinoza‘s 
political theory. 
And yet, the human subject, by definition being imperfect, can only strive to 
approximate the infinite intellect of God. The same applies to desire – neither a human 
being is able to satisfy one‘s desire fully (because then (s)he would become a perfect 
being – in essence, God) nor any degree of satisfaction is realistically possible without 
cooperation because there simply are too many individuals, each driven by their own 
conatus. As a result, an institutional structure of reason and management of desire, 
which establishes collective proceeding towards greater perfection, is crucial. Political 
ordering is, therefore, both based on reason and leading towards reason – aiming to 
bring forth something that is its own cause. The same applies to desire: the state is 
about the management and collective satisfaction of desire, which, in turn, is a 
precondition for the establishment of a state. Here again one returns to the politics of 
immanence. 
 
Knowledge: From Automata of Desire to Social Beings 
Since reason and adequate knowledge are universal, there can be no discrepancies 
between free individuals who follow the commands of reason. Reason shows the 
necessity of all things (Ethics IIp44) by revealing the causal chain leading to any 
given situation. Thus someone who possesses adequate knowledge is immune to 
doubt (Ethics IIp43). Politically, however, this understanding of necessity could be 
used to legitimise any status quo as necessary and, therefore, right. And, since every 
person, who abides by reason‘s commands, must agree with one another, the 
observance of any status quo must be universal. As with immanence, there is no 
outside in Spinoza‘s social and political world. 
For Spinoza, knowledge is an effective remedy against passion and inconstancy, 
which allows seeing things from an atemporal absolute perspective sub specie 
aeternitatis, i.e. from the perspective of God or Nature itself (for a more detailed 
77 
 
discussion, see e.g. Nadler 2006: 174); therefore, a theory of knowledge becomes 
crucial. In Ethics, Spinoza defines three kinds of knowledge, two of which are 
adequate. The first kind is opinion or imagination, which only involves sensory 
experience and associations arising in one‘s mind. Consequently, this kind of 
knowledge is ‗mutilated, confused, and without intellectual order‘ (Ethics IIp40s2); 
therefore, it cannot lead to common understanding. The second kind of knowledge is 
one proceeding from ‗common notions and adequate ideas of things‘ (Ethics IIp40s2), 
because that which is common can only be understood adequately (Ethics IIp38). This 
also has an important social dimension: humans can agree in nature because there are 
ideas common to all of them. This form of knowledge is what Spinoza understands by 
‗reason‘ and involves comprehending a thing‘s properties and causal chains 
determining it (Nadler 2006: 180). The highest, third, form of knowledge, meanwhile, 
is intuitive knowledge which ‗proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of 
some of the attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things‘ 
(Ethics IIp40s2). However, there can only be a never-ending approximation because 
otherwise conatus will cease and the person will exist no more. And yet, Spinoza has 
to admit that many, if not most, people are ignorant and even the educated ones, who 
are, for the most part, capable of employing the faculty of reason, are not always able 
to think reasonably. Consequently, there cannot be a rigid essentialist separation into 
two opposing camps: those who are reasonable and those who are not. Instead, there is 
at least some degree of fluidity between the two (Montag 1999: 28-29). Therefore, 
although humans clearly possess the seed of common understanding – following 
Spinoza‘s assertion that since common traits and qualities of things must be 
understood adequately, humans must possess some common notions (Ethics IIp38c) – 
actual agreement can be difficult to reach. As a result, a clear normative structure, 
which could guide individuals in their communal existence and common proceeding 
towards greater reason, is necessary. And this necessitates a political-institutional 
structure – the state – which would uphold the already existing norms and create new 
ones – all of this, of course, based on adequate knowledge, hence, with freedom-qua-
reason in mind. 
Absolute discrepancy is imaginable only when ‗people are deemed to live under the 
government of nature alone‘ because ‗the power of living on the basis of sound 
reason‘ was denied to people by nature and, therefore, needs to be acquired (TTP, 
78 
 
196). This is first and foremost because nature (contrary to human wishful thinking) is 
not bound by human reason, power, and interest, the latter being directed ‗at the true 
interest and conservation of humans‘ (TTP, 197). Interestingly, Spinoza did 
acknowledge a telos of perfection to human reason which is but an expression of 
substance (hence, of something that has no telos) under the attribute of thought. A 
possible explanation for this paradox is the presence of a benchmark for thought – the 
infinite intellect of God – and the absence of such ultimate criterion for the Nature as 
a whole. As a result, human societies, insofar as they are the products of ever more 
perfect reason, can progressively develop (although, since only God is perfect, such 
development always remains only an approximation) and are, therefore, different from 
nature as a whole, which is perfect already. The true function of politics is, in this 
case, the production of such order, which progressively approximates the infinite 
intellect of God. Consequently, politics and reason are inextricably intertwined. 
Next, although imagination is, according to Spinoza, far from a source of adequate 
knowledge due to being more related to affections rather than to understanding, it still 
is necessary for a community, at least insofar as individual imaginings correspond 
with those of others. Indeed, collective imaginings, being based on emotions, provide 
especially strong bonds. As Spinoza sees it, the mind easily contains ‗images‘, i.e. the 
ideas of things not actually present, which, in turn, are basis for imagination (Ethics 
IIp17s), which then shows things that could be. However, whereas adequate 
knowledge has a clear social dimension, uniting people under a common worldview 
and leading to joint perfection, imagination has both a social dimension in that it adds 
perspective to human existence, helping inspire and forge relations that are as yet 
nonexistent, and an anti-social one because it leads to divergent volitions. 
Consequently, political ordering plays a crucial role in strengthening the aggregating 
function of imagination by imputing the population with common images and always 
keeping the interpretations of such images in check. 
 
2.2. The Framework: State and Sovereignty 
The second part of this chapter will concentrate on the institutional/framework aspect 
of political ordering, i.e. the questions of the state and sovereignty. Beginning with the 
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dynamics of human communities and emphasising the natural need to associate and 
live according to the commands of reason, the real focus of this part is on what 
Spinoza holds to be the most important structure in ensuring not only common life 
according to reason but also collective proceeding towards even greater reason – the 
state – and its sometimes complicated relationship with the multitude, i.e. the body of 
citizens which gives the state its shape and form. No less crucially, the inseparability 
of the state and reason also has to be explored. In fact, reason will be seen as a 
conditio sine qua non of the state and the only (albeit extremely strong) real backing 
for any authority it can have on its citizens. Finally, the location and nature of 
sovereignty will have to be analysed, particularly concentrating on the limitations 
Spinoza puts on sovereign power and the problematic of democracy. As it is to be 
shown here and in the final chapter, Spinoza‘s approach is primarily of a limiting 
nature, providing support for the constituted side of the process of ordering. 
 
Agreement and Social Bonds 
A core difference between the premises of Spinoza‘s state and, for example, Hobbes‘ 
is that whereas Hobbes proceeds from reason – whence it is reasonable for humans to 
associate and therefore they do so, pursuing reasonable arrangements (see e.g. 
Leviathan, 188; De Cive, 22) – Spinoza proceeds from unreason, i.e. although it is 
reasonable for humans to associate, their actual association is unintentional, caused by 
desires, interactions of all kinds, and, ultimately, mutually developed understandings 
(see e.g. Curley 1988: 124). Thus, as Umphrey (1976: 48) notes, the state, albeit 
artificial, cannot be unnatural – it is reached by organic self-association. Indeed, if one 
of Hobbes‘ treatises on politics is entitled De Cive, one could properly entitle 
Spinoza‘s political endeavour De Natura, for while the former is concerned with 
autonomous political subjects, the latter is heavily dependent on the order of nature. 
Indeed, the state does not even create anything: it only ‗make[s] fluid relations fixed 
and reliable‘ (Duff 1903: 275). But these relations are always already organically 
developed as social fictions through a shared history of interactions and still continue 
to develop through incessant intermingling of affects and emotions even after a state is 
set up (Gatens and Lloyd 2002: 90, 95). The state, then, is always a work in progress, 
a constant effort to capture and stabilise a snapshot of natural history. To some extent, 
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as will be shown in the following chapters, Spinoza shares this understanding with 
Schmitt. 
Since the essence of a person has already been identified as desire, it seems perfectly 
natural that the essence of the social bonds that unite people should also be found in 
desire. This desire, first and foremost, is in the other: not only ‗if we imagine someone 
to love or desire or hate something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, by that very fact 
we shall love etc. the thing more steadfastly‘ (Ethics IIIp31) but also ‗the good which 
each person who follows virtue seeks for himself he also desires for all other men‘ – 
of course, provided that one has attained sufficient strength of intellect, or ‗knowledge 
of God‘ (Ethics IVp37). What is more, there is an intrinsic attraction towards those 
who are similar to us, which is crucial to the formation of social bonds: ‗[w]hen we 
love a thing which is like ourselves, we endeavour as far as we can to bring about that 
it loves us in return‘ (Ethics IIIp37). It is thus far possible to agree with Deleuze‘s 
reading of Spinoza that there is an inextricable relationality at the heart of any body, 
either individual or social as its ‗interior is only a selected exterior and exterior, a 
projected interior‘ (Deleuze 1988: 125). Although Hampshire (2005: xxxiv) may not 
be entirely correct in stating that natural interactions among humans take place in the 
context of Hobbesian strife (because of the actual lack of power in Spinoza‘s state of 
nature), he nonetheless correctly stresses that this constant interaction allows for at 
least some uncertainty and unpredictability in Spinoza‘s world because of the many 
ways in which humans can be affected by the same stimuli. 
Indeed, commonality is the result of sedimented traces of past interactions and 
constant current encounters, creating what today would be called a ‗social imaginary‘, 
and this intersubjective bond holds the political community together (see Gatens and 
Lloyd 2002: 39). In this way, the imaginary bonds of similarity become criteria in and 
for themselves. Also, because to a rational person there is nothing more useful than 
other rational people, ‗individual striving passes naturally over into a general striving 
to live with others according to the guidance of reason (Gatens and Lloyd 2002: 33). 
Crucially, in order for reason to prevail, it is a must that humans leave the natural 
condition and form a society (in the form of a semi-explicit social contract in the TTP 
or quasi-organically in the TP) and start living under ‗laws which moderate and 
restrain desires‘ (TTP, 73). However, even if this be the case, it is an attribute of a 
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well-ordered state that people obey its laws more in hope to obtain something they 
desire than out of fear of punishment (TTP, 73). 
Forming a society is, notably, about strength in numbers. As Spinoza sees it, all 
natural life is a never-ending struggle between an infinite number of things, each 
possessing its own conatus, even more challenging because ‗there exists no particular 
thing in the universe such that there does not exist another thing which is more 
powerful than it‘ (Ethics IVa). Indeed, any person‘s power to preserve oneself is 
dwarfed by external powers (Ethics IVp3). As a result, individuals, considered by 
themselves, can, strictly speaking, have neither right nor power because ‗so long as 
the natural power of man is determined by every individual, and belongs to everyone, 
so long it is a nonentity, existing in opinion rather than in fact‘ (TP, 296). In practice, 
right to things or right to act exists only when many people combine their power (and 
therefore right), i.e. in a community (TP, 296-297). Also, people obviously differ in 
their skills and abilities needed to sustain and preserve themselves; and yet it is futile 
to expect much cooperation and mutual assistance in the natural state. In a clearly 
Hobbesian manner, Spinoza holds that those unable to organise themselves ‗lead 
wretched and brutish lives‘ (TTP, 72). There can be, then, only one conclusion: it is 
rational for people to associate in order to live more safely because ‗if (for example) 
two individuals of the same nature are joined with each other, they constitute an 
individual which is twice as powerful as either‘ (Ethics IVp18s) and, correspondingly, 
has twice as much right (TP, 296). 
Quite clearly, the qualification ‗of the same nature‘ is a vital one because if humans 
differ in nature, they are ‗naturally enemies‘ and even the greatest enemies possible 
since humans are the most dangerous of all creatures (TP, 296). According to Spinoza, 
individuals tend to agree in nature only (but necessarily) when they are guided by 
sound reason and ground their actions and judgements in adequate knowledge. It is 
only then that individuals are useful to one another, even though everyone only seeks 
what is best for him/herself (and one always seeks what is best for oneself because of 
conatus as power and reality). After all, as long as humans agree in nature, they have 
common aims even when following individual motivations. Even though Spinoza has 
to admit that humans rarely live according to reason by themselves, they are at the 
same time unable to endure solitary existence; what is more, they are very often taught 
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by experience that mutual help is of considerable benefit (Ethics IVp35s). As a result, 
‗there exists in nature no particular thing that is more useful to a man than a man who 
lives in accordance with the guidance of reason‘ (Ethics IVp35c1). Not surprisingly, 
then, Spinoza strikes a balance between the Hobbesian underpinnings of his theory 
and the Aristotelian view of humans as social, or political, animals (Ethics IVp35s), 
although humans are social, most people are simply unaware of that and must be made 
social by the state or, rather, the state must make them act as if they consciously 
understood the need to socialise. In this way, political authority is not some alien force 
that a person must be protected from but rather a citizen‘s ‗best friend‘ which helps 
one to find and maintain his/her better self. 
 
The Organic Self-Creation of the Multitude 
Spinoza‘s view of the constitution of a commonwealth is a clearly contractarian one in 
the Theological-Political Treatise, but rather less so in the Political Treatise. As the 
contractarian doctrine goes, the state of nature is described by ‗hostility, hatred, anger 
and deceit‘, pervaded by fear and anxiety, and incongruous with the development of 
reason (TTP, 197). In order to leave this hostile existence, people had to associate, by 
mutual consent relinquishing their absolute right to all things (a right which, strictly 
speaking, never even existed because nobody had sufficient power) and agreeing to 
follow the commands of reason instead of desire or, rather, to desire according to 
reason. However, Spinoza does not necessarily imagine a single act of association, a 
single contract. Rather, it is an organic association, which develops in small steps over 
time. A distinct corporate entity is formed, which possesses its own conatus and, 
therefore, has its own absolute right to self-preservation (see e.g. Scruton 1986: 102-
103). This continuous development, as Levene (2004: 144) notes, is the only plausible 
way out of a paradox, whence humans need other humans in order to become rational 
and yet cannot establish a well-ordered community if they are not rational already. 
There clearly are, however, two necessary conditions: firstly, people have to be aware 
of the benefit of association in order to form a community voluntarily and, secondly, 
this association must be (or at least appear as) the best possible. Otherwise, as soon as 
the conditions that induced the establishment of a commonwealth are removed, the 
contract fails because nobody is bound by it anymore (TP, 307). 
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In order to better understand the multitude-state relationship, it is useful to employ 
Spinoza‘s distinction between definitions of created and uncreated things, which he 
presents in detail in his On the Improvement of the Understanding, even though 
Spinoza himself does not employ it directly when discussing political questions. 
Clearly, the state is a created thing: although it is natural for humans to associate, the 
state and its law are prosthetic devices that enable people to associate in an orderly 
manner under the guidance of reason. The multitude itself is not something natural, 
primordial, and uncreated; rather it is formed through human association, either 
spontaneously or artificially induced. However, in the context of state – multitude 
relations, the latter is clearly prior. The definition of a created thing, i.e. the state, 
should therefore ‗comprehend the proximate cause‘; all traits of the created thing, if 
not related to other causes, must be deductible from the proximate cause 
(Improvement, 35-36). In this case, the state must reflect the political community in 
such a way that the former could be effectively explained through the latter. The 
community, then, is not only a constitutive but, most importantly, the formative part 
of the state. A core element of such association is the community understood as the 
multitude. If traditionally the multitude had been perceived as formless multiplicity 
which is ‗inorganic, inconstant, and undisciplined‘ and opposed to the integrated 
‗people‘ (Del Lucchese 2009: 119), Spinoza in part inverts this tradition displaying 
the creative power of the multitude as an active constitutive element which resists 
total unification and tyranny (see Del Lucchese 2009: 130-131; Levene 2004: 147). 
However, even for Spinoza himself, the multitude remained indefinable and difficult 
to grasp (Correspondence, Letter XXXIX). 
Because the multitude is a contradictory and internally divided power, the point of 
departure for any effective order must be the acknowledgement of the primacy of 
passions (which, if left unchecked, lead to discord) and, therefore, development of 
effective strategies to deal with them (Levene 2004: 145). Society as an institution 
then should have the power (and the monopoly of it) to determine the principles of 
rationality and rational organisation and to enforce them, thus instituting a common 
way of life among its members. Correspondingly, if a human association fails, it is not 
because of the wickedness of the individuals that comprise it per se (because people 
are by nature weak and wicked anyway) but due to the deficiencies of the association 
itself (TP, 313). Quite clearly, the establishment of a human association is a process of 
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the transformation of the multitude: one of self-limitation and self-organisation 
(Balibar, 1998: 120). The process of self-limitation is especially important since it 
helps to bring together the intermingled and often contrary desires of the multitude 
under the umbrella of what could in today‘s terms would be called identification. This 
limitation is an alternative, affective, path to similarity, complementing that based on 
reason. These two ways of achieving similarity are neither mutually exclusive nor do 
they lead to different kinds of communities, one inferior and the other superior (for a 
characteristic example of such misinterpretation, see Strauss 1997). Rather, both are 
present in all communities, only to a varying degree. However achieved, this 
similarity subsequently serves as the basis for the state‘s normative-legal structure, 
which then can be enforced. Crucially, in a human community ‗no one does anything 
rightfully, save what he does in accordance with the general decree or consent‘ (TP, 
298). Similarly, then, the political community has both the power and right to compel 
its members to act in accordance with its own decrees (TP, 297). This is why 
postulations of an ideal inclusivity of the multitude (see e.g. Hardt and Negri 2009: 
43) are to be treated with caution: the multitude is inclusive only as long as it is 
apolitical. Once a political community is formed, the multitude becomes a bounded 
entity. 
 
State of Reason and Reason of State 
It has already been shown that humans are relational individuals: as summarised by 
Deleuze (1988: 123), ‗a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is 
this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body and its 
individuality‘ to the extent that an individual‘s very existence is based on being 
conceivable and intelligible to others (see e.g. Della Rocca 2008: 36). Since one‘s 
individuality is dependent on one‘s surroundings, human association is crucial. As it 
has also become evident, humans wilfully seek and contribute to only those relations 
that promise the greatest good and are inclined to withdraw their support as soon as 
this perception of greatest benefit disappears. This is of fundamental importance in the 
formation of any human association and, ultimately, the state. Indeed, ‗any agreement 
can have force only if it is in our interest, and when it is not in our interest, the 
agreement fails and remains void‘ (TTP, 199). And yet, human liability to passions 
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renders such support problematic. The state must, therefore, constantly maintain the 
foundational agreement by both rational persuasion and force. The need of force is 
clearly lamentable for Spinoza but it is a fact of life: if humans were perfectly 
reasonable, they would acknowledge the fundamental importance of the state and 
would wilfully abide by its laws. However, not everyone is led by reason‘s guidance 
and thus the state must be protected by any means necessary (TTP, 199). In fact, 
humans are so easily distracted that often there is no room left for reason and force is 
the sole remedy. On the other hand, for Spinoza (and, it will be shown later, for 
Schmitt), the ability of the state and the sovereign authority to exercise its function 
fully, i.e. to completely eliminate conflict and strife, would really mean the end of 
politics and history (see e.g. Balibar 1998: 66). It is the relative inadequacy of any 
order that underlies the process of ordering. 
Still, Spinoza rarely fails to stress that ‗the capricious mind of the multitude [...] is 
governed not by reason but by passion alone, it is precipitate in everything, and very 
easily corrupted by greed or good living. Each person thinks he alone knows 
everything and wants everything done in his way‘ (TTP, 210). And yet, if only 
humans were aware of the benefits of ‗mutual friendship‘ and ‗shared society‘, enmity 
and harmful intentions would be easily overcome (Ethics Vp10dem). It is crucial, 
then, that authority is for nothing else than for the common benefit of all and exercises 
some sort of a civilising mission. It has also to be kept in mind that those who lead (or 
aspire to lead) and make others desire the same things that they desire out of reason‘s 
command, are acting ‗humanely and benevolently‘ (Ethics IVp37s1). In other words, 
it is right to subject others as long as it is done for the sake of reason. The 
commonwealth itself is specifically designed to tackle acts that are against the 
commands of reason. Thus, true reason can only be effectively followed under 
dominion, and it is a task for the commonwealth to make people rational (see e.g. 
Levene, 2004: 165), that is, ‗fit for citizenship‘ (TP, 313). Foreshadowing some of the 
utilitarian doctrines, Spinoza states that a good social order has to be the most 
conducive to the development of reason ‗by the greatest number with the least 
difficulty and danger‘ (Improvement, 6-7). As a result, the ideal dominion is ordered 
according to the dictates of sound reason (TP, 298-299) since in that case, strictly 
speaking, nobody even has to obey – only to follow their true interest (TTP, 201), 
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presupposing that this true interest is always already known. It clearly follows, then, 
that the laws of such a state would be stable and unquestionable. 
Spinoza clearly states that a free person and somebody who is not free differ neither in 
appearance nor in their actions – the only difference being the latter acts out of fear 
while the former follows reason, i.e. s/he understands the unavoidable necessity of 
what s/he does (Ethics IVp66s). Therefore, at least as far as the state issues reasonable 
commands, a reasonable person remains free. As Rosen (1987: 465) accurately sums 
up, the voice of state authority is the voice of reason and to contradict authorities 
would mean to contradict oneself and act against one‘s own interests. In this way, 
Spinoza manages not to separate the power of the state and personal freedom – in 
essence, they become one and the same thing. Therefore, reason provides for the 
crucial integrity, unity, and strength of the commonwealth. This is the point at which 
Spinoza clearly conflates the state of reason with the reason of state. The fusion of 
reason and state only strengthens the anti-utopian character of Spinoza‘s thinking, in a 
peculiar way bringing him close to Leibniz: if, for the latter, the absoluteness of God 
means that the actual world is the best of all that could have been created, for Spinoza 
it is the only one that is possible at all (see generally Phemister, 2006: 195-196). 
Whatever the framing, in both cases the present world is unavoidable. Both are 
equally conservative, implying that it is futile even to attempt imagining a different 
world where a different standard of rationality would prevail. 
 
The Nature of Citizenship 
In a Spinozist society, only a person who has internalised the common order – ‗he 
who gives other men what is due because he knows the rationale of laws and 
understands their necessity‘ (TTP, 58) – can truly be called just. Spinoza clearly 
stresses that fear alone is ineffective: when people are forced to do what they do not 
want to, they not only ‗have no interest or necessity for doing what they do‘ but also 
‗cannot help but rejoice when their ruler suffers pain or loss, even if this involves 
them in great suffering themselves; they cannot help but wish him every calamity and 
inflict it themselves when they can‘ (TTP, 73). A clear conclusion is, then, that ‗those 
exert the greatest power who reign in the hearts and minds of their subjects‘ and, 
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although hearts and minds are difficult to control, the sovereign still ‗has various ways 
to ensure that a very large part of the people believes, loves, hates, etc. what the 
sovereign wants them to‘ (TTP, 209-210). 
Citizenship, for Spinoza, is something artificial: people have to be made citizens but 
are not born such (TTP, 313). Only after the overarching ethos of the state, i.e. a 
symbolic order with which all citizens can actively identify and partake in, is created, 
a truly well-organised polity which commands the greatest degree of obedience can 
function properly. It is especially so because while it is relatively simple for a state to 
control the outward behaviour of its citizens, it is much more difficult to do so with 
their minds ‗[f]or no one can transfer to another person his natural right, or ability, to 
think freely and make his own judgements about any matter whatsoever, and cannot 
be compelled to do so‘ (TTP, 250). This is because human opinion is based on 
imagination which itself draws on experience – and, as Balibar (1998: 29) stresses, it 
is impossible that people have absolutely identical experiences throughout their lives. 
However, once the overarching symbolic order, the ethos of state, is created, freedom 
and natural ability to think freely can only be directed towards the supreme good, i.e. 
the development of reason and striving for what is most useful. Spinoza partly 
reinstates freedom in declaring that the piety or impiety of human faith should be 
judged by their obedience or disobedience rather than by the truth or falsity of their 
doctrines (TTP, 182). And yet again, this statement necessitates qualification: 
adequate knowledge of God‘s essence cannot be doubted rationally. Hence, necessary 
uniformity is introduced through the back door. 
Clearly, people must partake in a common substance in order to become equal 
members of the commonwealth. Spinoza sees rights as necessarily political in that 
they can only be achieved through collective effort, which itself necessitates 
belonging to a common demos by combining power and will. Applying the right as 
power doctrine, real rights arise only when people have combined their power to 
claim and defend them (TP, 297). Indeed, for Spinoza, citizens, first of all as bearers 
or rights, are made by the state. Since individuals, considered separately, are of 
unequal power and this power itself varies throughout life, and right and power are the 
same, then equality becomes possible only due to some balancing act which can only 
come with the state (see e.g. Balibar, 1998: 59-60). 
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Spinoza clearly renders internal pluralism problematic, leaving legitimate plurality 
only beyond the borders of the commonwealth. A decision taken by a political 
community must be a decision taken by all and for all, always already expressing the 
general will, including the true will and interest of those who had (mistakenly) 
opposed the decision (TTP, 253). Consent, then, is given not to a specific decision as 
such but to the abstract general will regardless of the content of that will. As it will be 
subsequently shown, law for Spinoza clearly has an immanent nature since the general 
will which it expresses is always already present and manifests itself only through its 
own effects. Crucially, when members of the commonwealth are guided as if by one 
mind and have common rights (and unified power), such group surpasses any 
individual in right (and power) infinitely. Therefore, a person must do everything in 
his/her power to follow the reason enshrined in law or else face the state‘s coercive 
power which, the theory goes, always acts for that person‘s own good even if (s)he 
does not understand that. Dissent from reason is, then, not a political act but rather a 
deviation that has to be corrected. 
 
The Location of Sovereignty 
In Spinoza, it sometimes appears that the state acquires a life of its own. There is an 
apparent paradox: the state needs virtuous subjects who are constant in their 
inclinations, even though experience shows that people, both the rulers and the ruled, 
are rarely such (TTP, 210). It is, therefore, the role of the state to ensure constancy 
and virtue. But it turns out, then, that the state in and of itself is ensuring its survival 
quasi-independently from its citizens. This paradox, however, can be mediated: 
although it is true that Spinoza seems sometimes to view the state as an end in itself, it 
is such only insofar as it is a tool to further the natural human ability and need to 
associate and to promote the pursuit of reason. Another thing to bear in mind is that 
personal freedom and political liberty are very different things for Spinoza (for a more 
detailed discussion, see Prokhovnik: 2004, 204). Spinoza was clearly concerned with 
personal freedoms, including freedom of consciousness and, to some extent, freedom 
of speech. Therefore, when he writes about liberty as being the aim of the state, 
Spinoza means personal freedoms and the development of reason. But on the political 
side, the state is the ultimate guarantor of whatever freedoms there are and all citizens 
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are dependent on it. This is probably the key to the division of liberty in Spinoza‘s 
politics: individuals can have their personal liberty to think and do whatever is not 
contrary to the interest of all because they still retain their own (very limited) power 
and, consequently, right; but they cannot do anything against the community not only 
because they are thus harming themselves but also because their power and right, 
compared with that of the community, is non-existent. 
It is, then, up to the state to uphold certain political liberties that are beneficial to its 
citizens. The state also cannot overly limit the liberties of its citizens, since by doing 
so it would weaken its constitutive parts, and, therefore, itself. As Prokhovnik (2004: 
211) insightfully notes, a core notion in understanding Spinoza‘s politics is that of 
proportion: liberty is proportional to power, the power of the state is proportional to 
that of the multitude etc. Therefore, Spinoza‘s socio-political world appears less 
paradoxical when one takes into account a very tentative equilibrium of power and 
right that exists at all levels. This equilibrium between the sovereign authority‘s power 
and that of the multitude also means that the sovereign authority has the right to 
decide only as long as it possesses the power to enforce the decisions, which in turn 
means that any sovereign must do what is in the multitude‘s best interest, since acting 
otherwise would lead to self-destruction. Peculiarly, Spinoza arrives at a theory of 
limited state/sovereign power without alluding to natural law (in fact, denying its very 
existence) or any universal normative structure whatsoever. Instead, the balance of 
power (and right) is crucial. 
In Spinozist politics, the crucial tension lies between the ever-present and ever-
changing constitutive power of the multitude and a higher ordering power that guides 
it. In essence, ‗[t]his right, which is determined by the power of the multitude, is 
generally called Dominion. And, speaking generally, he holds dominion, to whom are 
entrusted by common consent the affairs of the state‘ (TP, 297). The sovereign 
authority is the ‗mind‘ and the guiding force, having the monopoly of right to decide 
on the questions of the good and the bad, what is and what is not to be done as well as 
to make and interpret laws (TP, 309). Consequently, the sovereign power cannot be 
claimed to be bound by its own laws, except for the sake of self-preservation whence 
the power of the authorities is checked by the power of the multitude (TP, 312-313). 
Once the laws become such that the majority is no longer able to obey them or if the 
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sovereign authority acts against good laws in such a way that good order of the state is 
threatened, there is a possibility of the multitude claiming its own power and right 
against the sovereign. In fact, since bad laws weaken a state, it is not impossible 
(although highly unlikely, since the state, as a collective entity embodied in the 
sovereign, possesses its own conatus) that the state legislates itself out of existence by 
merely passing bad laws (see generally Belaief 1971: 22-24). Rather unexpectedly, 
then, the right as power doctrine, instead of removing any critical tool for evaluating 
and opposing an oppressive regime, turns out to be an effective limiting clause – at 
least as long as the multitude and the sovereign authority have any distance between 
them, i.e. until democracy takes hold. 
As ever, dominion can rest either in the whole of society (democracy), when all power 
is held collegially and people are subject only to themselves, in which case obedience 
is not needed, or in part of society, be it a group of individuals (aristocracy) or one 
person only (monarchy); in the latter case, however, the one who holds the dominion 
must be (or pose as) somebody extraordinary (TTP, 73). What Spinoza appears to 
have been really interested in is the set of conditions and institutional arrangements 
that could make any of the three systems work best. Spinoza clearly stresses the 
primacy of the constitutive power of the multitude and there evidently is a very clear 
imperative of popular sovereignty underlying any form of government. One could, 
then, speak of a proto-democratic kernel in Spinoza‘s conceptualisation of monarchy 
and aristocracy but not necessarily about full-fledged advocacy of the democratic 
regime. 
There is, definitely, one clear tendency in Spinoza: monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy appear to form a progression of immanence. Monarchy is the least 
immanent form of government because its laws do not emanate directly from the 
political community and are promulgated as if from outside, even if they must reflect 
the will of the community; but the laws are not the sole product of the king either 
(thus the king too is not an immanent cause) because he is obliged to seek advice and 
thus his power to decide is bounded (TP, 327). Secondly, an aristocratic council is 
seen by Spinoza as immune to any debilitation, change of mind and spirit, and (since 
it is large enough not to be led astray by the passions of a few) able to follow the 
dictates of reason; being able to reflect the will of all but not just of one or few, it not 
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only does not need any advice whatsoever but enjoys dominion which is almost 
absolute (TP, 346-247). Finally, even though Spinoza died having barely started the 
chapter on democracy in his Political Treatise, it is still clear from what is available 
that democracy is ‗the perfectly absolute dominion‘ (TP, 385), thus implying the 
highest degree of immanent causality, when the political community is able to 
produce laws by and from itself with absolute self-sufficiency and, once a decision is 
taken (clearly this is done without any mediation), it is always already reflecting the 
will, the shape, and the interest of the multitude that are themselves only available 
through the laws thus produced. Clearly, ‗absolute dominion‘ here is to be understood 
in terms of power and right (see e.g. Hallett 1962: 189): the democratic state has 
summa potestas in the fullest sense of the term. Sovereign power is the more absolute 
the more it follows the requirements of the citizens (Duff 1903: 284), i.e. does what is 
always already willed, acting more as a medium than as a source of command. In 
democracy, of course, there is a complete overlap between the will and the power: 
whatever a democratic power does is always already willed by the people themselves. 
Clearly, democracy is closest to Spinoza‘s definition of freedom: there is no outside 
authority and every action and decision is, in essence, self-caused (while in monarchy 
and aristocracy they are mediated). Consequently, democracy is also a form of 
government where the most absolute transfer of power (and right) takes place, 
especially because it is not strictly seen as transfer but more as coming together (see 
e.g. Sacksteder 1975: 134). It also has to be kept in mind that ‗the more united the 
community is, the less will any of its members wish to claim rights against it‘ (Harris, 
1973: 188) and democracy is more united and closely-knit than any other form of 
government. Here, more than ever, the transcendence-like aspect of immanence is 
clear: all parts are contained within the sum and are, strictly speaking, held under the 
sum. Because of the fluidity of human social existence, the preservation of the totality 
requires submission, presumably forceful if necessary, even under the logic of 
immanence, since all parts must be contained within the totality at all cost. 
Spinoza‘s insights about proportionality and balance as well as the different degrees 
of immanence in the three forms of government contain a paradox when read together. 
Obviously, Spinoza wanted both the power of government and the power of the 
multitude to be limited and, thus, saw them as mutually interdependent and balancing 
one another. And yet, the same principle is rendered irrelevant in democracy where 
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the multitude and the sovereign coincide. Spinoza would have clearly thought that the 
multitude would not act against itself and that any decision taken by such a large 
group of people must be reasonable because, while a few can be corrupted, the entire 
community cannot – a view that is not necessarily sustainable. Indeed, the question of 
outside will return to haunt both Spinozist and Schmittian interpretations of ordering. 
 
Power, Law, and Winning Hearts and Minds 
It clearly follows that Spinoza‘s sovereign (either a monarch or the aristocratic 
council, or the whole multitude) holds the total right (and power) of judgement. The 
sovereign power is the sole interpreter and defender of all law, civil and sacred alike, 
and has exclusive authority to decide on justness and piety (TTP, 11). Spinoza does 
admit that the sovereign can do wrong at least in one sense, i.e. by sinning against 
God or Nature (TTP 205). The state itself, in theory at least, could be seen as capable 
of wrongdoing: it does wrong when acting against the dictates of reason but not 
because it then harms citizens directly (because apart from the state there is no law 
and thus no measure of harm); rather, the harm is indirect because a state that acts 
contrary to reason ultimately causes its own downfall and the downfall of the state is 
the greatest wrong it can inflict on its citizens (TP, 310). This, however, does not 
hinder the sovereign‘s natural right, which is infinitely superior to that of his subjects‘, 
and, therefore, his ultimate authority. Consequently, ‗no one can act against the 
sovereign‘s decisions without prejudicing his authority,‘ even though ‗they can think 
and judge and, consequently, also speak without any restriction, provided they merely 
speak or teach by way of reason alone‘ (TTP, 252). The latter statement could, at first 
sight, seem to be a strong affirmation of freedom of thought and freedom of speech. 
Evidently, Spinoza maintains that not only liberty must be granted to the people in the 
commonwealth but also its suppression is dangerous to the integrity of the whole 
political body (TTP, 11). But it must be remembered that freedom in Spinoza is 
relative anyway: unless a person is guided by reason, one does not really choose what 
to think or do. But the judgements of the sovereign are just as well, in ideal 
circumstances at least, based on sound reason. Therefore, the better the state is 
ordered, the more this affirmation of freedom slips into mere tautology. Indeed, ‗the 
more a man is guided by reason, that is, the more he is free, the more constantly he 
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will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and execute the commands of the sovereign 
authority, whose subject he is‘ (TP, 303). And yet, it has to also be kept in mind that 
reason is, in essence, immanent and thus must constantly be re-found, even though 
Spinoza himself would probably have disagreed with this conclusion, implying 
(Ethics IIp43) the possibility of ultimate knowledge: ‗just as light manifests both itself 
and the darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of falsity‘. By such truth 
Spinoza understands statements that show the world in its true meaning as a flash of 
light or suddenly bring sense to a disparate collection of experience bringing all 
fragments together (see, generally, Saw 1972: 162-163). Of course, this is more easily 
demonstrable in geometry or physics than in social life – indeed, in the final chapter 
this allegedly self-evident nature of truth and reason will be analysed in terms of 
quasi-theological faith. 
There is only very limited amount of natural right left within the state: because of the 
direct link between right as power and reality, a person must retain at least some 
power so as not to nullify his/her reality (TTP, 11), which, when read in the context of 
Spinoza‘s philosophy, appears to amount to little more than a safeguard against 
tyrannical government that strays away from the guidance of reason. Spinoza clearly 
states that it is impossible to strip people of their power to such an extent that ‗they 
could undertake nothing in the future without the consent of the holders of sovereign 
power‘ (TTP 209). A citizen must submit to the demands of the sovereign following 
one‘s own volition. The subjects, therefore, simultaneously act themselves and are 
acted upon by the sovereign power. In this act, the core of Spinozistic civic life is thus 
revealed: it is a conflation, virtually a point of indistinction, between the personal and 
the communal, the personal will and the will of the sovereign. 
While rule by fear captivates the body only and can only last as long as fear prevails, 
the captivation of mind is more permanent and more effective (TP, 295). Stable and 
lasting dominion is, then, one based on ideological and symbolic dominance rather 
than overt intimidation – ‗soft‘ rather than ‗hard‘ control of the subjects. In a sense, 
then, the state outsources the necessary emotions to its citizens who, in turn, become 
automata, loving or hating ‗owing to the power of the state alone‘ (TTP 2010). This 
statement, shocking as it might seem at first, must be seen through the lens of 
Spinoza‘s causally determined universe. Since free will is, for the most part, an 
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illusion anyway, the relevant question becomes one of effective cause. The ultimate 
cause is, undoubtedly, God or Nature. Humans are determined by that cause to 
socialise but none of them (or almost none, with the exception of the enlightened few) 
are able to do this by themselves. This is where the state steps in by bringing people 
together and, at least partly, substituting the bondage of passions with reason. Quite 
clearly, this is not the same as to impute reason itself: usually people merely act as if 
they were reasonable. Meanwhile, constant drive towards pleasure is likely to be a 
permanent undermining force; indeed, the multitude ‗is governed not by reason but by 
passion alone, it is precipitate in everything, and very easily corrupted by greed or 
good living‘ while each person judges by him/herself according to his/her personal 
interest rather than with the communal good in mind (TTP 210). Thus the best 
Spinoza is able to count on is prosthetic reason – the reason of state. Here again, the 
progression of immanence, evident in Spinoza‘s characterisation of state forms, comes 
as no surprise: whereas in a monarchy exceptional power, will, and charisma are 
needed to establish the reason of state and acquire the necessary ideological and 
symbolic dominance, in the case of democracy reason comes from within and is 
always already manifest in the dominant ideology. 
 
Sovereignty, Power, and Politics 
From the fact that the people‘s minds are much less prone to control than their tongues 
follows that no state can ever be completely stable and secure (TTP, 250) – there is 
always room for a centre of opposition to develop. Although this unavoidable 
heterogeneity is, from Spinoza‘s perspective, a failing and a sign of human weakness 
(since it leads to instability), it is, nevertheless, a fact of life (TTP, 251). It is also a 
sign that nobody surrenders his/her power to the state absolutely. Moreover, depriving 
people of the right to think and speak freely not only would undermine trust – an 
essential element of the state – but would also be futile since it would be impossible 
for people not to resist (TTP, 255). Spinoza does attempt to strike a compromise here 
by stating that everyone is free to think and speak as they wish and yet cannot act 
against the sovereign – if someone judges a law or any other decision to be contrary to 
sound reason, (s)he can report this to the sovereign authority but is not him/herself 
allowed to do anything about it (TTP, 252-253). In this very limited respect, it is not 
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completely unfounded to see in Spinoza an advocate of the freedom of speech and 
freedom of conscience, although a very unwilling one. And yet, as indicated earlier, 
the better the state is organised, the more Spinoza‘s concessions to personal freedoms 
slip to tautology, thus contributing to the constituted side of ordering. 
As has already been established, for Spinoza, subjugation is least likely in democracy 
(TTP, 251) since democracy is a rule of the popular will according to the logic of 
immanence: whatever is decided is the will of all and being subjected to one‘s own 
decision does not constitute oppression (although the reading developed in this thesis 
suggests that the actual effect would be the opposite). Crucially, Spinoza, possibly due 
to his rationalism, fails to account for other forms of subjugation that are enabled by 
such line of thinking: ideological dominance, whence concrete standards replace the 
human ability to decide. In this way, contrary to Spinoza‘s expressed intention, human 
beings are turned to automata, barely nodding to the always already existing general 
will. A crucial question, as always, remains: who decides on the content of the general 
will? Although this will be the crucial question of politics for Schmitt, for Spinoza 
that is not the case. In Spinoza‘s democracy, such decision is not political because it is 
a decision taken without contestation. Any contestation does not even become an 
attribute of the public enemy, as it is the case for Schmitt. Rather, it becomes an 
attribute of the unreasonable and is, consequently, discarded from legitimate 
discourse. Decision, therefore, does not even come across as such – the general will is 
more found than decided upon. Reason is simply ‗out there‘, in God-qua-Nature, and 
can only be discovered. 
As is clear from the above, Spinoza‘s claim that the state cannot turn people into 
‗beasts or automata‘ by overtly subjecting them to some form of authority (TTP, 252) 
is inherently problematic. As demonstrated, the only way out of this is, for Spinoza, to 
acknowledge that when automatically enacting state laws that are themselves an 
incarnation of reason humans are not automata – instead they are almost free if they 
follow those laws blindly and approximate true freedom if they are conscious of the 
internal reasonableness of such laws. Indeed, it is the purpose of the state to let people 
‗develop in their own ways‘, i.e. the ultimate telos is freedom (TTP, 252) as well as 
security of life (TP, 313). But, contrary to, for example, Smith‘s (2003: 144-145) 
interpretation, freedom should not be seen as empowerment, at least politically; rather, 
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political empowerment can only be a side effect of the general increase of the power 
of acting through the rule of reason. It is the role of the state to ensure the most 
favourable conditions for the exercise of reason but this simultaneously makes the 
state a guardian of what the state itself is. Again, a significant degree of tautology is 
present. 
Sovereign power is, in turn, legitimated by the very fact of the sovereign possessing 
the power – it is, as Scruton (1986: 101) states, self-legitimating. This circular 
legitimation rests on the assumption that, since the sovereign has a certain amount of 
power, everybody must have agreed to the fact; if the people had not agreed to it, they 
would have retained some power to themselves, which they evidently have not (TTP, 
200). Of course, as noted above, a crucial qualification of sovereignty lies in 
Spinoza‘s right as power doctrine: the sovereign‘s right extends only as far as the 
sovereign‘s power does. Consequently, once the balance of power within the state 
changes, so does the localisation of sovereign right (TTP, 200-201). Therefore, the 
sovereign power is under double determination by the multitude. On the one hand, the 
sovereign‘s power is the combined power of the entire multitude but, on the other 
hand, political change is enabled in a standoff between the sovereign and the 
multitude. In Spinoza‘s universe governed by reason, once such change takes place, 
something that has supposedly always already existed but had been unreasonably 
denied has been brought into being. Admittedly, this scheme of change is somewhat 
complicated in democracy, the most absolute and immanent form of state, because 
such balance of power would require at least the possibility of the multitude being 
internally divided and in conflict with itself. Indeed, the conceptualisation of 
democratic political change will benefit from the later discussion of Schmitt‘s usage 
of stasis. For Spinoza, meanwhile, democratic change appears to be problematic, 
although it is impossible to know for sure without the chapter on democracy itself. 
This standoff between the two core units of the state, the sovereign and the multitude, 
is stable until both powers remain only potential and refrain from becoming actual. 
When they do, however, the result is discord and, possibly, violence. As a result, the 
art of statecraft is to maintain the balance between the two and, no less importantly, 
between their potential interests and demands. And yet, this balance, as Prokhovnik 
(2004: 230) insightfully reads it, is not a compromise between extremes but 
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equilibrium as suspended movement within a relationship which is still full of tension. 
Therefore, in Spinoza‘s model of politics, both an ideologically repressive state and a 
state which allows a strong ideological centre of opposition to develop are posed to 
instability (see Balibar 1998: 29). Contrary to Hardt and Negri (2004: 221), positive 
opinion on revolts, revolutions, and refusal to recognise authority cannot be read into 
Spinoza‘s theory; rather, Spinoza appears to have emphasised stability (even if 
characterised by a certain tension) and denied sudden forceful change, save but in the 
most extreme circumstances characterised by absence of reason on the part of state 
authorities. Everything else should be seen as sedition guided by non-reason. 
 
2.3. The Mechanism: Law and Politics 
This part of the chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the content of political ordering: 
law and politics. For Spinoza, there are two ways in which order can be imposed. One 
of them is religion, which appeals to pre-rational qualities but can still make people 
act as if they were guided by reason, provided that it is carefully crafted. For the most 
part, however, Spinoza sees religion as being about superstition and promotion of an 
anthropocentric worldview that has nothing to do with the real order of nature. And 
yet, some form of theological thinking is unavoidable in any political community. The 
distinguishing factor between political theologies is the balance between superstition 
and the liberty to collectively proceed towards greater reason. Needless to argue, the 
more the state allows for the latter, the better it is organised. 
The second way to impose order is through law, which is, in essence, direct 
imposition of the dictates of reason. Law is needed due to the lamentable fact that not 
all humans are capable of living their lives according to reason. In this sense, it is very 
much a prosthetic device: it functions as a substitute for reason, making people act as 
if they were reasonable. As such, it makes people free (because reason is freedom) 
and harmonises human behaviour (because reasonable individuals necessarily agree 
with one another). In other words, law and reason are inseparable or, ideally, overlap 
almost completely (just like in the case of reason and the state). However, a paradox is 
also worth noting: due to its approximation to reason, law is both internal to a political 
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community (because it is the product of that community) and external (because the 
ultimate standard for reason is the infinite intellect of God). 
Finally, in terms of politics, reason again is a defining characteristic: indeed, it could 
even be argued that imposition of reason was more important to Spinoza than 
imposition of the popular will. And yet, democracy and democratic politics present a 
curious amalgamation of will, power, and reason because the will to establish the state 
and the law, the power to do so, and the collective proceeding towards greater reason 
coincide. As a result, the opportunities and dangers created by such politics of self-
referential immanence have to be explored. In fact, change is brought about through 
constant tension between the multitude and the sovereign authority. However, this 
tension is possible only between the two as integrated powers: further division and 
additional tensions (e.g. within the multitude) only contribute to sedition and discord 
and therefore are dangerous. Also, reason cannot be internally contradictory and, 
therefore, there can only be one standard for adequacy of a claim. As a result, those 
who propose an alternative will simply stray away from reason. Therefore, the 
function of a public enemy or, rather, an enemy of reason also must be analysed in 
order to fully understand the force of Spinoza‘s politics. In relation to the overall 
argument of this thesis, Spinoza is read as a theorist who, for the most part, provides 
legitimacy to the constituted. Indeed, the way politics and law are presented is more 
likely to contribute to limitation rather than creativity. 
 
Frameworks for Order: Religion and Law 
As Prokhovnik (2004: 170-171) correctly notes, Spinoza‘s aim in the Theological-
Political Treatise is to separate theology and reason, the first being concerned with 
obedience and piety, the second with wisdom and truth. Although they are 
interconnected and the religious component is somewhat dependent on the political 
one (because religion can flourish only in a suitable political context), there indeed is 
a line of separation between them, at least in Spinoza‘s writings. From the wider 
context of Spinoza‘s work, it is evident that the two even should be kept separate 
because their union in the form of some political theology is a clear pathway to 
ignorance and oppression, especially because it ‗intertwines the political and 
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theological implications of fear, and simultaneously opposes piety and peace‘ (James 
2012: 20). This is true at least as far as religion in the conventional sense is concerned; 
meanwhile, Spinoza‘s own understanding of religion, as an intellectual contemplation 
of God, can only lead to freedom. However, this contemplation is not meant to be 
universally achievable. Therefore, one is only left with religion as belief rather than 
knowledge.  
Religions prevail because of the failure of humans to know themselves and their 
environment adequately (Doueihi, 2010: 63). Since humans are by nature ignorant of 
the causes of their volitions, they tend to see nature not as a cause but as a means. It is 
from this misconception that an idea of some power that had created all nature for 
human enjoyment arises (Ethics IA). Blinded by desire, people thought of various 
ways of worshipping God so that nature would be more favourable to them than to 
others, in turn sinking into prejudice and superstition (Ethics IA). For Spinoza, fear is 
the source of superstitions of various kinds – it ‗is the root from which superstition is 
born, maintained and nourished‘ (TTP, 4). According to him, it is when things go 
wrong that people tend to seek guidance wherever possible and by whomever 
possible, and interpret the signs imagined in nature as if they corresponded to the 
situation people find themselves in (TTP, 3). For Spinoza, ‗the revelation of God can 
only be established by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles, or in other words 
by ignorance‘ (Correspondence, Letter XXI). Similar reasoning also applies to 
prophecy. It follows from Spinoza‘s natural philosophy that prophets cannot have 
witnessed miracles that are abundant in their prophesies – they only had ‗a more vivid 
power of imagination‘ (TTP, 27). This is not to say that prophesies are untrue or 
deceitful. These are stories finely tuned so as to fit their audiences. And they are also 
vital in teaching those unable to reason how to act by themselves. Spinoza‘s position 
here is clearly opposite to Schmitt‘s who, it remains to be seen, grounds the entire 
order, religious as well as legal, on the miracle-exception. In fact, there can be neither 
miracles nor exceptions in Spinoza‘s philosophy, both natural and political (for a 
discussion, see e.g. Strauss 2002: 176). Nevertheless, as it will be seen in the final 
chapter, Spinoza unwittingly captures crucial aspects of political theology, 
manifesting them in his own thinking. 
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Law, meanwhile, is, ideally at least, based on reason. First, however, Spinoza gets rid 
of all natural law (as a lawyer rather than a physicist would understand it) by 
employing his right as power doctrine. Obviously, as Miller (2012: 222) stresses, there 
can be no higher law, command, or will, either divine or natural if God (or Nature) has 
no will. In Spinoza‘s view, there are no natural norms or prescriptions, rather, power 
and right are coextensive (TP, 292) and everything one does, (s)he does by natural 
right. To put it even more radically, ‗the law and ordnance of nature <…> forbids 
nothing but what no one wishes or is able to do‘ (TP, 294). As Hampshire (1978: 147-
148) notes, to impose any external law or purpose would mean to imply a creator 
external from the creation, which would be contrary to Spinoza‘s philosophy of 
immanence. For Spinoza, there is no ‗original‘ freedom or natural ‗rights‘; rather, 
individual rights are inherently political and their very existence and content reflect 
the distribution of power within a political community at a particular time (see Levene 
2004: 144-145). And yet, Spinoza does retain some standard: ultimately, all rights, 
duties, and freedoms should be dispensed under the commands of reason, hence still 
preserving some normativity. 
Nevertheless, a slightly more relativist reading of Spinoza‘s law is possible, seeing the 
dictates of reason as principles to be applied on a case-by-case basis and thus more 
like orientations or maxims rather than universal and predetermined prescriptions (see 
e.g. Rasmussen and Den Uyl 2012: 251). Contrary to, for example, Smith (2003: 144-
145), it must be stressed that law, for Spinoza, does not necessarily have to possess a 
moral content. Something akin to conventional moral norms could be achieved 
through good laws and the application of reason but this kind of morality is more of a 
side effect than an essence. Therefore, for Spinoza (like, it will be shown, for Schmitt) 
there is no necessary essence and no transcendent guarantor of law (see e.g. 
Vardoulakis 2012: 135-136); however, unlike Schmitt, there still is a necessary ideal – 
sound reason, which allows the capable person to decipher a situation and find an 
adequate solution. Once again, the essence of humans lies outside (therefore, law is 
not subjective and cannot be imposed arbitrarily) but simultaneously it can only be 
established by humans because nature is indifferent in this respect (therefore, law is 
not a closed and autonomous sphere). Law, in essence, arises at the point of 
indistinction between outside and inside. In other words, law too operates under the 
logic of immanence. 
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Since all nature conforms to the same laws, no science can be different from another 
(Umphrey. 1976: 45). This is why law, physics, and mathematics are so inextricably 
combined in Spinoza‘s statecraft. In effect, for Spinoza, there are two kinds of law: 
natural law-qua-physics (universal and unchangeable) and civil law of the state 
(particular and always evolving). Although, for example, Belaief (1971: 67) sees 
moral law as the third distinct kind of law, such further divisions are superfluous. The 
moral element is already part of state law due to the ideal of human development 
towards a reason-led existence: essentially, morality, as law, is about application of 
reason. To some extent, it could even be argued that state law is the only kind of law 
in the strict sense, while everything else is only description of natural phenomena that 
cannot be different from what they are and lack any aim or prescription whatsoever. It 
can then be said that all law in the sense of prescriptive rules is, for Spinoza, human 
convention only. Similarly, as Del Lucchese (2009: 33) claims, there is no universal 
common good towards which law should aspire and/or lead: rather, there are common 
goods particular to each political community that are determined by a sovereign 
authority (and yet, one should not forget that the main telos must be reason, even 
though it can be approached in different ways). In theory, this could be seen as 
empowering since the common good is formulated from an accumulation of the 
interests of all (Del Luccese, 2009: 36-37). However, in practice, political power is 
especially strengthened in this way because when a transcendent dimension is 
removed and replaced with immanent causation from within the political community 
itself, there is no more distance left between the people and the articulated good and, 
therefore, any basis for political struggle is eliminated. 
 
Justness and Law / Justness of Law 
Balibar (1997) makes an important observation regarding human law in Spinoza: 
especially in the Theological-Political Treatise (but, one could also add, implicitly in 
the Political Treatise), there is a three-stage progression: (1) a selected right (as 
power, not as something innate) (2) through the pact establishing a commonwealth is 
(3) transformed into law thus translating the power of individuals to the power of the 
sovereign. This translation clearly happens according to the logic of immanence: a 
right comes into being only through its own effects (not only because people have the 
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power and right to something only after it becomes law but also because law has 
always already determined the content of the right in the first place). Therefore, as 
Belaief (1971: 25-26) notes, law becomes valid only thorough its efficacy, i.e. through 
being obeyed, and not through procedure. If a commandment is not obeyed, it simply 
ceases to be (see Duff, 1903: 327). Spinoza is, in fact, an ally of Schmitt in the 
struggle against strict legality and for legitimacy. 
Human law is a prosthetic device: a substitute for human reason. This substitute is 
needed because, according to Spinoza, most humans are unable to make good use of 
their reason; as a matter of fact, ‗the multitude are incapable of grasping sublime 
conceptions‘ (Correspondence, Letter XXXII). The function of law, then, is to make 
people free without requiring them to be reasonable. And yet, despite its synthetic 
nature, law, at least in the sense of a set of fundamental principles that ground the 
political community, is crucial to any human association. Indeed, ‗the constitution is 
the soul of a dominion. Therefore, if it is preserved, so is a dominion‘ (TP, 383). The 
function of law is to harmonise and orchestrate human behaviour: it makes all people 
within a community act in the same way, determined by either necessity or reason 
(TTP, 57). It is the latter kind of law that is the most important here. Although the 
need to associate may be determined by nature, to surrender natural right and to enter 
into an agreement with other people whereby one‘s actions become determined by a 
common set of rules is a human decision and has to be analysed as such (TTP, 57-58). 
Law-making is a purposeful activity since a law is a rule prescribed with a certain end 
in mind, which for most people is set or imposed by others, more capable of 
employing the faculty of reason. One can suspect that if all people were as capable as 
the intellectual elite, there would be no need for law anymore and, consequently, no 
need for a state. However, there is hardly any evidence that Spinoza would have 
thought this to be achievable. Instead, Spinoza holds, people are in need of laws 
because they are driven by and judge according to their sensual desires and passions 
(TTP, 72-73). 
Spinoza firmly states that there can be no sin before there is law (TTP, 196) and, 
consequently, the essence of being just is following the law as laid out by the 
sovereign authority (TTP, 253). In essence, as Kashap (1972: 334) notes, only with 
the promulgation of laws an evaluative framework of ‗could have done otherwise‘ is 
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created; although causation is not removed (i.e. people are no more ‗free‘ to choose 
one action over another), at least an alternative is provided. Hence, as Saw (1972: 
146) argues, laws can also act as manmade interventions into causal chains: blames 
and rewards, as well as the very existence of prescriptions can act as artificial causes 
for action and, despite their artificiality, operate in the same way as natural ones. 
Since it is law (or, more precisely, the commonwealth which produces law) that 
introduces the notions of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, ‗sin‘ and ‗virtue‘ into human existence, 
humans cannot be judged outside the state. Indeed, in the natural state people do 
everything with a sovereign right and this includes both a philosopher‘s conscious 
following of reason according to his/her knowledge of God and a common person‘s 
life driven by desire and appetite (TTP, 196). In the natural state they are both equal, 
even though only the philosopher follows his/her true interests and is thereby free. 
The only factors that determine their right to do things are their desire and the power 
to satisfy it. Law, then, has to reverse this order of ‗anything goes‘ and introduce the 
primacy or reason, thus prescribing a correct way of life. 
As already shown, a human association becomes a commonwealth only through its 
ability to pass laws and the power to preserve itself (i.e. to coerce). Law is, then, ‗a 
rule for living which a man prescribes to himself for some purpose‘ (TTP, 58). The 
crucial issue is that this purpose, from Spinoza‘s point of view, is visible only to 
some, while the majority of the population is ignorant – this is why coercion is a 
necessary element of the commonwealth. Not surprisingly, then, ‗the essence of law is 
taken to be a rule of life prescribed to men by command of another‘ (TTP, 58). 
However, what is crucial at this point is the paradoxical nature of law: its exteriority – 
since it lies with somebody who knows the true purpose – combined with interiority, 
whence the law is directed at furthering one‘s own interest and true potential. The 
state, then, as Balibar (1998: 26) notices, ‗is the supposed author of all actions that 
conform to the law.‘ Natural right does not cease in the commonwealth; rather, 
everyone still strives for his/her own interest. The crucial difference is that once a 
commonwealth is formed, the interests of its members coalesce into common ones; 
consequently, judgement also needs to become common – citizens need to be guided 
as if by one mind (TP, 302). The individual right to decide is forfeited for the sake of 
the common will. After all, because of human weakness, the freedom to decide is not 
only politically dangerous but also contrary to reason (TP, 303). By counteracting that 
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danger, the state not only necessarily does good but it also contributes to freedom by 
making the necessities of reason apparent through its legal structure. The state and its 
law are thus made the ultimate points of reference for a human community which is to 
live together harmoniously and according to the dictates of sound reason. 
 
Politics and the Progression of Immanence 
Definitely, Balibar (1998: 70-71) correctly stresses that the common will is not static: 
although democracy necessitates a unanimous multitude, this unanimity still is a 
praxis rather than a stable given (something similar will also be encountered in 
Schmitt‘s stasiology). On the other hand, as Kolakowski (1979: 290-291) notes, extra 
stability is provided by the fact that Spinoza was more preoccupied with creating ‗a 
system of reason‘ rather than a system where the popular will always prevails, 
presumably because, for him, the commands of reason were the real will and interest 
of the people, even if the people themselves did not know that. Spinoza‘s treatment of 
prophecy, especially in relation to politics, is illustrative. While an order based on 
prophetic revelation is dictatorial and jeopardises freedom, a truly political order is 
based on reason and, therefore, freedom (for a critical comparison, see e.g. Scruton, 
1986: 97-99). However, two reservations have to be made. First, this distinction may 
not be that radical in reality because the always already existing will must be 
somehow articulated and promulgated as law, and this can only be done through a 
quasi-prophetic medium of some sort. Secondly, monarchy, then, paradoxically is the 
least prophetic order because of the need to explain the relation between the source 
and the law (and the degree of alienation between the two is the highest in monarchy) 
while democracy, due to its immediacy, is the most prophetic order of all. Also, 
proceeding along the progression of immanence, with regards to law, the king must be 
restrained and, therefore, ‗it is in no way repugnant to experience, for laws to be so 
firmly fixed, that not the king himself can abolish them‘ (TP, 327). Meanwhile, in a 
democracy, it appears (although it is impossible to know definitely) that there would 
be no restraint and no limit to lawmaking potential. 
In a democratic state, people remain free because they are governed by themselves; 
and yet, they still need an outside point of reference – the law – to know what their 
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will and true interest is (TTP, 73). In this case, the law is simultaneously inside and 
outside, while society is both the immanent cause of law and itself constituted by law 
since the law establishes the community‘s always already existent, albeit latent, form. 
In this way, the democratic sovereign power ‗is bound by no law and everybody is 
obliged to obey it in all things‘ (TTP, 200). Also, the democratic sovereign avoids 
another limitation. For Spinoza, it is crucial that the supreme authority‘s power is 
‗limited, indeed, by the power […] of the multitude‘ (TP, 301). While this easily holds 
for monarchy and aristocracy, where the sovereign is forced to make only such 
decisions that would not antagonise the multitude, in democracy the sovereign and the 
multitude coincide. As a result, any checks and balances are removed and the power 
of the multitude/sovereign becomes absolute (at least as far as absolute unhindered 
power is possible in Spinoza‘s universe). This power, however, must come with the 
elimination of difference in the political sphere whence any decision is a decision of 
all and any deviation from it is an act of enmity. In essence, the political dimension is 
removed because politics can only arise from a surplus of meaning, i.e. from the 
multitude‘s non-identity to itself. Therefore, although those who interpret ‗most 
absolute‘ as ‗most stable‘ (see e.g. Negri 2004; Balibar 1998) are not mistaken, this 
stability is achieved only because of an always already present will of all, which does 
not necessarily go hand in hand with the kind of freedom these same authors advocate. 
The difference between the forms of government is instead the following: whereas 
monarchy and aristocracy are in danger of explosion, i.e. destruction through internal 
opposition and conflict, democracy is in danger of implosion, i.e. self-destruction of 
self-referential absolute immanence whereby the crushing force of uniformity is 
imposed by the multitude upon itself by the creation of total absolute order and the 
loss of all political capacity. n fact, the more immediate is the merger of the will and 
of the power behind it, the more absolute the dominion is but absolute should be read 
not only as stable but also as total. 
Spinoza stresses that ‗[a]n enemy is someone who lives outside a state in the sense 
that he does not recognise the authority of the state‘ and that consequently ‗a state‘s 
right against someone who does not recognise its authority by any agreement is the 
same as its right against someone who actively damages it‘ (TTP, 204). Spinoza 
widens the definition of the enemy even further in the Political Treatise: ‗those who 
are without fear or hope are so far independent, they are, therefore, enemies of the 
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dominion, and may lawfully be coerced by force‘ (TP, 304). Deviation, independence 
from the common will is, therefore, enmity. This is a logical conclusion from 
Spinoza‘s entire political order: as stressed by Balibar (1998: 25), the state must 
always possess absolute authority or else there would be no sovereignty whatsoever; 
whoever challenges that becomes an enemy. The enemy is not only someone who 
lives outside the borders of the state: one can be an enemy when living inside the state 
simply by refusing to recognise the general will and the ensuing law. In even stronger 
terms, Spinoza stipulates that ‗unless we wish to be enemies of government and act 
against reason, which urges us to defend the government with all our strength, we are 
obliged to carry out absolutely all the commands of the sovereign power, however 
absurd they may be‘ (TTP, 200). In fact, carrying out absurd commands still is a lesser 
evil than the dissolution of the state (TP, 303). Spinoza here hints at a form of political 
theology in the fact that a contract or, indeed, any other societal agreement can only 
be imagined after the political community is formed and sovereignty instituted – i.e. 
only retrospectively – but nevertheless has to be believed in. Faith here precedes and 
grounds the doctrine. This faith, however, takes the form of the knowledge of an 
immanent God. Lack of faith, it transpires, is no less a sin in politics than in religion. 
Spinoza tends to essentialise the enemy. While it will be shown that Schmitt‘s enemy 
is mostly contingent and attribution of the enemy status depends on political 
alignment, Spinoza tends to conflate the political enemy with the enemy of reason. 
And yet, whereas Schmitt‘s enemy is an existential one, somebody who has to be 
fought against and destroyed, Spinoza is much more lenient, especially as far as the 
‗internal‘ enemy, i.e. someone who dissents from public law, is concerned. From 
Spinoza‘s point of view, outright liquidation of opposition is counter-productive since 
it undermines the government in the eyes of its own people thus diminishing its power 
and, consequently, right (TTP, 251). And yet, the perception of danger caused by the 
enemy and the need for his/her relegation to the status of an outcast (with regards to 
both politics and reason) never really withers. But, whereas, for Schmitt, the enemy 
simply exists and has to be combated as such, for Spinoza, some form of brotherly 
correction, forceful as it might be, is needed – after all, even if the enemy suffers some 
harm while being brought back to the path of sound reason, this is, allegedly, only for 
his/her own benefit. Nevertheless, Schmitt acknowledges the dignity of the enemy and 
requires the struggle to take place on equal grounds, whereas, for Spinoza, the one 
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who needs to be ‗corrected‘ clearly is not of equal standing and can have no dignity, 
especially as far as democracy is concerned. Spinoza‘s politics, especially democratic 
politics, is clearly politics without an outside, politics menaced by the danger of 
implosion. As it will be shown in the final chapter, ordering as process is only 
possible when a Schmittian counterweight is introduced. 
 
Epilogue: The Question of Ordering 
Ordering, for Spinoza, is about the management of a point of indistinction between 
collective and personal conatus and never-ending effort to approximate the most 
perfect thing – God or Nature. In fact, the conatus of the state is both collective and 
personal: simultaneously a collective striving for satisfaction and fulfilment and the 
personal strivings that coalesce into it. Politics happens at the moment of this 
indistinction as a process of negotiation between both. Sovereignty is about the 
control of this indistinction or who is able to conduct the management of the 
private/public nexus. And law is about setting norms so that this collective-personal 
striving leads towards greater reason, no matter if the majority of the community is 
conscious about it or not. The state, meanwhile, could be taken to refer to the 
institutional structure – the exoskeleton – within which the aforementioned processes 
take place. All of these qualities are significant to the theory of ordering since they the 
motivational force and urgency behind the political community‘s perpetual 
remoulding of itself and its simultaneous ability to retain at least some shape and 
form. 
Crucially, Spinoza sees everything as partaking in a single substance, which is 
expressed through various attributes and modes. This has two underlying effects 
which are, however, not always explicit: first, it presupposes an underlying 
commonality, thus making association natural; secondly, there is no outside. The 
outside is lacking both metaphysically – because God is an immanent cause and 
everything partakes in a single substance – and politically – because the political 
community is self-sufficient and all signification is contained within itself. This 
political self-containment is twofold: both an empirical reality (self-determination of 
the political community as the presence of the general will) and an aspiration 
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(constant, and sometimes forceful, attempt to prevent an inside-outside relationship 
from developing, i.e. a constant striving to keep the community integrated). In both 
ways, a sudden decision establishing order is impossible – all ordering must come 
from within the community. For Spinoza, there is a constant creative interplay: the 
creative force (natura naturans) and the created reality (natura naturata) cannot be 
separate in a universe of immanent causality but they are also never fully identical. 
Transposed to the political world, this means that a permanent tension between the 
constitutive and the constituted never really ceases and is the source of ordering, even 
though the degree of identity (and, therefore, the amount of creation) varies between 
different forms of government. This tension is, of course, the driving force behind 
ordering being a permanent process. But it is also an antidote to theories of closure, 
whether in the form of dominant international norms or natural, just, or moral 
preconditions to lawmaking, or politics that presupposes some form of consent. 
Because human (and any other) beings are necessarily imperfect, Spinoza places 
conatus, or striving to persevere in existence, as their essence. Conatus denotes the 
presence of a permanent insatiable deficit, which needs to be filled and yet is 
impossible to fill. The most an individual can do once a goal is attained is to direct 
his/her desire for fullness and self-sufficiency towards something else. As a result, 
desire is the central motivating force. This is also where Spinoza‘s equation of reality, 
power and perfection kicks in. Reality-qua-existence is the goal of conatus. The more 
real something or somebody is, the more it (or he or she) approximates the ultimate 
perfection of God. And such reality-perfection can only mean power. Conatus, 
therefore, acts as both a motivating force in Spinoza‘s psychology and a key towards 
establishing fixed criteria in his moral theory: the ultimate striving for 
existence/reality/perfection/power is the striving towards sound reason and, therefore, 
all human actions and qualities can be evaluated against the standard of sound reason. 
This is Spinoza‘s back door for a prescriptive moral theory or, in fact, a tool for 
imputing a significant degree of constitutive stability. In this way, Spinoza 
demonstrates how the introduction of a (supposedly) objective criterion (reason) 
allows one to direct even an abstract striving towards some constituted order. 
The primacy of desire also means that humans strive, first and foremost, towards 
something that is, or appears to be, capable of bringing pleasure and, vice versa, they 
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seek to avoid and destroy things that seem to cause pain. However, insofar as this 
striving is not based on adequate knowledge (and very often people are unable to 
think adequately), it leads to discrepancy among humans and inconstancy of their 
relations. And even true knowledge alone cannot direct humans single-handedly – it 
has to be supplemented by emotion or established through an institutional structure 
(the two often go hand in hand). This is where human association and, ultimately, the 
state become necessary – to ensure that people follow the commands of reason, 
whether they want it or not. And because a person led by reason is a free person, the 
ultimate telos of a state is, according to Spinoza, freedom. Self-determination, then, is 
simultaneously personal and collective. But there is, however, only a single path this 
self-determination could take – a path along the lines of reason. In such a scenario, the 
state of reason and the reason of state coincide. Such quasi-objectivisation is, of 
course, the ultimate goal of the constituted and the high point of any established order 
in the process of continuous reproduction. 
The state, although a created artefact, is natural in the sense that it embodies and 
facilitates the innate human need to associate and is formed through constant 
interactions and, ultimately, common notions that are to be upheld. The state is also 
strengthened by the social dynamics of desire: common objects of love and common 
objects of hate. Indeed, because of the human need to associate and to strive towards 
sound reason as a community, bonds of friendship and enmity are formed that are 
equally important in maintaining the state. The need to associate is made even more 
pressing by the fact that individual power and right are so dwarfed by the surrounding 
world that it is rendered almost non-existent – only when people combine their power 
one could talk about effective right. However, since the majority of people do not 
understand this, the role of the state is also to make people to either understand the 
value of association or at least act as if they understood it. Consequently, a political 
community must have a monopoly on establishing what sound reason is and ensuring 
that the commands of reason are followed. In effect, law then becomes prosthesis for 
reason while citizens, understood as bearers of rights, are created by the state. This is, 
of course, a fundamentally state-centric position and one at odds with many of the 
current theories of state. And yet, Spinoza‘s emphasis on the natural need to associate 
is something to be upheld as belonging to the stabilising constituted part of the 
process of ordering.  
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The core element of the state, for Spinoza, is the multitude – a creative force almost 
impossible to grasp and define. It is the source of perpetual movement and the driving 
force behind political change, thus precluding the state itself from being static. This 
creative power, however, is channelled through and ordered by an institutional 
structure – the state – since otherwise any organised association would be impossible. 
Although the state is a substitute for human inability to live, think, and act in common 
under the guidance of reason, it also bears crucial similarities with the multitude that 
had formed it. In fact, it is, simultaneously, an imprint and a mould of the multitude. 
Nevertheless, this creative drive and collective power-as-right are crucial: since there 
is no creator outside the creation itself, there is no natural law or natural right (with 
the exception of the laws of physics) as well and, consequently, all law is 
fundamentally a human creation. There is no sin and, therefore, no judgement beyond 
the state. But a caveat is clear: because any outside (as the higher creative/ordering 
force) is removed and all norms are just expressions of always already existent will of 
all, political authority is made absolute – it becomes the embodiment of everybody‘s 
true interest and political strife is eliminated as seditious. The citizens must be guided 
as if by one mind, while to act against the will of the aggregate body of the entire 
citizenry (as expressed in its laws) is to act against oneself. To the extent that Spinoza 
prescribes freedom as the ideal telos of the state, he has only personal freedoms in 
mind. Political freedom here only includes understanding the rationality of demands 
and conscious observation of them. Anyone who does not comply and recognise the 
ultimate ordering of the state becomes an enemy not only of the state but also of 
reason and has to be fought against. And yet, the citizens cannot be left entirely 
powerless: a tyrannical sovereign would meet the end either by revolt (because living 
in such state would no longer be in the best interest of everybody) or by draining the 
power of the state from within (because the stronger the multitude, the stronger the 
state is and vice versa). As a result, Spinoza manages to arrive at a theory of limited 
sovereign power without recourse to natural law, moral theory, or any other 
precondition except for a simple balancing act. Nevertheless, Spinoza‘s is a theory 
very much oriented towards the constituted. The emphasis on rationality, a singular 
common good that everybody should strive for, and the automatic stigmatisation of 
those who do not submit to the common ordering principle are clear signs of the 
primacy of a stable set of signifiers that have acquired a privileged position. These 
ordering principles are no longer contestable – they simply have to be believed in. The 
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final chapter will add a Schmittian counterbalance to such thinking: groundlessness 
where any particular status quo is arbitrary. But such a take on the state and its order 
is precisely the object of criticism for those postulating, or at least calling for, a 
rethink or even the discarding of the state. This thesis, therefore, also demonstrates 
that such a rethink is both necessary and possible but from a position internal to the 
state. Indeed, one does not need to challenge the state as a structure or as a principle. 
Instead, one needs to counterbalance the constituted state-centrism with the 
constitutive groundlessness and uncertainty, which is always behind any supposed 
stability. 
Finally, in Spinoza‘s discussion of the three main forms of government – namely, 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – there is a clear progression of immanence: 
from a straightforward separation of the sovereign and the multitude in monarchy to 
absolute immanence in democracy, whence the constitutive and the constituted are 
indistinguishable. Therefore, Spinoza‘s democracy is the most absolute, the most total 
form of government for which there is no outside: everything must be subsumed under 
the totality and whatever will there is must be the unanimous general will. 
Presumably, this unanimity must be achieved by all necessary means. Because the 
sovereign and the multitude coincide, any checks and balances are removed. 
Therefore, one could say that whereas monarchy and, to a slightly lesser degree, 
aristocracy are in danger of explosion (an antagonised multitude tearing the state 
apparatus apart), democracy is in danger of implosion (absolute power pulling the 
entire community into a single point of singularity). In either case, however, political 
life is a point of indistinction between the own and the outside will, between the 
individual and the community. It is entirely plausible that if Spinoza had lived to 
complete the chapter on democracy in the Political Treatise, he would have found a 
way to translate his critique of anthropocentrism into democratic politics, even though 
the characterisation of democracy as a perfectly absolute dominion does raise 
reasonable doubts about it. As a result, one of the themes of the last chapter will be an 
injection of outside into this self-referential system of self-sufficient democracy. 
The last point to be made is that Spinoza‘s political theory is apt with paradoxes: for 
example, politics is simultaneously about the multitude and the state, the importance 
of constitutive will and primacy of reason, continuous creation and there being no 
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outside, the position of citizens as simultaneously creators of and created by the state, 
the position of law both inside and outside the political community etc. Notably, the 
first element of each pairing refers to the constitutive drive while the second one 
denotes a stabilising, limiting function. However, in all cases Spinoza‘s political 
theory is also about balance and constant interplay between the two elements of each 
pairing. Indeed, ordering, for Spinoza, is first and foremost, an interactive process. 
And yet, the constant need to approximate the infinite intellect and perfect existence 
of God means that teleology is unavoidable, at least in communal life. Thus, political 
ordering is, ultimately, constant effort to bridge the gap between the private-public 
conatus and the ideal of God or Nature. The last chapter of this thesis will be 
dedicated to radicalising this interplay by introducing unavoidable indeterminacy, 
derived from Schmitt. 
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3. Schmitt: The Theological Existentialism of the Borderline 
Arguably, Schmittian politics is a cross-breed of (sometimes even quasi-Spinozist) 
immanence, quasi-Kantian transcendentalism of shared subjectivity, and religious 
transcendence. As a result, three very different ways of ordering coalesce into a rather 
complicated mix. Nevertheless, the crucial notion, as will be shown, is the 
groundlessness of social existence. Hence, any meaning that is present at a certain 
time must have always already created the conditions of its own existence (immanent 
causation). But here Schmitt also introduces an element of belief. In his view, in order 
not to descend into chaos, immanence must be treated politically as if it were 
transcendence. Whatever the result of immanent causation is, it must be an object of 
belief in very much the same way as divine commandments are. And that is not all: 
ultimately, norm-making also takes place horizontally, across the political community, 
because Schmitt is concerned with the common way of being, which is invented and 
developed by all members simultaneously. This scheme of groundless ordering will 
significantly contribute to the constitutive part of the model developed in the final 
chapter. 
For Schmitt, every political community has its own mode of existence, which is 
limited by the borders of that community – and this is why the state, as a spatial-
political body, is important for Schmitt (although, it remains to be seen, not absolutely 
crucial). This limitation also implies another border – between ‗us‘ and ‗them, 
‗friends‘ and ‗enemies‘. But certain borders are present even within the political 
community itself. Since the common mode of existence is constantly developing and 
changing, divisions between the old and the new, between law as a transposition of a 
political community‘s Being and non-law (or, potentially, not-yet-law), between those 
who tend to side with one or the other (thus creating potential for internal enmity) are, 
if not constantly then at least potentially, present. Schmitt‘s solution to this division is 
sovereignty as a borderline concept, which occupies the groundless terrain between 
one side and the other and provides an authoritative decision on what belongs to the 
political community and what does not. Consequently, then, politics is a constant and 
central condition of human life, and not only of meaningful or virtuous life, but of any 
life. All of these traits are crucial parts of the dynamic model of ordering introduced in 




3.1. A Community of the Fallen 
If one had to name a single point of departure – a sort of Big Bang – from which 
Schmitt‘s entire intellectual endeavour flows, that would be the Biblical narrative of 
the Fall and, then, the killing of Abel (Schmitt 1950). The effect of this narrative is 
twofold: first, it points to the weakness and depravity of humans, their inability to lead 
self-sufficient and truly moral lives. From this follows the need for a political 
community and strong government – compensatory elements that would restrict the 
naturally evil nature of humans and impute order into what would otherwise be 
universal fratricidal enmity. Secondly, being banished from Eden, humans no longer 
have access to absolute certainty and, thus, any order is necessarily groundless. 
However, some order must necessarily exist, especially if one embraces communal 
living as a remedy. Therefore, at some point, there must be a decision that brings 
peace and stability – at least temporarily. It is this need to decide that grounds 
Schmittian politics and (what is only rarely analysed) morality. 
Then, one needs to take a closer look at the community to which the notions of the 
state, sovereignty, law, and politics apply. Here, the questions of homogeneity and 
possible grounds for unity, the necessarily political nature of human association, and 
the very possibility of presence of the people have to be considered. It will be argued 
here that on all these counts Schmitt is less of an essentialist than is commonly 
thought. After all, the kernel of radical indeterminacy, caused by the Original Sin, is 
ever-present. These basic preconditions of Schmitt‘s political and legal thinking are 
going to inform all the major claims in the remaining parts of this chapter. They will 
also be found to underlie the dynamic side of the process of ordering in the final 
chapter. 
 
Emptiness and Depravity 
Through the narrative of the Original Sin, Schmitt presupposes a certain deficit at the 
heart of subjectivity, not at all dissimilar from one found in Spinoza‘s theory. 
However, while Spinoza can still presuppose an ideal (reason) thus avoiding complete 
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groundlessness, Schmitt does not envisage any necessary content. In order to 
understand the significance of the deficit, Schmitt‘s Catholicism must be taken 
seriously. For him, humans could have enjoyed plenitude and universal agreement if 
Adam and Eve had not committed the Original Sin. Contradiction, confusion and 
violence prevail in each generation because humans have lost their privilege of being 
in a spiritual union with God, especially as read in Genesis 3:15 (I will put enmity 
between thy seed and her seed). Indeed, Schmitt traces violence and hostility to the 
Original Sin but not directly from Adam and Eve‘s decision to eat the fruit of the Tree 
of Knowledge of Good and Evil but from Cain‘s murder of Abel, seen in this context 
as a punishment for the sin (Schmitt 1950: 89). The entire human history is, then, seen 
as continuous repetition of this story of brotherly conflict, in fact, existential conflict 
between those who put one another‘s existence in question (Schmitt 1950: 89-90). To 
imagine a world devoid of hostility, a world of all friends and no enemies is, 
therefore, an attempt to avoid responsibility for the Original Sin (Slomp 2009: 18-19). 
The only universal truth that remains in this world is universal disagreement which is 
seen to persist until the end of time. As a result, the need to choose between 
incompatible but equally groundless demands becomes the substance of (political) life 
and the ensuing distinction between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ turns to an ever-recurring reality. 
Politics and social life are ways of managing this disagreement. But this collective 
dimension is only able to displace conflict, containing it within one‘s own group and 
channelling it against the other. 
However, even between fellow members of one‘s own group and, indeed, within 
one‘s self, constant turmoil must persist because no way of being can ever fill the void 
of non-existent grounding. Consequently, humans are constantly torn between 
multiple conflicting demands. Here Schmitt turns not to the Bible but, rather, to 
literature and, more precisely, Hamlet. For him, Hamlet is a paradigmatic figure, torn 
between radically conflicting demands without any chance of mediation and 
compromise because there is no higher point of reference to act as an arbiter (Schmitt 
2006: 53). Only an authentic existential decision would do. And that, as is well 
known, leads Hamlet to a tragic conclusion. Indeed, Rowan (2011: 150) comes across 
something very important when he notes that ‗[t]hroughout his work Schmitt 
repeatedly presents indeterminacy as an ontological condition on the one hand, on the 
other, ceaselessly attempts to bring this indeterminacy to a close by grounding order 
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in some form of authentic legitimacy‘. Crucially, all of the key issues to be considered 
later in the chapter must be read in the light of this fundamental tension between the 
absence of grounding and the persistent necessity of some normativity and certainty. 
This is also why, for Schmitt, political struggle can only end when this world ends. 
Read in this light, Schmitt becomes a non-essentialist par excellence. And if such 
view is accepted, ordering can certainly only be a process. 
The existential and normative deficit and the depravity of human beings, which (as 
will subsequently be shown) does not allow them to lead independent lives, act 
together to necessitate imposition of (any) order. There is a constant need to determine 
‗what is‘ (because, in essence, there exists everything and nothing), to condense 
something ‗out of the spatial and legal vacuum‘ (Marder 2010: 18). It is a sign of 
human lack of self-sufficiency that they constantly need to refer elsewhere for 
affirmation of their identity, either positively, through recognition by others, or 
negatively, by negation of something radically different. Both pathways towards self-
definition are necessary and usually simultaneous. This is the reason why Schmitt was 
preoccupied with questions of friendship and enmity. But, even then, the human 
condition is such that an objective, exhaustive and neutral definition of the self is 
impossible. Rather, it is only possible to know what manifests itself at a given 
moment in time. Consequently, the self can only be recognised through being, through 
its own mode of existence and that of his/her friends and enemies. This is another 
manifestation of immanent causality in Schmitt: the political subject, which is part of 
the order, is the creator of that order, which itself reflects the subject‘s always already 
existing mode of being. 
And yet, the power of ideas cannot be underestimated. Whenever a decision is made 
or a new order is instituted, ‗a substantive principle of justice will nevertheless have to 
be presupposed‘ or else the entire system collapses (Schmitt 2004a: 28). Any political 
act must have legitimacy in the eyes of those it affects, and legitimacy can only be 
based on appeal to shared ideas that are seen as natural and universal. This, of course, 
leaves any authority in a paradoxical situation: there can be no purely natural and 
universal norms (due to ontological groundlessness) and yet there must be. Social and 
political life must, therefore, be based on an absent fullness, something that is socially 
created and maintained. And yet, very differently from Spinoza, an ideal of perfect 
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existence (Spinoza‘s God or Nature) cannot be presupposed. As a result, where 
Spinoza sees organic natural striving for perfection and fullness, Schmitt can only 
imply an arbitrary fullness. 
 
Decision and Morality 
It is a popular misconception to perceive Schmitt as a political nihilist who rejects any 
substantial ethical standards and moral concerns in favour of bare power and radical 
enmity (see e.g. Hirst 1999: 8; Müller 2003: 249). Instead, an absolute decision that 
relates to existential matters and leaves no space for shirking necessarily involves a 
moral dimension. The sovereign decision, insofar as it is intimately related to a 
particular political community, is never completely abstract, and never indicates any 
random order without any relation to those concerned. Rather, the decision is 
necessarily conditioned by the available socio-cultural environment, i.e. a particular 
nation‘s way of being, which underlies laws and fills them with substance (see e.g. 
Pan 2009: 58). This is where the Schmittian dynamic connects with the limiting aspect 
of ordering. 
Needles to say, the constant need to choose between incommensurable yet groundless 
demands also involves the tragic. If a decision is unavoidable, never allowing the 
subject to remain a mere spectator, and yet there is no guidance as to the ultimate 
truth, then the tragic element comes into play. Risk is the ultimate attribute of 
decision: one could lose everything or win salvation (Schmitt 2007b: 28). In such 
moments, when everything is at stake, one is left alone to his/her own means. And yet, 
as Meier (1998: 11, 14) contends in his reading of Schmitt, tragedy is what a moral 
person must long for: the decision between incommensurable Either-Or affirms the 
moral aspect of politics. The answers to the questions of what is right and moral, how 
life should be lived are to be found nowhere else than in the political decision itself 
(Meier 1998: 41-42). As Schmitt lays out in Hamlet or Hecuba, the tragic is 
something irrevocable, impossible to feign, and absolutely authentic: ‗no mortal can 
imagine it, no genius can invent it‘ (Schmitt 2006: 39). There cannot be a rational 
justification – only an act of faith in a groundless fiat (Meier 2006: 30), thus only 
making the tragic more pertinent. 
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Of course, there must be a necessary limit to reintroduction of morality into 
Schmittian politics: even if there is morality within groups, it cannot be stretched 
universally. Consequently, the distinction between universal and particular must be 
maintained: morality applies to the inside – i.e. friends – only. From this perspective, 
one cannot expect friends and enemies to share the same moral categories; hence, one 
cannot fight the other on moral grounds. And yet, the weight of decision cannot be 
underestimated as morality is far from being relativised completely: the fact that there 
is no universal morality does not mean that Good and Evil can be placed on a 
continuum; instead, they are incommensurable and require the full force of decision 
which is unavoidably tragic: deciding the undecidable, choosing among 
incommensurable options without authoritative guidance as to which choice is correct, 
possibly because neither of them is. And yet, whatever the decision, the divine will 
(the will of God or of the people-qua-God) is always already present in and caused by 
its own effects. The final chapter of this thesis provides a more extensive account of 
such model. 
 
Unity and Homogeneity 
At the core of Schmitt‘s understanding of political community, but especially of 
community as a precondition for a democratic state, lies the principle of identity and 
homogeneity, better understood as self-identity of a people as a political unity 
(Schmitt 2000b: 299; Schmitt 2008: 255). Such homogeneous unity is able to 
guarantee justice and reasonableness for itself; what is more, it is the source of this 
justice and reasonableness (Schmitt 2004a: 24). Whatever such unity wills, is 
necessarily just and true. Such truth is qualitatively different from a liberal one, at 
least as liberalism is seen by Schmitt: for the liberals, truth is a function of a constant 
competition between various opinions or a point of equilibrium among them (Schmitt 
2000a: 35-36), while according to a Schmittian understanding of democracy, truth is 
always present in the political coexistence of the people and is above internal strife. 
Schmitt‘s own theory is based on tension between the inside and the outside of the 
political community, those who partake in a general will and those who do not. Such 




To reiterate, Schmitt sees homogeneity as central to democracy. This also has 
significant implications to the treatment of individuals and groups. A core principle of 
democracy based on homogeneity is ‗that not only are equals equal but unequals will 
not be treated equally‘; as a result, democracy needs ‗first homogeneity and second – 
if the need arises – elimination or eradication of heterogeneity‘ (Schmitt 2000a: 9). 
Keeping in mind Schmitt‘s political allegiance, such statement legitimately sounds 
alarming. However, its real meaning requires more effort to be unpacked. First of all, 
as stressed by Balakrishnan (2000: 71), for Schmitt, there can be numerous grounds 
for unity and homogeneity and no one dimension can permanently describe it. 
Language, history, traditions, or common political goals: all of these are important but 
still do not form an exhaustive list. In Schmitt‘s view, a historical trend of 
commonality and a conscious will to uphold such commonality, which naturally leads 
to common goals, is the defining feature (Schmitt 2008a: 262). Furthermore, there are 
numerous ways in which unity and homogeneity can develop: from above (i.e. 
through power) and from below (i.e. from pre-existing homogeneity), ‗through 
enduring association and compromise between social groups or through an 
equilibrium achieved somehow by some other means between such groups‘, unity 
originating from within or resting on external pressure only, ‗unity by force and unity 
by consensus‘ (Schmitt 1999a: 201-202). Also, identity and homogeneity can only be 
approximated; effectively, the state is complex and ‗internally pluralist‘, a unity of 
‗social multiplicity‘ (Schmitt 1999a: 201). It is clear that such homogeneity reflects 
not an actual legal, political, or sociological reality but merely an act of identification, 
that is, a conscious will to belong to a community (Schmitt 2000a: 26-27). Thus, 
although Balakrishnan (2000: 71) is correct in arguing that, for Schmitt, democracy 
was ‗essentially a nationalist phenomenon‘, nationalism should be understood in a 
civic sense. 
In respect to political unity, Schmitt‘s ideal was the Roman Catholic complexio 
oppositorum (combination of opposites), a spiritual community of the entire 
Christendom that ‗succeeded in constituting and sustaining configuration of historical 
and social reality‘ despite the actual rich diversity of that community (Schmitt 1996: 
8). In Schmitt‘s view, this offers a crucial lesson: retaining the unity of identification 
and faith in the face of actual multiplicity and heterogeneity (Schmitt 1996: 8). This 
notion (see, generally, Shapiro 2008: 26-30), describes a unity of opposing elements 
120 
 
that is not achieved through reason, logic, or any other mediating tool but ensues from 
a catechetic unity whereby all of the opposites are equally present in God; it therefore 
involves a unity of emotive attachments, a reproduction of this unity on the rhetorical 
and symbolic plains, and a provision of an embodiment of it. In the domain of politics, 
the state becomes the unit of highest relevance and the highest imperative of fidelity. 
But it can only become so as the embodiment of the complexio oppositorum if the 
political community has already achieved political consciousness. In this process, the 
representative person or institution is invested with ‗a special dignity, because the 
representative of a noble value cannot be without value‘ (Schmitt 1996: 21). This 
added dignity of something more than itself will be crucial in the final chapter to 
provide a temporary stabilising element of ordering. 
The inclusiveness of the political community must also be stressed – or at least 
inclusiveness of a certain kind. Following from the previous argument, homogeneity 
and heterogeneity are, first and foremost, political concepts. Therefore, the 
elimination of heterogeneity, even if it happens, also needs to be political. This 
elimination, as it will be subsequently seen, refers to the sovereign decision that 
establishes the otherwise latent will of the people and restores unity where otherwise 
internal strife had persisted and possibly threatened the political body itself. 
Therefore, for a political community to be viable, not only internal inclusion is 
necessary, but so is also the exclusion and refutation of those who threaten democracy 
and the homogeneity that lies at its core (Schmitt 2000a: 9). As homogeneity can only 
be approximated, this striving for unity and integrity is endless, and so is the political 
struggle that it animates. Striving for unity, therefore, has to be a necessary 
precondition and driving force of Schmitt‘s entire political and legal theory. 
But unity always also implies otherness against which it is defined. In some instances, 
that otherness might refer to something internal – the internal enemy – but, in a 
normal situation, it mostly refers to someone who is outside the political community, 
i.e. not member of the state. This question of inclusion-exclusion is not an abstract 
one: it is about the substance of equality: rights within the state, such as universal 
suffrage, cannot be attributed to any person simply as a person but only to someone 
who partakes in a common substance; anything else would end up depriving equality 
of its meaning (Schmitt 2000a: 9-11). It is not a question of the human value of each 
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and every individual (and Schmitt openly acknowledges this value) but one of 
political characteristic (Schmitt 2000a: 9). Therefore, although there are areas where 
an outsider might be treated equally, these are not political areas (Schmitt 2008a: 
258). The institute of citizenship is an obvious example of a gate-keeping procedure 
that draws a distinction between the equal ones inside and the unequal ones outside. 
However, from a Schmittian perspective, a formal requirement of possessing a fixed 
and institutionalised attribute (e.g. citizenship) would not be enough. What matters is 
the existential feeling of belonging together, common existence, and common 
consciousness. 
The true presence of the political people is the presence of it as an assembled public 
(Schmitt 2000b: 298). The public is a way around a fundamental flaw in the concept 
of representation: only something absent can be represented and yet the people must 
always be present. The public, for Schmitt, is substantively different from the abstract 
liberal public sphere. The public is always potentially or actually present and 
assembled; it is always concrete, conscious, and capable of political action, not only 
of opinion and chatter. If such consciousness and purposiveness is present, every 
assembled public is at least potentially a political entity (Schmitt 2008a: 272). Such 
public is more than the sum of individuals, and its opinion is not the sum of private 
opinions, formed individually: rather, the public and its opinion is a constantly 
evolving common being that develops itself in the public sphere (Schmitt 2000b: 298). 
The people never shed the status of the constituent power and still remain a power 
above the law. 
What the above illustrates are some of the key preconditions to political ordering. 
Indeed, Schmitt‘s entire oeuvre stems from certain religious underpinnings, especially 
as concerning the fallen nature of humanity and the ensuing groundlessness of 
existence. Therefore, living in political communities, with their specific modes of 
ordering, is both a necessity and a way around that groundlessness – it allows setting 
at least temporary certainties, thus masking the tragic nature of life but without falling 
to some kind of essentialism. Having established these premises, the analysis now has 




3.2. The Framework: State and Sovereignty 
State and sovereignty, as one might expect, are closely linked in Schmitt‘s theory: the 
state is the locus where the sovereign power to decide is played out but 
simultaneously the state would be nothing but formless matter if there was no 
sovereignty to shape and mould it. As such, they are closely intertwined in Schmitt‘s 
thought. 
The state, as can be inferred from the preceding analysis, is the body of a conscious 
political community. This common consciousness is what allows the transference of 
the common mode of existence into the structure of the state, the latter then acting as a 
sort of exoskeleton, which then upholds the form of the political community. As an 
embodiment of Being, the state becomes a central element of Schmitt‘s theory. And 
yet, there must be something prior that the existence of the state presupposes: the 
political. The political is the possibility of the community to distinguish between 
friends and enemies and the willingness to engage in an existential struggle against the 
enemies. That, of course, is the communal consciousness taken to the extreme: if a 
community understands itself as a collective ‗we‘, it must also presume something 
that is ‗not-we‘. And the state is, then, a spatial-political embodiment of the ‗us-them‘ 
distinction, in terms of both external and internal enemies. It is, however, argued that 
the friend-enemy distinction is not as straightforward as it is often thought to be and 
is, instead, based on a complex network of affirmation and negation. Nevertheless, all 
this places the state in a position of the locus of ordering. 
Sovereignty, meanwhile, is simultaneously a tool for stability and for change in 
Schmitt: it can both preserve the status quo and radically change it, depending on 
who, in the end, has the real sovereign power. It is a borderline concept in terms of 
relating to law and non-law at the same time but also because any sovereign decision 
is also a decision on old and new, on the distinction between friends and enemies, and, 
as a result, on the (either old or new) form of the political community and the state. As 
is fitting for a borderline concept, sovereignty is a rather complicated notion that 
requires a lot of unpacking. Therefore, not only the importance of sovereignty but also 
its relation to the normal order, simultaneously dynamic and absolute nature, the 
question of who is really sovereign when two equally strong imperatives clash and, 
related to that, the tragic nature of sovereignty as a decision on a groundless terrain 
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will have to be considered. In short, in relation to the overall aim of this thesis, 
sovereignty is to be seen as the ability to impose a certain temporary snapshot of the 
process of ordering as the order that prevails at a particular time and place. 
 
The Conscious Political Community 
The state and the people are inseparable for Schmitt. The state is the status of the 
people and the embodiment – the form – of its political unity (Schmitt 2008a: 239). 
The Schmittian state is, therefore, ‗properly a site of ―pouvoir constituant‖‘, in which 
collective will-formation and its expression through the constitution takes place 
(Shapiro 2008a: 3). As a result, a state can only be defined through the people. In this 
way, Schmitt clearly opposes legal positivism, especially his acclaimed contemporary 
Hans Kelsen (1999: 182-183; 189-190), for whom the normative order pre-exists the 
state-qua-community; in fact, in the Kelsenian system, the state as a community exists 
only because the already existing normative order predefines and shapes it – the state 
owes any reality it has to law and not vice versa. However, as Ojakangas (2006: 76) is 
correct in showing, the Schmitt-Kelsen opposition is not on the grounds of content 
(because Schmitt was indifferent to it – whatever is decided is legitimate and just) but 
on the grounds of form. 
A unity capable of acting and conscious of its status as a unity – this is what a nation 
is for Schmitt (Schmitt 2008a: 101). Such consciousness allows for an understanding 
and appreciation of the political distinctiveness of the group and thus enables the unity 
to take political action as opposed to there being a mere ethnic bond (Schmitt 2008a: 
127). Therefore, it would be incorrect to conceive the nation necessarily as based on 
blood ties. Instead, the political bond is all-important: a conscious decision to stick 
together, whatever informs such decision. This consciousness is needed if the 
grouping itself is to exercise the constitution-making power, i.e. to determine its 
destiny and political existence. When a group exists merely as a collection of 
disparate parts that, despite having something in common, are not aware of their 
common belonging or are unable to act together on these commonalities, it cannot 
determine its own political existence. Conversely, as long as the will to common 
political existence persists, the nation is superior to any normative framework 
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(Schmitt 2008a: 131). Political existence precedes political consciousness and, 
correspondingly, political will because that which does not yet exist cannot decide. 
Decision presupposes the existence of the deciding subject and the content of the 
decision presupposes the nature of the deciding unity (Schmitt 2008a: 102). Therefore, 
it would be correct to say that the political body exists only through its own effects. 
Any notion of contract is alien to such self-conscious political unity and to its 
immanent presence because a contract implies divergences and oppositions within a 
grouping and, thus, embodies an artificial and superficial unity. In contrast, unity and 
the general will of a united people either exists or it does not: there is no room for an 
artificial bringing together of disparate parts (Schmitt 2000a: 14). 
Despite the close interrelationship between the people and the state, Schmitt traces a 
basic distinction in the conceptualisation of the two: that between identity and 
representation. Under the principle of identity, they are basically one and the same: 
when the people exercises the constitution-making power, it exists as a whole in 
concrete terms. Meanwhile, the principle of representation precludes the existence of 
the entire people at a single moment in time and space and instead opts for someone to 
stand in for the political unity (Schmitt 2008a: 239). Schmitt sees the state as 
perpetually caught in-between these two extremes. On the one hand, in modern states, 
it is not possible for the entire people to gather in one place: they need a form of 
representation. On the other, the entire principle of representation means that there is a 
people to be represented (Schmitt 2008a: 240-241). Absolute identity and 
homogeneity is never a reality but only a mental construct, just as, in practice, there 
are no ideal models but only potentialities. A maximum of identity with a minimum of 
representation and government means a homogeneous community unable to form an 
effective state while a minimum of identity with a maximum of representation implies 
a strong governmental apparatus but, in essence, a state without a people (Schmitt 
2008a: 248). Constant tension between identity and representation is also crucial to 
understanding whatever is at the helm of the state, be it an individual person or a 
composite body: it cannot be detached and merely stand in for the people but at the 
same time cannot be completely identical with it. Any authority is, therefore, caught 




The Importance of the State 
The state is taken to be the central organisational unit for Schmitt. However, 
Bendersky (1983: 285-286) overstates it being at the core of Schmitt‘s entire oeuvre 
from the early writings in imperial Germany to his late post-World War II texts. In 
fact, one can trace a changing emphasis: from concentration purely on the state early 
on to regional (pre-World War II Großraum) or global (post-World War II nomos) 
orders to the fluidity of the partisan. The state, however, is a useful element of 
analysis: it is the most immediate expression of a political relationship between 
individuals and between a community and its form. For Schmitt, the state is 
coextensive with the people and sovereignty but none of the three overlap completely. 
The state is not identical with sovereignty because the latter is independent of the 
legal order that forms the backbone of a state and is able to suspend that order in its 
entirety. The state is the form that the people has assumed at a given time and is, 
therefore, shaped by the people – it is, in essence, ‗a specific entity of a people‘ 
(Schmitt 2007a: 19). However, it is not identical with the people not only because the 
state is a dependent variable but also because the people is not something that has 
determined itself once and for all; the nature of a people‘s existence – its fundamental 
way of being – is prone to change, and, therefore, the people is a more dynamic entity 
than the state. Consequently, although the existence of a state is, for Schmitt ‗a 
question of fact which the law can only recognize but cannot control‘ (Koskenniemi 
2005: 232), this is not to say that the state is absolute. 
The state, as the embodiment of the political community, has the decisive power to 
wage war and, therefore, to require the ultimate sacrifice – that of one‘s own life 
(Schmitt 2007a: 46). In Schmitt‘s theory, the state is the collective existence of those 
who comprise it, and therefore sacrifice is not for the state as something external but 
for the being of the kin. Following this logic, it is absolutely natural that the state 
should control the subjects: the subjects‘ ability to act according to their own 
consciousness instead of obeying threatens peace and challenges the political quality 
of the state (see e.g. Preuss 160-161). Although this prerogative of the state is central, 
it will be shown later that neither homogeneity nor sacrifice are absolute as they are 
not intended to be invoked in the normal situation in which the foundations of the 
state are unquestioned. But in exceptional circumstances where they come into 
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question, the decision over the inside and the outside becomes central. In addition, 
Schmitt ascribes fundamental importance to the state as a spatial organisation of the 
people: for him, spatial division and appropriation form the basis for any normative 
structures that govern a certain territory and the people that claim it their own 
(Schmitt 1997: 37-38). The state, providing a fixed body to the people, also provides 
the territory with fixed borders. The inner equality that a state produces can only apply 
to a bounded place and not to a universal sphere (see e.g. Kennedy 2004: 128). 
Therefore, territoriality is of vital importance for Schmitt, not only because a 
community and a state cannot exist without a certain territory but also because of an 
almost mystical quality attributed to land. Land, for him, is ‗the mother of law‘: as a 
producer of harvest, as something that must be cultivated, and as an area that can be 
fenced off – all this requires a legal order of appropriation and allocation (Schmitt 
2003: 42). As Kahn (2011: 155) reads it, there can be no willingness to commit 
oneself wholeheartedly, to the level of self-sacrifice, for an abstract, disembodied 
idea. Therefore, the territorial element of the nation‘s political body is vital. 
Once a higher ethic of the state is abandoned, one ends up postulating a universal 
entity (e.g. ‗humanity‘) that, in theory, subsumes all conflicting parties (Schmitt 
2007a: 44). However, in Schmitt‘s understanding, such universal concepts are 
meaningless – at least on the political level – because they have nothing to negate. 
Political subjects become obsessed with the illusion of it being possible to become 
subjects by themselves. Self-affirmation, self-expression, self-empowerment become 
the fictions that guide the modern political world devoid of potentially stabilising 
points of reference (Schmitt 2007c; Schmitt 2008b: 34). As Meier (1998: 5-6) puts it, 
this is the Promethean rebellion in all its madness and self-arrogation of attempted 
self-salvation and self-redemption. Such process is ‗the opposite of creation out of 
nothing‘ and is, in fact, ‗the creation of nothingness as the condition for the possibility 
of the self-creation of an ever new worldliness‘ (Schmitt 2008b: 129). This is what 
Schmitt loathes in the Romantic spirit in politics: complete rejection of any causal 
relations in the name of indeterminacy (Schmitt 1985: 82). Such political subjectivity 
refuses to discard any option and possibility, resists any objectivity, any exhaustive 
list of characteristics, and does so in the name of infinite freedom (Schmitt 1986: 71-
72). Such freedom is possible only where real substance is lacking. However, this 
prerequisite of removal of any being means that absolute freedom and self-sufficiency 
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is non-political. And yet, if for the Romantics, the normal (the necessary condition for 
political order) is uninteresting (Kelly 2003: 169), Schmitt himself is a Romantic in a 
way that he is interested in the exceptional rather than the normal. However, unlike 
the Romantics, he is so with the normal as a goal. Hence, the infinity of possibilities is 
both necessary for Schmittian politics and a menace to be confronted. 
 
The Concept of the Political 
The Schmittian state is the locus of political activity. And yet, there is another crucial 
notion: the political. In fact, ‗[t]he concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political‘ (Schmitt 2007a: 19). Therefore, Schmitt sets out to discover the essence of 
the political and the criteria that define it. In a well-known passage, he pursues an 
analogy with other domains, such as morality, aesthetics, and economy to determine 
that all of them rest of specific distinctions. At the core of aesthetics is the distinction 
between beautiful and ugly, morality is defined by the opposition between good and 
evil, while the domain of economics is characterised by the distinction between 
profitable and unprofitable. A specifically political distinction is, then, between friend 
and enemy (Schmitt, 2007: 25-26) and delimits the ‗degree and intensity of 
association and dissociation‘ (Schmitt 2008b: 45). It is precisely the intensity and the 
ability to presuppose friends and enemies, and not enmity per se as it is often thought, 
that lies at the heart of the political (Schmitt 2007b: 91). This distinction goes ‗entirely 
beyond good and bad‘ (Sneller 2007: 293) and, as noted by Kahn (2011: 20), due to 
its existential intensity, is prerational because reason on its own cannot establish it. 
And yet, from the conflictual nature of the political one should not imply that Schmitt 
outrightly favoured violence. What matters the most is the possibility of conflict. 
According to Schmitt, the fact that modern state theory, and liberalism in particular, 
had negated, or at least concealed, the political does not automatically mean that the 
latter has ceased to exist; rather, the political must be brought again to the forefront of 
political life if the state and politics are to be treated seriously (see e.g. Strauss 1995: 
92). Schmitt sees grave danger in the shift towards value-free or value-neutral 
domains, be they scientific or political, because they allow humans to shed 
responsibility for their actions and decisions, simultaneously paving path to 
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disintegration of communities towards the struggle of all against all when no more 
uniting ideas are left (Schmitt 2001b: 19-20). It is precisely the political, with its 
distinction between friends and enemies, that allows, on the one hand, the recognition 
of and siding with the own and, on the other hand, makes any absolute assertion of a 
single value impossible. This impossibility is seen as necessary: when a single value is 
posited as a major point of reference, it not only establishes a hierarchy of values 
within its own value system but also presupposes a non-value and thus negates 
otherness (Schmitt 2001b: 23). What thus emerges is a ‗tyranny of values‘, which 
offers a straight path to fanaticism, disqualifying the other as inadequate and leaving 
no price too high to pay for the ultimate value to be achieved (Schmitt 2001a: 24-26). 
Taken to the extreme, this means that, when a system of human values is known in 
advance, there must also be the inhuman, which can be righteously destroyed (Schmitt 
2002a: 114). The political, on the contrary, at least presupposes that the opponents 
stand on an equal ground. 
One of the common objections raised against Schmitt is that for him enmity, and not 
friendship, is central (see e.g. Strauss 1995: 96-97). Hirst (1999: 14) even asserts that 
Schmitt is left only with the exception, perpetual struggle between opponents that 
have nothing to discuss. And yet, in Schmitt‘s own words, ‗[t]he core of the political 
is not enmity per se, but the distinction of friend and enemy, and the presupposition of 
friend and enemy‘ (Schmitt 2007b: 91). Schmitt is also accused of personalising 
politics, turning political struggle into fight among individuals not between ideas: 
supposedly, Schmittian politics ‗is tantamount to fighting for and against someone, 
not for and against something‘ (Heller 1991: 232). However, the Schmittian enmity is 
a particular kind of enmity. Schmitt‘s reference to Hegel when defining the enemy is 
noteworthy as it sheds light on the nature and function of political enmity. Basing his 
observation on the master-slave dialectic, Schmitt, like Hegel, sees the enemy as a 
negated otherness (Schmitt 2007a: 63). Here, again, two consciousnesses engage in a 
life-and-death struggle, simultaneously owing their identities one to another. The 
enemy is essential for one‘s own self-definition. In essence, ‗the enemy defines us‘ by 
calling one‘s very constitution into question and, therefore, ‗is on the same level as am 
I‘ (Schmitt 2007b: 85). Schmittian identity is, therefore, essentially anti-
fundamentalist: it is not known in advance and does not predetermine relationships 
but is the product of them. And yet, the Hegelian formula is slightly reworked: while 
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the original dichotomy was simultaneously abstract and personalised, for Schmitt the 
‗I‘ is more correctly understood as the ‗we‘ or a collective ‗I‘ of a (political) 
community (see Balakrishnan 2000: 112-113). However, rather than being a weakness 
and showing ‗the author‘s own political disorientation‘ as Balakrishnan (2000: 112) 
suggests, such reworking is a completely logical extension of the Schmittian politics 
of identity, necessarily based on collective identification. Indeed, individual identity is 
far from being a concern for Schmitt. In fact, it could be argued that Schmitt 
disproved any self-forming personal identity, including that stemming from enmity, 
because political enmity is not personal; furthermore, self-forming individual 
identities would only foster political discord within the political community (Slomp 
2009: 53-54). Whatever individual identity exists, is derived from the group to which 
the individual belongs. As Kelly (2003: 222) concludes, the very existence of enemies 
presupposes the existence of political entities. These entities then appear inimical, 
though they are not necessarily bad or unjust ones (Sneller 2007: 293). This 
relationship constitutes group identities which then transcend to individuals. In the 
end, these identities are entrenched through the structure of the state. These are, 
ultimately, also the relationships that define to whom the process of ordering applies. 
 
Friendship and Enmity: Two Sides of the Same Coin 
Slomp (2009: 113-114) raises a crucial point by stressing that, contrary to mainstream 
interpretations, not only the enemy but also the friend, the member of one‘s own 
group, should be seen as a constitutive and affirmative part of one‘s identity. The 
enemy defines the borders of identity, whereas the friend affirms the content of 
identity. Such is, for example, the nature of Schmitt‘s partisan who not only has the 
enemy in sight but – crucially – is also wholly immersed in the local population and 
amongst comrades (Schmitt 2007b: 15). A self-identity in the process of becoming has 
to be acknowledged and affirmed by an already existing self-identity in order to obtain 
content instead of remaining a monstrosity without content, only determined by and 
from outside (Schmitt 2007b: 75). This implies, then, that Strauss (1995: 99, 115) is 
fundamentally mistaken in equating the political with the state of nature, first and 
foremost because in the state of nature there is only enmity. But there is, nevertheless, 
a crucial distinction between the substance of friendship and that of enmity: the enemy 
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is usually concrete – an outside group that questions the self, albeit the content of 
questioning changes depending upon situation – while friendship is, in essence, empty 
(see e.g. Smith 2011: 193) and can refer to any content and any group. Böckenförde 
(1998: 39) correctly argues that the function of the state, therefore, is to integrate the 
many tensions within a common identity – i.e. in friendship – and thus ensure 
peaceful coexistence. And yet, due to the Protean nature of the political community, 
friendship, and the institutional power structure that expresses and maintains it, cannot 
remain fixed and rigid. The state could certainly be correctly defined as ‗a unity of 
power and peace‘ (Böckenförde 1998: 39) but it is erroneous to see it as a given, 
purely because the substance that underlies it – the constitutive power of the political 
community – is never a given but is something that must be constantly transcended 
into being. 
Although the enemy is absolute otherness that one has to engage in a life-and-death 
struggle, this struggle is not to annihilate the enemy but to assert one‘s own self. Also, 
it is only in enmity, and not in the world of friends, that otherness can really find its 
place. In a world of all friends, otherness is excluded. An enemy, meanwhile, has a 
consciousness, and this consciousness, even if fought against, cannot be completely 
negated because it is a constitutive part of one‘s self. In contrast, where there is only 
friendship, otherness is merely false consciousness. On the other hand, pure enmity 
without friendship and without the ability to partake in a unity is not far from the 
struggle of all against all. Therefore, only the political, with its tension between 
friendship and enmity, can account for the multiplicity of life and contribute to the 
perpetuity of the process of ordering. 
 
The Independence and Public Nature of the Political 
Schmitt insists that politics and the political, with its central distinction between 
friends and enemies, are to be treated seriously. The political is to be seen as based on 
embedded identities and existential struggle and not as merely a game ruled by 
chance. This is one of the several open conflicts that Schmitt has with Spinoza, who, 
in Schmitt‘s opinion, had inspired ‗a philosophy of intuition and pantheistic 
rationalism‘ (Schmitt 1986: 54). Although it will be argued later that the intuitive and 
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the occasional-qua-contingent can be redeemed even within a politico-theological 
framework, this would still be something objectionable for Schmitt, even if not 
logically incompatible with his thought. 
The political is independent of other domains in the sense that its core distinction, just 
like those of other domains, cannot be derived from distinctions belonging to another 
sphere, e.g. good cannot be derived from beautiful or ugly cannot be derived from 
enemy. However, the various domains are often strategically associated with one 
another, thus producing a stronger emotional affect (Schmitt 2007a: 26-27); also, 
every distinction often leans on others for support, and even more so the political 
distinction between friend and enemy, because it is the most intense distinction. At the 
same time, moral, economic, religious, and other domains can acquire existential 
intensity but by so doing they cease being moral, economic, religious etc. and become 
political (Schmitt 2007a: 38). As Schmitt himself powerfully states, ‗political enemy 
need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic 
competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business 
transactions. But […] it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense 
way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts 
with him are possible‘ (Schmitt 2007a: 27). The above quote clearly illustrates the 
nature of political enmity: a political enemy is a public one and its existence involves 
the possibility of one political unity confronting another. 
The public nature of the enemy means that even the commandment ‗Love your 
enemies‘ does not apply as it deals with private enemies only (Schmitt 2007a: 28). 
Because the enemy is public, an intervention by the state is necessary: only unified 
authority could preclude individualised understandings of the political. It is perfectly 
possible that the development of political identities had involved non-essential and 
contingent events, but as Hirst (1999: 9) notes, once the existential logic of the 
political is strong enough to bring a group to the sense of identity, the motives that had 
brought to this point would have already sunk into oblivion. Once an antagonism 
reaches political intensity, it sheds all the particularity previously possessed – ‗the 
enemy becomes a palimpsest and finally blurs, ultimately losing any recognisable 
form‘ (Shapiro 2008: 42). This is essentially the meaning of (political) stranger: a 
palimpsest of traits that are ‗not I‘, thus delimiting the boundaries of the ‗I‘ and 
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opening up potential for enmity. It is a palimpsest not only because multiple meanings 
and textures are fused into one. It is a palimpsest also in the sense that whenever a 
particular trait of the ‗I‘ (or the ‗us‘) is in question, a necessary layer of the ‗not I‘ (or 
the ‗not us‘) is always already present to both threaten and establish the troubled 
identity (see e.g. Kalpokas 2012). 
Next, the political, as the core of communal existence, implies not only knowledge of 
one‘s self but also a necessary limitation as to the objectivity of this knowledge in the 
form of the ideological apparatus. There is a necessary element of force in communal 
existence: even when a free consensus is presupposed, one still needs to raise the 
question of who has the power to produce the consensus (Schmitt 1999a: 202). As 
Schmitt states, ‗[n]o political system can survive even a generation with only naked 
techniques of holding power. To the political belongs the idea, because there is no 
politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of belief‘ (Schmitt 1996: 
17). In essence, even though (political) existence is groundless, ideas are still crucial 
as both rallying cries and means to cover the groundlessness of subjectivity. Emphasis 
on ideas, therefore, becomes for Schmitt a tool for critiquing the mechanised and 
depoliticised modern governance (see, generally, Braun 2012). Evidently, there are 
two aspects of idea in Schmitt: the dominant structure of belief and the metaphysics of 
institutions, in which they are invested with special dignity. And yet, both of them not 
only are mutually compatible but even serve to reinforce one another to create a 
higher ethos of politics. However, such ethos is hardly possible once the mythical 
politico-theological element has been removed and the state is transformed into 
machine. As Mehring (1998: 145-146) insightfully notes, epochal metaphysics, the 
higher ethos of belief is what holds political communities together and legitimises 
them; once the metaphysics is lost, disintegration ensues. But if such an ethos exists 
and the politico-theological belief in a higher grounding order is in place, then people 
obey not the ruler as a person but the higher force (Schmitt 1996: 50-51), be it God or 
any other higher third element. It is clear that for Schmitt, the source of political 
authority is an Idea, which sustains political form in a temporal unfolding of events 
(see Shapiro 2008: 31). Political theology arises from Schmitt‘s decentred subject and 
places faith at the core of common existence and common action. As pointed out by 
Meier (1998: 43), not only is political theology aware that it is based on faith but it 
even wishes to be because from this perspective every interpretive scheme is based on 
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faith. If Schmitt‘s entire theory of politics and the state is a quest against the subject 
who is always occupied with him/herself, then political theology is the antidote that he 
offers to the depoliticised modern age. And such theological structure is embodied by 
the state as the locus of the central Idea. Hence, the political world becomes 
groundless and quasi-objective simultaneously. 
By stressing the existential intensity and the public nature of political enmity, Schmitt 
seemingly relegates the real political distinction to inter-state relations, noting grimly 
that should one assert the primacy of internal politics, this would mean affirmation of 
civil war (Schmitt 2007a: 32). However, while it is true that inside a homogeneous 
political entity of friends significant conflicts are impossible, differences and minor 
conflicts are not necessarily precluded entirely; it is the function of the state (and the 
sovereign) to preclude these conflicts from achieving existential intensity, i.e. from 
becoming friend-enemy relations. If necessary, the state thus can decide on the 
domestic enemy and ostracise or destroy him/her in order to prevent internal conflict 
and to preserve the homogeneity of the political community (Schmitt 2007a: 46). And 
even in the international sphere, war is important as a possibility and not as an actual 
state of affairs. The ever-present possibility of war is necessary in order to define the 
nation and its boundaries but is not the aim or content of politics (Schmitt 2007a: 34), 
since only a grouping that can orient itself towards the ultimate existential conflict can 
be called sovereign in that the decision on the exception (and on the friend-enemy 
relation) necessarily arises from inside this entity (Schmitt 2007a: 38). One might 
reasonably suspect that what actually matters is the political community‘s ability to 
distinguish between the inside and the outside, both physically, in terms of its borders, 
and symbolically, in terms of what modes of communal life it deems acceptable. In 
terms of the overall argument of this thesis, that refers to the community‘s ability to 
carry out its own ordering. 
 
The Borderline Concept of Sovereignty 
If the state requires the political and the political is based on conflict between friends 
and enemies, there is a need to both decide on where this distinction lies and preclude 
internal conflict inside the political community. This is the essence of sovereignty. 
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Sovereignty, for Schmitt, has had a crucial function in the formation of modern states 
by absorbing all other status relationships (Schmitt 2008a: 100-101). However, 
sovereignty, despite being a historical phenomenon, for Schmitt, is something more 
than just a passing temporary issue: it is an existential concept, the fundamental 
attribute of which is a decision on the status of the political unity, which is the highest 
unity, subsuming all other groupings (Schmitt 1999a: 203). 
It is well known that, for Schmitt, ‗[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception‘ 
(Schmitt 1985: 5). Only the sovereign can defy existing laws by suspending or 
replacing them, just as in Hobbes (Leviathan, 313, 346, 367; De Cive, 129) and Bodin 
(On Sovereignty, 8, 11-12, 55), although Schmitt, arguably, goes further, disregarding 
natural law as a noteworthy limitation (in contrast to e.g. On Sovereignty, 8, 12). 
Schmittian sovereignty is a borderline concept that defies any routine and, indeed, a 
core concept to understanding his entire thinking. Several important attributes of the 
borderline nature of sovereignty are already clear from the above. First, sovereignty as 
a borderline concept pertains to a limit, a dividing line between the inside and the 
outside, ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, but also between order and disorder, the normal situation and 
the exception. The need to decide on the border arises from the logic of the political: 
once the existential intensity of the political is reached, no discussion and critical 
reflection is able offer a solution; rather, the Gordian knot has to be cut by a sovereign 
decision. Constant renegotiation of borders also precludes the political from being 
completely relegated to purely external affairs, even in a Schmittian homogeneous 
political community, because homogeneity is constantly brought into question. Gross 
(2007: 149) emphasises a crucial point in noting that a decision creates not only the 
content of the law but also ‗the nature of the legal person the decision applies to‘: by 
creating the law it also moulds (or even establishes) the political community. 
Moreover, whatever is decided, necessarily reflects the always already existing (old or 
new) form of the political community. To an extent, then, sovereignty and law both 
have an immanent nature in Schmitt, just as in Spinoza. 
The second attribute of sovereignty as a borderline concept is that it defies routine and 
is concerned only with existential issues: in routine situations, sovereignty remains a 
potentiality, while in situations concerning a state‘s existence it becomes an actuality. 
There is also a third aspect of sovereignty as a borderline concept: the one who is 
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sovereign decides in a situation where conflict arises (Schmitt 1985: 6), i.e. 
sovereignty is the frontline on which conflicting interests clash. Instances of sovereign 
power exist because there remains the possibility of bellum omnium contra omnes – 
the possibility of (civil) war should differences within a state be left unchecked. To 
the nature of the sovereign belongs the responsibility to determine the condition, form, 
and interests of the state, i.e. of the people (Schmitt 1985: 9). Such task, as Schmitt 
sees it, would be impossible should different groups be left to quarrel among 
themselves without a higher authoritative force. As such, the sovereign power is 
included through exclusion: it is outside the law but at the same time belongs to the 
legal system. Consequently, the sovereign power belongs to law and to non-law 
simultaneously. By making a decision on the state of exception, the sovereign not only 
establishes the law but also declares the absence of anything outside the law, thus 
imputing the law with its absent fullness (see Agamben 1998: 15). Sovereignty is 
itself the threshold between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, nomos and anomie. Albeit arbitrary and 
unable to exhaust all available possibilities, the decision still establishes a chain of 
signification that seemingly holds the constantly shifting world in place. The state of 
exception allows the creation of political totality: in addition to the taking of land 
(Landesnahme) that, for Schmitt (2003), characterises a political entity, exception 
(Ausnahme) is the taking of the outside (see Agamben 1998: 19). The exception 
captures the outside of law – the world of things not yet ordered by the chain of 
signification – and paradoxically includes it into law, albeit through exclusion. 
Exception is the law‘s response to the unknown, the unrepresentable, and the 
unpredictable. 
Finally, one more paradoxical quality of sovereignty has to be stressed: it can be both 
norm-preserving and norm-creating or, more precisely, either one or the other at any 
given time. This two-sidedness is already found in one of Schmitt‘s earliest works – 
his analysis of dictatorship – in the distinction between commissary dictatorship and 
sovereign dictatorship. While ‗the commissary dictatorship suspends the constitution 
in order to protect it‘, the sovereign one ‗does not suspend an existing constitution 
[…]; rather, it seeks to create conditions in which constitution – a constitution that it 
regards as a true one – is made possible‘: the former grounds itself in the already 
existing constitution, the latter – in a constitution ‗that is still to come‘ (Schmitt 2014: 
118-119). It is not unimaginable for these two aspects to clash – and yet, only one of 
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them can be truly sovereign at a time. Here, Schmitt could be interpreted as an anti-
essentialist because the only relevant question is whose decision has effectively 
determined the state of exception in a particular case: the constituted (upholding 
decision) or the constitutive (creative decision). That, which is against the pre-existing 
order, can become the basis of a new order but, in case of failure to establish itself, it 
only remains outside of the law. In either case, there is a decision at the end – a ‗last 
say‘ which ‗normalises‘ the situation, making it part of the legal and symbolic order, 
either an old or a new one. It, therefore, follows that sovereign power, instead of being 
an objective given, can only be attributed retrospectively: whoever succeeds in 
making an effective decision, is sovereign. In fact, the successful person or body, at 
least as a matter of representation, has always already been sovereign. After all, the 
clash takes place on a groundless terrain and, therefore, the ability to decide 
effectively only proves a pre-existing quality, even though that proof is only created 
by and applicable to the new situation that has been created by either a conservative or 
a revolutionary decision and not in relation to some universal essence (Kalpokas, 
Mininger and Rusinaitė 2013: 132). Hence, possession of the attribute of sovereignty 
can easily be subsequently disproved by a new situation, whereby the new sovereign 
loses to an even newer one. This, nevertheless, is the strongest grounding one can 
expect – one that is constantly within the process of ordering. 
 
Sovereignty: Dynamic but Absolute 
Of course, the ultimate aim of sovereignty is to establish order. However, order, as it 
relates to sovereignty, is an empty concept: any order must exist and not a particular 
one. As a result, sovereignty is not only about preservation but also about contestation 
and indistinction between the contending forces, those preserving the status quo on the 
one side and those challenging it on the other. As the political is based on an ever-
present possibility of conflict, it comes as no surprise that ‗all political concepts, 
images, and terms have a polemical meaning‘ (Schmitt 2007a: 30). Their content 
derives from a concrete situation, a concrete friend-enemy grouping, and without this 
particular situation, any political concept becomes a mere abstraction, devoid of any 
meaning. Such concepts cannot be comprehended ‗if one does not know exactly who 
is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term‘ (Schmitt 2007a: 31). 
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The precise content of the decision is secondary; of prime importance is the 
transformation from chaos to norm. The sovereign intervenes in an undecidable 
situation and fills the empty idea of order with a particular meaning. Sovereign 
decision, therefore, must not be seen as trailblazing a path to a predestined bright 
future, i.e. as a teleological process, but as a constant steering process, the outcome 
and final end of which are unknown. And, since there is no ultimate telos, sovereignty 
cannot, at least from a political point of view, be rigid and incontestable. 
Sovereignty necessarily implies the ability to decide, and decision is impossible 
without sovereignty. In a critique of Walter Benjamin‘s sovereign that is ultimately 
unable to decide, described in the book on Trauerspiel (Benjamin 1998 [1925]), 
which, in turn, was at least partly a critique of the sovereign of Political Theology, 
Schmitt embarks on his own literary analysis by espousing the figure of Hamlet. Here, 
as in Benjamin‘s account of Baroque sovereignty, the hero is unable to decide. 
However, this is so for a reason. In one of the central passages of his Hamlet or 
Hecuba, Schmitt explicitly places Hamlet on the dividing line, portraying him as a 
borderline figure and placing him among what he considers as the great symbolic 
figures of European literature, the Spanish Catholic Don Quixote and the German 
Protestant Faustus (although one could disagree with Schmitt by referring to the pre-
Protestant origin of the Faustian legend). Hamlet, in turn, is in-between, constantly 
torn between Rome and Wittenberg and their conflicting doctrinal worlds (Schmitt 
2006: 44-45). This allegory is at the same time very particular (for Schmitt, Germany 
is Hamlet) and abstract, referring to a situation where a decision needs to be made in 
the grey zone between two equally strong imperatives. Hamlet‘s madness, real or 
simulated, is, in essence, an exception without a decision. And yet, Hamlet‘s 
indecision is not a sign of a deficiency in the theory of sovereignty. On the contrary, 
Schmitt‘s explanation is almost straightforward: Hamlet is not yet a sovereign figure. 
It is only with Corneille and Racine and their overarching unity of place, time, and 
action that the new sovereign state penetrates the stage, making the earlier form of 
never-ending possibility look savage (Schmitt 2006: 53-55). But, as Salter (2012: 190-
191) shows, Hamlet also marks a transition: after a long and agonising period of 
indecision, Hamlet finally acts, claiming sovereignty that rightfully belongs to him, 
even though it only brings death and doom. This excursus to literature illustrates the 
tectonic shift not only in government but also in popular imagination that the 
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inception of sovereignty had brought. If previously indecision and multiplicity were 
commonplace, after this shift decision and unity became central. In a world that has 
passed the epoch of Schmitt‘s revered societas Christiana, a conflict between equally 
strong imperatives is commonplace, and indecision is madness, a struggle of the 
(political) subject against itself. Transferred to the political realm, this means civil war 
(political madness), and it is the task of the sovereign to prevent it. 
Notably, exception is about choice on the part of both the sovereign and the potential 
sovereign-to-be. It is also about a choice on the part of the people and of every 
individual – a need to take sides. This comes at a price, and the tragic once again 
comes into play. The choice in the exception is between the order of the state and 
something that challenges it. That is the tragic choice of the political, impossible to 
either feign or avoid, in other words, the moment of absolute responsibility and 
authenticity. As in Kahn‘s (2011: 155) reappropriation of Schmitt, no revolution is 
possible until there is the willingness of sacrifice, the pledging of life. The stakes 
cannot be higher: as sovereign power is not an atemporal essence but an attribute to be 
obtained, a successful challenger is able to ex post facto establish one‘s own decision 
as a sovereign one, that is, this decision is subsequently seen as always already 
reflecting the state and the homogeneous people that it embodies. Authority becomes 
a corollary to success (Schmitt 1998: 231). This could be the answer to what 
Dyzenhaus (1999a: 43) sees as a fundamental ambiguity in the Schmittian concept of 
sovereignty, whence the sovereign decision is simultaneously grounded on de facto 
power and on holding the formal attribute of sovereignty: both are interwoven 
inextricably and are retrospectively seen as having always already been present and 
simultaneous. Returning to Kahn‘s (2011: 155-156) interpretation, the basic formula, 
then, becomes a movement from slavery, which through a sacrificial act, has been 
transformed into emancipation, culminating with a sovereign decision to establish an 
order of reason and freedom. But whoever loses, becomes the object of the 
sovereign‘s right to decide on the internal enemy and has always already 
misconceived the true essence of the homogeneous people. Meanwhile, the winner in 
this tragic drama is able to produce a political pact that has the strength of divine 
covenant for those who remain (Kahn 2011: 155). 
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There is a further limit to sovereign decisionism. Any sovereign establishment of 
order cannot be disconnected from metaphysical ideals. Pan (2009: 53-54) has an 
important insight here: the very conditio sine qua non of sovereignty is the existence 
of a plurality of such ideas and conceptions of the good that cannot be grounded and 
prioritised by any other means than an external decision. No normative order can pass 
from potentiality into actuality, i.e. into concrete political existence, without being 
imposed by a sovereign decision, which bridges the gap between the world of words 
and the world of things in a groundless, foundationless fiat (see Žižek 1999: 18-19). 
This is where Schmitt‘s parallel between miracle and exception is especially pertinent. 
And yet, just as the miracle needs the religious context to be at least partly explicated, 
i.e. included into the symbolic structure of representation, the sovereign decision must 
be understood in the context of both what it establishes and also of what it rejects, that 
is, in the context of available options. In both cases – the religious and the political – 
an extremely strong element of belief is necessary because only belief can bring about 
the tragic decision and the willingness to sacrifice oneself. In this sense, political 
martyrdom parallels religious martyrdom. An extra element of the tragic is introduced, 
however: for Schmitt, one of the core prescriptions for political action is doing what is 
commanded rather than what is good (see Versluis 2006: 52-53) but, at the same time, 
when a real existential struggle between two authoritative commandments takes place, 
it is impossible to know which commandment is real until after the struggle has taken 
place and the ultimate decision has been made. Furthermore, given that a decision is 
always made on a groundless terrain, whatever one chooses to stick with and sacrifice 
oneself for, the sacrifice is always in vain since no choice is inherently better than the 
other. And yet, one has to choose anyway. This is the ultimate tragic of Schmitt‘s 
politics – perhaps, the tragic taken to its extreme: no security of the universal and 
simultaneous unavoidability of constantly being tried and tested in a never-ending 
struggle to establish a universal which does not even exist. But also there cannot be a 
clearer opening for ordering to be conceived as process. 
 
3.3. The Theology: Law and Politics 
Having already established the basic framework of ordering in Schmitt‘s thought – his 
ideas about the state and sovereignty as well as the bridging concept of the political – 
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it is the purpose of this subchapter to delve into the content of Schmittian ordering: 
law and politics. This content, it transpires, is to a significant extent, about 
establishing a system of belief – in essence, a theology of ordering. 
Schmitt (2014: 16-17) openly declares his Hobbesian roots with regards to legal 
thinking, claiming that there can be no law before or outside the state. Although 
Spinoza, as seen in the previous chapter, does the same, Schmitt is more radical: while 
Spinoza, although refuting natural law as such, still introduces parts of it as universal 
norms of reason, for Schmitt, no ideal model or even guideline can be presupposed. 
Law is, in essence, situational and any content there is depends on the political 
community‘s mode of existence as expressed through a sovereign decision. The law, 
old or new, is always already willed by the community and imposed onto itself to 
provide Being with embodiment and structure. And yet, despite that groundlessness 
(or, probably, because of it), the law has to be believed in and observed in a quasi-
religious way. The will of the sovereign becomes analogous to the will of God – that 
is one of the core pillars of Schmitt‘s political theology. If law does become the core 
of a political theology of a state, it becomes a tool to uphold the shape and form of a 
political community and precludes chaos – and that was Schmitt‘s ultimate concern. 
In effect, Schmitt‘s understanding of law will inform the constitutive element of legal 
thinking promoted in the final chapter. 
For Schmitt, law is necessarily political. It is the result of political processes within 
the community and not based on a self-referential system of legalistic norms and 
procedures. Since it refers to existence, it can never be detached from that existence – 
that is the core of Schmitt‘s quest against legality and for legitimacy and for politics as 
opposed to managerial adjudication of interests. The political community always 
retains its potential to change the mode of its existence, even if in normal 
circumstances the actual power to do so might not be visible. In fact, in everyday 
situations that temporality of ordering has to be forgotten because only in this way 
political theology is possible. But even under this collective amnesia, political life 
never stops and potential changes to law are constantly brewing. Once again, the 
relentless permanence of politics is to prove crucial in formulating a model of 




Constitution as Partial Suturing 
Constitution, as far as it is of interest to Schmitt, is ‗the constitution of the state, that is 
to say, the political unity of the people‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 59) and, therefore, must arise 
from the people. The people is where all the meanings of the constitution converge: 
the constitution is the way of a political community‘s organisation and its condition of 
being, a particular form the political community assumes, and a continuous act of the 
people‘s self-determination. Schmitt (2008a) sees the constitution as a mediator 
between the people and the state: it simultaneously provides the state with its 
normative framework, i.e. with its form, and is moulded by the self-conscious political 
community. Also, in normal circumstances, constitution is the pinnacle of law which 
governs the community which has provided itself with that constitution. It is, 
therefore, a paradoxical instrument that occupies a borderline position between the 
creator and the created, potestas and auctoritas. 
Only a self-conscious unity can provide itself with norms and only those norms that a 
community has provided itself with are legitimate. Central is the will external to 
norms, the will that transforms the existence of the people, its political way of being, 
into norms, thus establishing the integrity of a legal system (Schmitt 2008a: 70, 125). 
In this case, it is the will to political existence, direct and unmediated (Schmitt 2008a: 
131-132). The quasi-metaphysical will is thus seen by Schmitt as the prime mover of 
law and politics. As a result, he has no doubt which of the two is first: political unity 
or the order governing it. The constitution cannot establish itself; it cannot originate 
from absolute nothingness. The primordial act is the decision of a constitution-making 
power – the legal order ‗does not give itself‘ (Kennedy 2004: 126). The core actor is 
the people which immanently defines itself through the constitution. A constitution is 
a boundary, a borderline, a site of inclusion and exclusion: any act of self-definition 
and self-determination necessarily includes and excludes by embracing some 
alternatives and discarding others. And a constitution is, essentially, such an act. A 
constitution, then, is ‗a conscious decision, which the political unity reaches for itself 
and provides itself through the constitution-making power‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 75-76). 
This power can be a monarch, an aristocratic council, or the whole of the people – 
such considerations are secondary for Schmitt. What matters for him, in the entire 
corpus of his work, is the decision that defines the political unity and its way of being; 
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due to such existential quality, this decision does not require any ethical or juridical 
justification (Schmitt 2008a: 136) although, as already stressed, it is premised on a 
quasi-theological framework. This decision stems from the political being of the 
people as such and has an essentially existential quality (Schmitt 2008a: 125). As a 
result, Schmitt‘s focus is not on legality but on legitimacy. 
In a sense, one can speak about an immanent nature of law in Schmitt. There is no 
order that could arise without a pre-existing unity of will, that is, without a political 
foundation, as opposed to mere integrity and coherence of bare norms (Schmitt 2008a: 
65). Indeed, for him, all legal norms, constitutional ones included, presuppose ‗a will 
that already exists‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 76). Whatever the law, it is always already willed 
by the political unity of the people, and this unity takes shape only through its own 
effects, i.e. through the norms produced. What is even more, everything the people 
intends is law: law ‗stems from the potestas of the people‘ and has no limitation 
(Schmitt 2008a: 286). The state as such produces law in the positivist sense but not its 
content – it only codifies the will of the people and the people‘s sense of right 
(Schmitt 1985: 23). Therefore, proper meaning arises from a concrete source, not from 
an empty transcendental ideal or an abstract concept of right (Schmitt 1985: 35). 
Schmitt is radical on this point: whatever the political community decides is just and 
right, and any real democracy has to take the risk of accepting that indeterminacy. 
What has already been said applies at least as far as the potentially unchangeable core 
of the constitution – its fundamental essence – is concerned, although perhaps less so 
to the adjustable secondary provisions. This is Schmitt‘s distinction between 
constitution in the fundamental sense and constitutional laws (Schmitt 2008a: 75). The 
former stems from the very being of the people, embodying the fundamental decisions 
on the form of a particular people‘s existence and on the basic principles of a political 
unity‘s organisation in a state form, thus providing validity and legitimacy to all other 
regulations (Schmitt 2008a: 78, 125). Constitution, in essence, is also a borderline 
concept: ‗not an actual existing condition, also not a dynamic becoming‘ (Schmitt 
2008a: 62). It is the ‗law of laws‘ to which all other norms can be traced, quasi-
sovereign in a sense that it implements ‗a closed, systematic unity of norms‘, which 
becomes equivalent to the state; in this way ‗constitution is the state‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 
63). However, the sovereign must first of all be concrete, and constitution, in the sense 
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of a mere valid norm, is not concrete enough to be considered sovereign. This comes 
as no surprise when one considers the existential quality of political unity and the 
constitution that embodies it: as long as the constitution is the unity of the people and 
establishes their particular will, it is quasi-sovereign; conversely, when the 
constitution exists as a mere legal form and no longer has an existential foundation, 
the political community has to decide on its own mode of political existence once 
again, thus reappropriating its sovereign power. 
 
Law, Norm, and the Decision 
The centrality of exception in the foundation of any order indicates that, for Schmitt, 
all law is ‗situational law‘ (Schmitt 1985: 13). It is in this character of law that 
sovereignty resides. If law was simply somewhere ‗out there‘, if it existed universally 
and independently, there would be no sovereignty in its popular or any other form, 
because there would be no place for will and decision. It is decision and not a norm 
that grounds a legal order (Schmitt 1985: 10). Such statement is less controversial 
than it might appear: indeed, order, even for Schmitt, is about norms. What is 
important, however, is that norms cannot establish themselves. They require an act of 
will – a decision – in order to come into being. Such decision has the power of law 
without being law as yet and serves as a foundation of law, the force of which it 
already carries within itself: the will that establishes the norm is always already 
present – immanent – and transforms chaos into law (Schmitt 2004b: 59-60). It is up 
to the sovereign to decide whether the normal situation, to which legal order is 
applicable, exists at any given moment (Schmitt 1985: 13). Such decision cannot be 
explained from a normative perspective and incorporated into any order because it 
grounds and establishes what only subsequently becomes order (Schmitt 2004b: 62). 
At first glance, it seems that the sovereign also decides on the conditions of his own 
appearance and is an independent variable on its own. Although to a certain extent this 
is correct, Kennedy (2004: 101) correctly notes that sovereignty, being transformed by 
Schmitt from a personal institution (Bodin, Hobbes) to an existential intervention into 
the normal order of things, simultaneously loses a certain degree of autonomy: the 
sovereign decides but only when the conditions are ripe, when antagonisms within the 
political community reach a dangerous intensity. 
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In a famous politico-theological twist, Schmitt equates exception in jurisprudence 
with the miracle in theology (Schmitt 1985: 36). The allusion to the miracle is 
twofold. First, the miracle is something that defies the normal order of things by the 
sheer will of the supreme power. Second, the miracle also serves as a proof of election 
and divine mission. In the same manner, the exception, as a rupture in the fabric of the 
everyday, serves as a moment of unconcealment in which the very essence of political 
Being appears in its pure form. Consequently, the very essence of law is revealed in 
non-law and the very essence of a political community is revealed in a non-communal 
moment of sovereign decision – thus, again, on the boundary of exception. As it has 
already been seen, this is contrary to Spinoza who denied the existence of miracles 
and thus could not accept law as arising from exception either. Schmitt is here also in 
explicit opposition to the positivist interpretation of law, embodied in particular by 
another prominent legal scholar of the time, Hans Kelsen. If, for Schmitt, law is a 
normative consequence of a fact-description, imposed by a sovereign decision, and 
sovereignty is the ability to impose law from outside the law, for Kelsen, as seen in 
the first chapter, the picture is absolutely the opposite: what ought to be cannot be 
arbitrarily decided and established and can only be derived from a hypothetical 
Grundnorm, or basic norm (Kelsen 1989: 8-9, 198-199; Kelsen 1999: 111). 
Sovereignty is, then, an attribute of legal validity, existing within the legal order and 
not above it (Kelsen 1999: 189). Although the basic norm may not be graspable in 
concrete terms, its existence must be presupposed as an underived foundation, as a 
kind of prime mover (Kelsen 1989: 194-195); having this in mind, it is not surprising 
that Kelsen constantly refers to God‘s commandments as the archetypal Grundnorm. 
In this context, Schmitt‘s abovementioned claim that all political concepts are 
secularised religious ones obtains new currency. 
Clearly, despite Schmitt‘s ever-recurring emphasis on the importance of order, not the 
law but the exception is paramount: ‗the rule proves noting; the exception proves 
everything‘ (Schmitt 1985: 15). Exception is that which defies codification and cannot 
be subsumed (Schmitt 1985: 13). The state of exception, as suspension of the existing 
order, entails an unlimited authority and an absolute decision unhindered by any 
normative ties; however, the exception is not completely anarchic or chaotic, because 
a certain kind of order still exists (Schmitt 1985: 12). More precisely, three kinds or 
order exist: the old order is still included as a spectre of itself that can be re-embodied 
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once again, a new order can be in the making, and between them is the will of the 
sovereign. In this respect, Kennedy (2004: 85) is incorrect to point out that Schmitt 
allows for unlimited indeterminacy and removes all law: although law in the formal 
sense might be abolished in the exception, it is still perfectly viable as a goal, an 
antithesis to be countered, or a potentiality to be transcended into being. In other 
words, although law is grounded in the exception and defined by and within an 
exception, this is not to say that exception is lawless or that law is discarded or even 
discardable. Law is, rather, an ever-recurring reality, only without any necessary 
content and even without any criteria to adjudicate between different normative orders 
or to compare them. 
Since norm and any specific content of law rests on a decision, the very need for a 
founding fiat which would produce the norm ex nihilo becomes crucial. In fact, the 
law, once decided upon, becomes probably the most important weapon in the 
theologico-political struggle but not by its content (since there is no necessary 
content) but by its very presence. Clearly, the Schmittian decision that grounds legal 
order plays a special role in what Schmitt sees as a Christian idea of history, by which 
he means history that ends in a redemptive struggle. The state, insofar as it protects 
order, stands as the Katechon (a figure that Schmitt borrows from Paul‘s letter to 
Thessalonians) – the restrainer of the Antichrist. Although, as Hell (2009) stresses, 
this figure is only directly applicable to imperial political theology on a global scale 
(the upholder of world order), the basic logic of sovereign-qua-Katechon could be 
easily transposed to the national level. On the state level, katechonic logic would 
mean the upholding of order (which in itself always contains the potentiality of 
disorder and change) against the fall of any communal signification (and the ensuing 
loss of any distinctions and of the ability to stand up for anything). Sovereigns may 
change but the katechonic function and, therefore, the political community itself, 
remains. Balakrishnan (2000: 224-225) quite rightly suggests that the Katechon in its 
various guises (as a ‗commissarial dictator‘, ‗sovereign‘, ‗Defender of the 
Constitution‘, ‗Leviathan‘) persists in Schmitt‘s core writings as something which is 
beyond order with a view to establish it and banish lawlessness. As early as Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt related the Antichrist with the modern 
economic-technical thinking that pervades all domains of life, making subjects 
comfortably numb (Schmitt 1996: 15-16). Also present in Schmitt‘s entire oeuvre is 
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the positioning of Marxism as the arch-enemy, indeed, the new Antichrist (see 
Bolsinger 2001: 164). Here the source of Schmitt‘s antipathy to liberalism is also 
perfectly clear: while it is necessary to make a decision, to take sides, liberalism 
engages in a permanent discussion, unable to either affirm or negate anything, not 
even to choose between Christ and Barabbas (Schmitt 1985: 59). Those who oppose 
the high stakes of politics, then, necessarily take sides with the Antichrist, understood 
as lawlessness, demystification of politics, and negation of political conflict. Indeed, 
the importance placed on establishing and maintaining order cannot be higher. 
 
Between Legality and Legitimacy 
Despite the power of the state playing a stabilising role, Schmitt still assigns 
superiority to the constitutive power. He vehemently opposes the reduction of law to a 
decree issued by the right authority following a correct procedure. On his account, 
such an approach replaces concrete existing sovereignty with the ‗sovereignty of law‘ 
– a set of fictions designated to conceal the real sovereignty. A rigid symbolic 
structure thus deprives the people of the existential will. In such a system, norms 
govern but do not rule. As a matter of fact, due to their impersonal nature, they 
eliminate rule, power, and obedience. What is left is a system of bare legality that 
even suspends the right to resistance because one can resist power but not legality 
(Schmitt 2004a: 4). Indeed, the only rudimentary traces of any authority are those 
derived from legality itself, discarding the claims even of powers that do not require 
an external foundation, including the power of the people (Schmitt 2004a: 9). Such 
state form is abstract in the sense that it loses any connection with ‗the actual concrete 
situation‘ and is placed in its own sphere, distinct from the state of a political unity 
(Schmitt 2004a: 10), thereby violating the nature of the state as an entity of the people. 
The state is reduced to ‗law in statutory form‘; law, but not the people, becomes the 
essence of the state (Schmitt 2004a: 11). Schmitt sees the origin of this approach as 
coextensive with the deist turn in theology. Just as deism effectively banished God 
and miracles from the world by subjecting terrestrial processes to the rational laws of 
nature, the new quasi-deist approach to law removed the metaphysical-existential 
origin of every norm and left only rational legal process in its place (Schmitt 1985: 
36-37). Although the deist turn happened at a time when one sole sovereign was 
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proclaimed – the time of absolute monarchy – the sovereign, simultaneously, was, in 
effect, pushed aside. The state-machine was imagined as running by itself according 
to universal laws of reason and nature that provided an external point of reference 
(Schmitt 1985: 47-48). Of course, Schmitt was not alone in expressing such concerns. 
On the contrary, as Shapiro (2008: 4) notes, he could lean upon a rich tradition that 
included not only the reactionary tradition but also his contemporaries from the entire 
political spectrum. However, Schmitt was able to achieve a broader synthesis of 
concerns than many of his contemporaries and add a new twist through his political-
theological interpretation. 
Schmitt offers a clear alternative to the dominance of legality: a ‗political‘ concept of 
law. This understanding of law is, then, directly juxtaposed to the legalistic one by 
presuming a law that ‗is concrete will and command and an act of sovereignty‘ 
(Schmitt 2008a: 187). Law, then, is not a norm but an order that arises directly from 
the political existence of the state and the people and directly reflects its present form. 
Law as command deals with the particular case, it is situational and adjustable, but is 
such at the expense of equality before the law. Only the Rechtsstaat law presupposes 
equality because it is meant to be general, but this recourse to pure law ‗destroys 
everything individual‘ (Schmitt 1996: 50). Rather than removing any arbitrariness 
from law, as aimed by both positivist and normative theories, Schmitt opts for the 
‗judicially concrete‘, for law tailored separately for each situation (for an elaboration, 
see Kennedy 2004: 79). Political law treats each case separately and does not 
presuppose equality because the cases are not necessarily identical (Schmitt 2008a: 
194). Such decision on a case-by-case basis, according to Schmitt, allows for reason 
and justice to manifest themselves unmediated by general norms without being 
exhausted ‗in the normativism of mere legality‘ (Schmitt 2004a: 5). Contrary to bare 
legality, such approach is based on legitimacy: ‗an instance of will‘ (Schmitt 2004a: 
6). This instance can be twofold: on the one hand, it arises from the law-making 
power and orders the world; on the other, it is the will of the individual as a part of the 
political unity to act in conformity with law (the latter understood here as the will of 
the sovereign), as opposed to following the rule without reflection. Once again, the 




The Immanent Will 
Although it could be argued that many aspects of Schmitt‘s theory of state and politics 
are best understood through the prism of immanence, Schmitt himself was far from 
content with what he saw as an increased prevalence of immanence in the modern 
world. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the ways in which he fused immanence 
and transcendence in his work or, more precisely, how, despite laying down a theory 
of immanence, he still left a back door open for transcendence, creating, in essence, 
‗transcendence within immanence‘ (Ojakangas, 2006: 33). This flash of transcendence 
– which Schmitt calls the concrete – suddenly breaks the chain of immanence and 
discloses the void at the heart of subjectivity and politics: this is how theorising a 
border (or, better, the borderline) becomes possible. As Ojakangas (2006: 34-35) 
shows, this void or openness is a crucial attribute of some of Schmitt‘s core ideas: the 
sovereign decision of Political Theology, a people‘s self-determination in 
Constitutional Theory, or the figure of the enemy in The Concept of the Political. This 
openness not only interrupts the order of things: it provides for a creative force which 
renews and recreates (political) order. The borderline not only is a primeval aspect of 
order but also provides for the indeterminacy and non-finality of any existing order by 
resisting a synthesis. After all, Schmitt was no Hegelian: although, for him, thesis and 
antithesis are very real, they never form a new, more perfect, sum of previous parts. 
Change is, therefore, not a challenge to a synthesis but a constant movement of 
tectonic plates that are themselves constantly changing. And yet, even these flashes 
are no longer pure transcendence: even a seemingly foundationless fiat has become a 
manifestation of something pre-existing, either an always already existing form and 
will of a political community or the existential identity of friendship, coming into 
being only through its own effects. Therefore, a void simultaneously is created 
between what already is and creates a new reality which purports a radical break with 
the past and, seemingly, has no roots in the past. To be more precise, Schmitt 
politicises immanence, fusing it with transcendence to an extent that they become 
indistinguishable. 
Again following the immanence-transcendence amalgamation, it is only when 
substantial homogeneity is presupposed that a vote is not about quarrel and disunity 
but a means of bringing forth an already latently existing agreement because a 
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homogeneous people presupposes a homogeneous will and not a struggle between 
majorities and minorities (Schmitt 2004a: 27-28). If democracy is based on 
homogeneity, there is no necessary difference between the wills of the majority and of 
the minority. In effect, if a people is homogeneous, it can have one will only, and 
those who had remained in minority have no other option than to admit that they were 
wrong and that what they considered to be the general will in reality was not (Schmitt 
2000a: 26-27). The content of the popular will can only be understood through its 
effects. Therefore, the function of the government in a democracy is to 
transubstantiate the otherwise latent will into order. This is because the nature of 
democracy is ‗the identity of the ruler and the ruled, governing and governed, 
commander and follower‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 264) – in short, democracy is characterised 
by immediacy and its absolute character. This is not ‗psychological identification‘ 
(Holmes 1993: 49) but a much deeper – existential – identity. Although such identity 
is never absolute – as long as there is government, there is also representation – one 
rules not because of some trivial qualities (e.g. class, nobility etc.) but because one has 
the confidence of the people. This, however, should not be confused with mere 
election of a representative. For Schmitt, ‗nothing could be further from the idea of 
representation‘ than technical procedures (Schmitt 1996: 20). Instead, what matters 
for Schmitt is the underlying will that is carried from potentiality to actuality in the 
process of representation while the very technique of representation could take any 
form (hence it is not too difficult to understand why Schmitt did not have a problem 
with authoritarianism). However, due to the underlying will of the people, a 
democratic government‘s rule can be stricter, more intense, and more decisive 
(Schmitt 2008a: 265-266). Hence, the one who rules, rules by the will of the people 
and through him/her the people rules itself (Schmitt 2008a: 264). A democratic 
government becomes, in essence, a medium through which the people speaks and acts. 
No mediation or external criteria are required: ‗homogeneity elevated to an identity 
understands itself completely from itself‘ (Schmitt 2000a: 14). Therefore, in Schmitt‘s 
own words, ‗all democratic thinking centers on ideas of immanence‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 
266). In democracy, the will of the people and the will of God cannot contradict, and 
if they do, the will of the people must take precedence, because the God that appears 
in the political realm can only be a god of a particular people. This is how Schmitt 
interprets the principle ‗the people‘s voice is the voice of God‘ (Schmitt 2008a: 267). 
Consequently, any political theology can only be of a particular political community. 
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And yet, as noted earlier, it must still be perceived as an absolute and quasi-
transcendent universal, just like any theology. Immanence is, thereby, again 
politicised by an infusion of transcendence. What Schmitt implies here is that 
democracy has inverted the traditional trajectory: when the people qua God is the 
omnipotent lawgiver, God is no longer transcendent but immanent, even if not without 
certain losses involved: the loss of transcendence has limited the decisionist character 
and independence of sovereignty (Schmitt 1985: 49). 
Immanence is the logic of both the decision that establishes a norm and of the decision 
to follow that norm. One could probably object that Schmitt consciously rejects the 
applicability of the logic of immanence, especially to the theologico-political, by 
expressly dissociating power and prophecy (Schmitt 1996: 14). However, this applies 
to the normal situation only. In such situation, the will of the homogeneous people is 
already expressed and has become a reality. Therefore, there is no need to prophecise 
in the sense of seeing through the signs of what passes as reality in order to tell the 
‗real‘ order and direction of things. However, as any present constitution of the state is 
fundamentally dependent on the people, once the people‘s way of existence moves 
away from what had been established and a tension between being and norm becomes 
acute, a need for prophecy arises in order to bring the otherwise latent popular will 
into actuality. The question that remains is how to know whether an attempt at 
political prophecy is a genuine effort to express the new will or an effort to undermine 
the very existence of the political unity and to possibly incite civil war. The only 
plausible answer is that, again, one can know only ex post facto: should a prophecy 
prevail, it becomes evident that this had been the true and authentic will of the people. 
Otherwise it had been a seditious idea only. Here, again, the Being of the people 
becomes true only through its own effects. In this sense, the process of ordering 
manifests its autonomy: whatever is established through such process is legitimate 
internally to the process. 
There is, however, one more quasi-prophetic moment implicit in the Schmittian 
account of politics. As already discussed, Schmitt suggests equating the power of God 
and the democratic power of the people in that they must act under the logic of 
immanence, being always already present and caused by their own effects. As Shapiro 
(2008: 7) suggests, this means that the will not only cannot be reduced to positive 
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statutes but also cannot manifest itself directly and must be transcended into reality, 
literally, spoken into being. However, this needs some unpacking. Clearly, there is a 
need for a figure, a locus of concentrated power, in order to establish meaning and the 
content of the will, thus constraining the omnipresent and inexhaustible creative 
power of heresy (or ‗dissent‘ in the discourse of secularised political theology). And 
yet, this incarnation of order is necessarily empty or otherwise it, and not the will of 
God or of the people-qua-God, would be the real constitutive power. The mystery of 
this embodiment of order lies in its dignitas, a sort of Corpus Mysticum assumed by 
the actual person or institution. Here one must distinguish clearly between 
embodiment and representation: while in representation someone steps in for the 
people, in embodiment the political community is in the Corpus Mysticum, suggesting 
– what is crucial for Schmitt – identity of the ruler(s) and the ruled. Similarly, the 
political community cannot stand for itself and must be embodied. Both the 
constitutive and the constituted constantly need something more than themselves in 
order to become themselves. This is clearly reflected in Schmitt‘s discussion of the 
pope in Roman Catholicism: he is the Vicar of Christ and not a prophet, therefore, he 
is infallible and has authority by the merit of his office and not through personal 
charisma (Schmitt 1996: 10). However, the distinction between the person and the 
office, the divine/popular will and the will of the medium is often blurred. There still 
remains, it appears, an unavoidable tension and standoff between the constitutive and 
the constituted, which, in turn, upholds the process of ordering as a process. 
 
The Constitutive Power and Its Law 
Even after it has been established that any order rests upon a decision, a fundamental 
question still remains: who decides? The answer to it determines the entire legal and 
political reality (Schmitt 1985: 34). Also, it has already been established that the 
sovereign decision can be both radical and conservative. There is, as almost always 
with Schmitt, a dualistic tension: he is fascinated by the political community and its 
will and simultaneously doubts the people‘s capacity to decide adequately. The 
constant tension between the constitutive and the constituted elements means that the 
people and the state cannot be completely identical in Schmitt, and the powers of both 
constantly check one another. The possibility of exception exists only because the 
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political community as constituent power outpaces whatever the embodiment of that 
community is at a given moment in time, i.e. the constituted power. The constitutive 
power, however defined, creates the normal situation through exception (Kennedy 
2004: 86). The normal situation and the laws that apply to it constrain the constitutive 
power but at the same time the normal is grounded in the exception, and the latter can 
only be produced by the constitutive power. Sovereignty, thus understood, is the locus 
of tension between the two powers: truly, a borderline concept. Schmitt‘s solution is 
double conceptualisation of sovereignty: radically popular in Constitutional Theory 
and abstract-conservative in Political Theology. These two works, taken together, 
clearly illustrate another tension in Schmitt‘s thought: between Protean change and 
stability. Indeed, in a Schmittian political universe, the nature of the ordering power 
(and of every concrete order) can most aptly be expressed in the words of Exodus 
(3:14): ‗I am that I am‘. No further identification or grounding is available or needed, 
meaning, once again, that any status quo can only be an instance in the process of 
ordering. 
Although some authors (see e.g. Kelly 2003: 225; Agamben 2005: 54) suggest that 
Schmitt abandoned the distinction between constitutive and constituted power as his 
body of work progressed, this distinction not only motivates the early work on 
dictatorship but also, very explicitly, Constitutional Theory and remains implicit in 
many other works, including his last book Political Theology II, where the political 
importance of stasis (to be discussed later on in the chapter) can be fully appreciated 
only if the division between the constitutive and the constituted powers is 
presupposed. And yet, it must be admitted that the relationship between the 
constitution-making power and an already established constitution is a rather 
complicated one for Schmitt. On the one hand, the people, as the ultimate 
constitution-making power, retains the potential to act and to express its being anew; 
on the other hand, Schmitt‘s entire oeuvre is a quest for stability and order within the 
state (see Hirst 1999: 12, 14; Preuss 1999: 160). Indeed, as Preuss (1999: 160-161) 
reads it, the dynamic nature of humans and their quest for what they themselves 
consider to be good make them dangerous because both unpredictable and easy to 
sway. Therefore, Schmitt could not leave popular power unchecked. As a result, the 
people‘s potential to decide in normal circumstances of orderly political life remains 
precisely that – only a potential. In a normal, orderly situation, a people conforms to 
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the norms that it has imposed upon itself and exercises only those freedoms that it has 
provided itself with (Schmitt 2008a: 268). The power of the people is, in a sense, 
exhausted, absorbed, or consumed once it has been exercised, although it is not 
eliminated. This power remains subterranean and can become visible only when 
constitutional conflicts arise or gaps within the present constitution become visible. It 
is only this constitution-making power that can legitimately fill in any substantive 
lacunae within the normative framework (Schmitt 2008a: 125-126), thus providing an 
opening for political struggle. These lacunae, grey areas within a constitution, 
inevitably become political due to the lack of one specific interpretation and thus 
require a sovereign decision. 
Crucially, existential issues cannot be decided from a standpoint neutral to existence. 
Balakrishnan (2000: 141-142) validly sees this as the core reason that had led Schmitt 
to argue against judicial review and in favour of the role of popular power, which 
cannot be captured by any formal institution or procedure (for this, see Scheuerman 
1999: 71). It follows, then, that the constitution-making power is a sovereign power: it 
decides in a situation of exception, i.e. a situation that is not codified in the existing 
order (Schmitt 1985: 6). In such cases of unconcealment, existential danger requires 
an existential decision. Therefore, the will of the political grouping remains the 
fundamental power that can decide on questions concerning existence itself. Finally, 
faced with an existential threat, the political community can decide to significantly 
amend the constitution or abolish an existing constitution and replace it with a new 
one. This ability is a necessary attribute of the constitution-making power and the 
concept of popular sovereignty is an important illustration of that. However, the 
content of the will of the constitution-making power can be and is attributed 
retrospectively from the perspective of new power relations – that, of course is the 
price to pay for the removal or any normative prescriptions. 
 
The Importance of the Constitutive Power 
It is not true that, by seeing the most immediate expression of the will of the people in 
public acclamation, Schmitt reduces the people‘s political role and that he envisages 
‗a state populated by passive consumers rather than citizens‘ (Dyzenhaus 1999b: 84; 
154 
 
see also Cristi 1998: 206; Scheuerman 1999: 72). Such interpretation definitely misses 
the wider picture. An immediate critique of it would be a reference to the role of the 
people in existentially significant situations, i.e. in the state of exception, as shown 
above. Keeping this role in mind, acclamation receives new significance. An 
acclamation (an acceptance or rejection), supported by the potential for exception, is 
not a mere rubber stamp. This potential can be turned to actuality in critical situations 
and abolish the present order by deciding on a new form of political existence 
(Schmitt 2008a: 131-132). Through acclamation, the people – constitutive power and 
the highest sovereign authority – ‗exercise their political freedom, not as individuals 
with rights but as citizens with an opinion‘ (Kennedy 2004: 133). Hence, acclamation 
is an attribute of active citizenship and not of consumption, even if it is exercised in 
exceptional situations, relating to the mode of collective existence, only. Crucially, the 
political community‘s power to take decisive action – its potential to make an 
existential decision – remains intact even in ‗normal‘ circumstances despite lurking in 
the background. For Schmitt, even if the power of the people is delegated, it is never 
surrendered but remains an essential attribute. Any constituted body, therefore, 
remains bound by the popular will and by the limits the latter had set, remaining under 
constant control and open to the possibility of being abolished at any time. The power 
of the people is, therefore, a force to be reckoned with. 
To sum up, ‗the people‘ (or ‗the nation‘) is not a static concept for Schmitt. Therefore, 
despite lurking in the background after a concrete order is established, the nation 
‗remains the origin of all political action, the source of all power‘, perpetually 
expressing itself in ever new forms and organising itself in new ways (Schmitt 2008a: 
128). As a result, no final, conclusive, and unchangeable mode of a nation‘s being 
exists. There are two implications of this approach. First, a new constitution – i.e. a 
new way of a nation‘s being – is an ever-present possibility; moreover, due to the self-
determining and existential nature of the political will of the constitution-making 
subject, the new order does not owe its justification to the previous one: the new order 
is self-sufficient and derives its legitimacy from the act of will only (Schmitt 2008a: 
136). Second, the present mode of a people‘s existence can only be seen and theorised 
from its own effects, i.e. from decisions concerning its existence. It must be also noted 
that the inconclusive nature of the people does not allow it to act as a magistrate or 
decide on day-to-day issues: only fundamental questions invoke the founding will of 
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the people (Schmitt 2008a: 131). Even if the popular element was reduced to a simple 
plebiscitarian ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ vote, it is an attribute of a successful leader to know what 
questions are to be asked in order to get public affirmation (see e.g. Scheuerman 1999: 
102): in essence, a leader always already knows what the popular will is and speaks it 
into existence. The constitutive and the constituted elements are, therefore, 
inseparable. And yet, the constitutive element is both chronologically prior and 
foundational, even if not self-sufficient. Furthermore, it must be noted that, although 
the constitution establishes and entrenches a particular form of the people, the political 
still persists as a latent potential and even as the animating force of the constitution 
(see Preuss 1999: 157). Therefore, existential tensions that refer to the power of the 
people can only be hidden rather than eliminated. 
 
Constant Turmoil: The Constitutive Power against Itself 
Schmitt himself prepares the ground, albeit not necessarily intentionally, for the 
application of the logic of immanence to his political theory. This was done in his last 
major work, Political Theology II (Schmitt 2008b), conceived as a defence of his 
political theology against various critiques but primarily against that of Erik Peterson 
(1935). Peterson argued that, with the defeat of the Arian heresy and the establishment 
of the dogma of the Holy Trinity (as opposed to God as unitary), any equation 
between God and sole unitary lawgiver (e.g. one God – one King) has become 
logically flawed and incorrect in relation to the Christian doctrine. In reply to this, 
Schmitt firstly refers to the function of political theology from the Antiquity onwards, 
beginning with Terentius Varro, for whom political theology belongs to the political 
community (unlike the mythical theology of the poets and the natural theology of the 
philosophers) and constitutes its public sphere through rituals, norms, social bonding, 
procedures of legitimisation etc. (Schmitt 2008b: 64-65). As a result, political 
theology is about life and belief – the common mode of existence – and is not 
necessarily God-centred. It is a theology without a centre because, as already stated, 
sovereignty is only graspable through the miracle of exception. Notably, Schmitt was 
not a conventional Catholic theorist of the state, especially after his estrangement from 
the Church in the mid-1920s. However, it is erroneous to claim, as Hollerich (2004: 
119) does, that Schmitt had merely instrumentalised Christianity, or, as Scheuerman 
156 
 
(1999: 3) does, that most of Schmitt‘s writings can be understood without due 
recourse to religious undertones. On the contrary, Christian (and, fundamentally, 
Catholic) worldview remained crucial to significant parts of his theoretical endeavour. 
And yet, this importance did not preclude him from, at times, creatively interpreting 
religion, with a tendency to treat dogma as ancillary to political argument – and 
Political Theology II is rather symptomatic of that. 
Schmitt was ready to admit that the Trinity in the political sphere is impossible, 
especially in the case of monarchy for which the politico-theological equation 
between God and the King was originally coined. But Schmitt was not prepared to 
accept Peterson‘s argument any further. As soon as the emphasis shifts from the king 
to the people as a depersonalised power and, therefore, to democracy, there no longer 
is any inconsistency even with the Trinitarian view (Schmitt 2008b: 70-72). Schmitt 
makes two more crucial observations on the nature of the relationship between politics 
and theology. First, when an early Christian heresy (Arianism) is invoked as a critique 
of political theology, ‗the heretic appears eo ipso as the one who is political, while the 
one who is orthodox, on the other hand, appears as the pure, apolitical theologian‘ 
(Schmitt. 2008b: 84). The political sphere is one of creativity and contestation, rather 
than of rigid orthodoxy. The heretic is someone who opens the political horizon of 
otherness and brings forward the ultimate need to choose between the inside and the 
outside of the community; consequently, the heretic, and not the orthodox, creates the 
possibility of the political. Indeed, there can be no existential split if there is no 
questioning of the status quo in the first place. Therefore, from a political perspective, 
the heretic is much more interesting than the orthodox. The heretic is also the one who 
discloses the rupture between the dynamic nature of a community and the rigid 
conservatism of the norm. Second, Schmitt provides an illuminating exegesis of a 
passage from Gregory of Nazianzus (Oratio Theologica III 2): ‗The One – to Hen – is 
always in uproar – stasiazon – against itself – pros heauton‘. Striking in this phrase is 
the presence of the word stasis not in the meaning of stability but of its opposite – 
uproar. As Schmitt explains, ‗Stasis means in the first place quiescence, tranquillity, 
standpoint, status; its antonym is kinesis, movement. But stasis also means, in the 
second place, (political) unrest, movement, uproar and civil war‘ (Schmitt 2008b: 
123). Here, as shown by Ojakangas (2006: 86), Schmitt draws on a distinction 
between not only private enemies (echtros) and public ones (polemios) but also 
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betweem inter-Greek conflict (stasis) and struggle against the barbarians (polemos). 
One could argue that while polemos is characterised by the unleashing of destructive 
force, stasis is constructive and destructive simultaneously: it negates the old but has 
the potential to create the new. In essence, stasis as constant turmoil, is at the heart of 
a political community as well as, it seems, of political theology. Every unity thus 
implies a duality, the double-edged stasis: simultaneously stability and uproar. Here 
one can remember other significant political dualities: between auctoritas and 
potestas, between the two swords of the Gelasian doctrine, between the King‘s two 
bodies, between the rulers and the ruled. And, to take this further, there is a stasis 
within the subject itself: if, as it has been indicated, only the subject can question its 
own Gestalt so fundamentally as to provide for enmity, which is subsequently 
externalised, then this constant turmoil, the inability to be identical to oneself, is the 
driving force of politics. Therefore, a political stasis involves a distinction between 
the institute of power, which provides for stability, and the underlying instituting 
power: between constituted power and the constitutive power. This necessary duality 
provides for the creative power of politics and precludes it from becoming rigid 
orthodoxy. Rather, a continuous process of ordering is central. 
Consequently, even when the element of quasi-religious belief is introduced through 
political theology, one has to keep in mind that even divine unity is a unity in 
diversity, whereby diversity loses itself in disunity: a unity perpetually dissolves into 
disunity and disunity perpetually solidifies into unity. In other words, stasis and 
complexio oppositorum are inextricably fused, unity and diversity fundamentally 
being one and the same. In a political theology of the people-qua-God, the people are 
the unity that produces the diversity of things, which in turn constitute the unity of the 
state. What prevails, then, is constant movement from unity to plurality to unity where 
the One is constantly in uproar against itself. Admittedly, Schmitt would be highly 
cautious not to take the principle too far. However, the principle itself is evident. 
Ultimately, the unity of the state as secularised complexio oppositorum characterised 
by constant uproar is an antidote to any final settlement. A homogeneous political 
community can exercise the will to existence (and will to power) by producing 
diversity which is, nevertheless, still able to coalesce into one political body. The 
politics of stasis could possibly be a tentative answer that encapsulates unity and 
diversity, oneness and multiplicity. This does not necessarily lead to harmony and 
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toleration but, rather, to a constant productive tension and competition, a stasis that 
simultaneously stands for fixity and a standoff that threatens the (political) unity with 
dissolution, offering only very precarious equilibria, if any. Such relationship is much 
more complicated than the theories that, for example, Strauss (1995: 117) attempts to 
extract from pure or Mouffe (see e.g. Mouffe 2000; Mouffe 2002) from reinterpreted, 
‗agonistic‘, Schmittian thought: for both, Schmitt eventually becomes in a sense more 
liberal than the liberals themselves. 
 
Epilogue: The Question of Ordering 
Clearly, the question of ordering is a central concern throughout Schmitt‘s writings. 
The problems of how and by whom a certain political order is enacted as well as 
defence of the necessity and unavoidability of political ordering as such are the 
animating forces of his entire oeuvre. And the four core elements of that ordering – 
the state, sovereignty, law, and politics – are all inseparable for Schmitt. 
The state, throughout Schmitt‘s writings, is the form and embodiment of the self-
conscious political community, a spatial, normative, and institutional embodiment of 
the community‘s mode of existence. It is the theatre in which the drama of ordering is 
enacted: its physical borders delimit the spatial extent to which ordering applies while 
its symbolic borders (the normative-functional-institutional embodiment of the 
community, which simultaneously defines what belongs to it and what does not) 
become the locus of contestation and struggle for the soul and Being of that 
community. Only temporary outcomes of this struggle are available but they still serve 
as the basis of ordering, which is then expressed through the structure of the state 
itself. In fact, the state is, for Schmitt, the way in which the political community can 
become visible: although the political community must exist prior to the state (since 
the state is merely its expression), it can only come into being and become manifest 
once it is embodied, i.e. through the state, which, in turn, defines what a political 
community is, thus making it present. In a manner partly similar to Spinoza‘s theory, 
this conceptualisation of the state is contrary to many current theories that have a 
tendency to treat the state and the political community as at last partly separate 
entities. What we encounter here is the notion of the state as the ultimate structure of 
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intelligibility, which is still employed by today‘s state-centrists. And yet, as will be 
shown in the final chapter, the state does not necessarily have to have complete 
exclusivity: in fact, the same function can be carried out by any particular (as opposed 
to universal) collective entity that can successfully arrogate sufficient power. Hence, 
the outlook is also capable of embracing the changes to what previously was, quite 
strictly, an international state system. Peculiar to Schmitt, in comparison with 
Spinoza, is the emphasis on content: whereas for Spinoza association is natural and 
comes first, followed by common content, which then holds the political community 
and its state together, for Schmitt there first of all has to be some substantial content, 
which only subsequently produces formal association. This tension between the state 
(or some other association that holds ultimate normative value) as a natural institution 
and as a created one is to be seen as one of the animating forces within the constant 
process of ordering. 
As already indicated, the state is the locus of contestation (and contestation is, of 
course, unavoidable given the fallen state of humanity and the loss of certainty after 
the Original Sin). That contestation both predates the state (because one would not 
need the institutional-normative organisation of the state if all was harmony and 
concord) and is a constant feature of it. This is what Schmitt refers to as the political, 
which entails the basic ability to distinguish between friends and enemies and the 
willingness to engage in an existential struggle with those who question one‘s mode of 
existence. And since the only level of existence that really interests Schmitt is 
collective existence (and ordering, of course, refers to collective life as well, truly 
concerning individuals as part of the political community only), political friendship 
and enmity are necessarily collective – public – phenomena. Indeed, the friend-enemy 
distinction is the basis of the political self. The enemy is the negative definition of the 
self: an extrapolation of traits that the political subject is not, representing the ultimate 
outside of the political community, open to ever new meanings depending on 
circumstances and the political community‘s own mode of existence. The friend, 
meanwhile, is the embodiment of the ‗own‘, a model of the self (thus a positive 
definition of the self) and an affirmation of the self because the function of the friend 
is also that of recognition and confirmation: the political community depends on these 
networks of recognition that constitute its collective consciousness. In both cases – 
self-definition through the friend and through the enemy – Schmitt‘s subject is 
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decentred as the truth of the self is in the other. Humans, for Schmitt, truly are 
relational – political – beings, even if that is solely because of the fallen state of 
humanity. Such emphasis on struggle can only be at odds with any theories of politics-
as-consent and objectivist notions of law, such as those presupposing some ultimate 
criterion, be it natural, moral, or any other. Any existing order is constantly menaced 
by the possibility of dissent (since any order is groundless), and law is unavoidably 
dependent on the temporary outcomes of this struggle. Hence, in the final part, the 
Schmittian approach will provide considerable support to the constitutive side of the 
process of ordering. 
Of course, there can only be one political order in a state at a time, despite the fact that 
the political as potential or actual conflict is ever-present. It is the function of the 
sovereign to keep conflict outside state borders and ensure peace and stability inside. 
Sovereignty, therefore, is a borderline concept: it rests on the division between inside 
and outside, friends and enemies, order and disorder, law and non-law. Only the 
sovereign can decide on the exception and suspend the present order altogether. 
However, this suspension is anything but straightforward because it can equally be 
intended to preserve the suspended order and to replace it with something completely 
new. Still, at the moment of exception, both aspects must be present: there must be the 
protector of the order but there must also be something to protect the order from, even 
though only one can be sovereign at a given time. It must, therefore, be the case that 
the actual locus of sovereignty can only be known ex post facto. Although the 
protective power is sovereign by default, the ultimate sovereign is the power which 
prevails. If the pre-existing order is restored, then the protective power was truly 
sovereign all the way. But if the old order is replaced by a new one, then it turns out 
that the previous sovereign power was usurpation only, not truly reflective of the 
political community‘s true mode of existence. In either case, the sovereign decision 
suspends the order and then affirms and enshrines either the old or the new order. In 
both cases, that is a constitutive moment: a political community‘s collective Being is 
established as the basis for the political order of the state. The above clearly shows 
why the theories of sovereignty‘s demise need to be put into question. Of course, the 
traditional state-sovereignty nexus is, in many ways, more and more questionable. But 
the essence of sovereignty – a political community‘s self-determination – forms an 
essential part of political ordering. 
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Sovereignty, it should be clear from the above, is an attribute rather than an essence, a 
moment of clash between opposing interests and demands and a moment of resolution 
of that clash. This nature of sovereignty also pinpoints to the political nature of any 
entitlements, rights, privileges, and any basic norms that define life within a state. 
They cannot be grounded in any higher principle and are neither natural nor God-
given. They can only come into being through political struggle and, therefore, any 
group that is to promote its own vision of normativity must be prepared to fight for it 
on a groundless terrain. The only thing that determines the presence or absence of 
norms is the success or failure in this struggle. If a group succeeds, they have always 
already reflected the true shape and form of the political community, which was 
otherwise neglected. But in case of failure, that group risks becoming public enemies, 
for their agenda had been seditious and the norms they were fighting for never really 
existed. This is the tragic element of both sovereignty and political life in general: 
there is no ultimate criterion for a decision and yet there must be a decision. The same 
applies more widely: every member of the political community must take sides when 
an existential struggle over the survival (external threat) or essence (internal threat) of 
the community ensues, although, again, there is no way of objectively determining 
which side is right. Ultimately, there is no grounding on either side and, therefore, the 
struggle is for nothing (because there is no essence) and everything (because existence 
is at stake) at the same time. In short, the political and sovereignty – the former‘s 
ultimate corollary – are inseparable from the tragic. This element of the tragic is not 
sufficiently emphasised in most current theories of sovereignty: the individual tends to 
be seen as either determined and protected by sovereignty or able to relatively 
seamlessly translate political strivings into sovereign acts (in both cases referring to 
pro-sovereignty views), or subjected to the arbitrary and often oppressive actions of 
the sovereign authorities (according to the sceptics of sovereignty). The tragic, 
through the need to make a choice on a groundless terrain, adds more depth to the 
understanding of constitutive agency. 
Regardless of its groundlessness, the ultimate decision on the political community‘s 
mode of existence is absolute and is then transformed into law, thus enshrining its 
content. In this respect, the constitution is central for Schmitt because it offers a 
codification of the existential will of the community – it is the community‘s body in 
law. At least in terms of its fundamental provisions, the constitution is stable and 
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unchangeable, save for the next instance of existential will. However, this does not 
mean that all other laws are accidental or have a life of their own, independent of the 
political community. Schmitt‘s oeuvre is also a crusade against positivism and 
manifestations of crude legalism. Instead, Schmitt holds, law and politics are 
inseparable and, therefore, the normative structure of law is, first and foremost, about 
legitimacy and correspondence to the Being and will of the political community. And 
still, as in the case of community-state relation, there is a significant degree of 
immanent causality: the political community is the cause of all law but it can only 
come into existence and assume certain content through its law. It appears, then, that 
immanence is the paradigm of the constitutive-constituted relation. 
Law, just as the decision that precedes and establishes it, is groundless. Definitely, 
nothing that is built on a groundless terrain can ever reach natural or transcendent 
certainty. The most that law can refer to is its immanent relationship with the political 
community. However, Schmitt does infuse that immanent relationship with a hint of 
transcendence. Conscious of the fact that nothing that is groundless can command 
absolute obedience (and law must command absolute obedience or else chaos ensues), 
he engages in political theology. If politics is, as Schmitt claims, secularised religion 
and the sovereign power is secularised God, then law must be a secularised version of 
divine commandments. Despite its arbitrary nature (in fact, precisely because of it), 
law must be believed in and observed with quasi-religious fervour. Once again, at the 
core is an encounter with the absolute that does not allow any shirking or shedding 
responsibility. Hence, law simultaneously is dependent on circumstances, just as it 
would be for the theorists who see law as secondary, and must be seen as referring to 
something more than itself – as if there was a natural, moral, or any other criterion. 
Finally, politics is, for Schmitt, the underlying element that dominates the content of 
ordering. Politics is, again, based on the existence and will of the political community 
and is the result of the latter‘s relative inability to be identical to itself. The more basic 
layer of that non-identity is the community‘s constant evolution and change. The 
constituted element simply does not keep up with it and, therefore, tensions arise. 
This, though, is a simple case of updating and readjusting the legal-institutional 
settlement. There is, however, a deeper, existential lack of self-identity. For one 
matter, the necessary homogeneity of the political community is a political and not 
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sociological reality and, therefore, differences that require resolution are constantly 
present. Later in his writings, Schmitt even employs the concept of stasis, whereby the 
political community (the constitutive power-qua-God) is in turmoil against itself. 
Schmitt, thus, uncovers constant tension regarding the soul of the political community 
and the definition of its existence. But, contrary to what could otherwise be expected, 
this turmoil does not incapacitate political unity – it only makes the sovereign decision 
on the content of that unity ever more relevant. Politics, therefore, has to be about 
constant dissent (as already indicated by the primacy of the political) but that dissent 
has to simultaneously produce temporary instances of perceived consent – fleeting 
stabilisations of political content. And if it appears that such stabilisations are 
challenged only occasionally, this is only because the observer is unaware of the 
constant dissent and permanent tragic choices that underlie any supposed status quo 
and also are building up towards more visible change. 
Although any order, once established, pushes the constitutive power of the political 
community to the background, that power, nevertheless, remains potential, becoming 
actual once the political conditions within the state no longer correspond to the 
community‘s mode of existence or when any lacunae arise within the present order. 
And since any community is structured around an absent fullness, any present order is 
unavoidably less than satisfactory. The constitutive political community, therefore, 
brings forth ever new legal-institutional embodiments of itself, in turn being 
effectively brought into existence by them. As a result, a principle of continual 
reproduction of one power by another prevails, animating the process of ordering, 
which is to be the subject matter of the next chapter. 
164 
 
4. The Four Elements of Ordering Revisited 
So far, an answer to the question of ordering has proved elusive. As shown in the first 
chapter, the approaches to the four core elements – the state, sovereignty, law, and 
politics – can only be characterised by diversity. Not only the relevance and survival 
of the state and sovereignty are being questioned but also the role and manifestations 
of law and politics cannot be agreed upon. Nevertheless, both Spinoza and Schmitt 
can offer important contributions to the proper understanding of ordering and of its 
four key elements. Their contributions do correspond on certain issues. But their 
premises and many crucial conclusions are, in fact, radically different, precluding a 
proper synthesis. Instead, Spinoza and Schmitt are read in a constant swinging motion 
whence each represents the constitutive or the constituted. Such reading is capable of 
revealing ordering as a process. 
In this, final, chapter the four elements of ordering are revisited in terms of this 
reading-as-movement but also with reference to the current discourse, outlined in the 
first chapter. Such reading proposes a case for the state and sovereignty in the 
contemporary increasingly globalised world, albeit without many of the fixities and 
certainties accorded to them by traditional theory. Still, they are seen to carry out 
crucial functions as principles of ordering. Law and politics, meanwhile, are seen as 
being constantly caught in-between belief and contestation, with Spinoza, rather 
perplexingly, usually representing the former and Schmitt defending the latter. The 
answer to the question of ordering is, therefore, seen to reside in the movement 
between the constitutive and the constituted thrusts of politics, represented by the 
theories of (in no particular order) Spinoza and Schmitt. 
In a sense, the two concepts that belong to the framework of ordering – the state and 
sovereignty – are the effects of law and politics. But that does not mean that they are 
less important. As will be demonstrated, stronger or weaker immanence is a feature of 
both Spinoza‘s and Schmitt‘s theories; thus, in an immanent fashion, the cause (law 
and politics) is in, and only comes about through, its own effects (the state and 
sovereignty). Hence, a normative point is reinforced: ordering must happen at the 





4.1. The Framework: State and Sovereignty 
As seen in the first chapter, the state and sovereignty have traditionally been seen as 
closely interrelated phenomena. In fact, the state has been seen as the only truly 
sovereign entity, and even when one talks about the ‗sovereignty of the people‘, that 
conventionally means the people of a particular state. However, in today‘s world, it is 
not immediately evident that the state-sovereign nexus is to survive. In fact, as already 
noted in the first chapter, the future of both the state and sovereignty is contested. And 
yet, it is claimed here that they both represent crucial principles which are deemed 
more than likely to survive. 
First of all, the state points at the principle of differentiation. As argued in the first 
chapter, even if the formal institutional structure of the state is not to survive in the 
long term, there will, nevertheless, exist other forms of political communities able to 
demand allegiance and arrogate to themselves ultimate norm-making power – after 
all, since as per both Spinoza and Schmitt, there is a necessary imperfection, or deficit 
of existence, at the heart of human nature, any particular order can only relate to the 
power of imposition. And, as per Spinoza, such power also equals right. That power, 
in turn, refers to sovereignty, which is the power of the relevant political community 
to determine its own existence. Both sovereignty and the state are analysed in this 
chapter by employing a reading of Spinoza and Schmitt which constantly exercises a 
swinging pendulum movement between one thinker and the other, establishing a 
process of ordering as permanent tension between contestation and belief. 
 
4.1.1. The State 
For both Spinoza and Schmitt, the state is the predominant mode of human (self-) 
organisation. The state determines reason, common interest, and rights by delimiting 
who belongs to the demos and who does not – this distinction is crucial for political 
will to take shape. The distinction between the inside and the outside of the political 
community cannot be avoided but only negotiated differently, and is one of the 
essential traits of a political grouping. The very ability to define these limits once 
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again points at the domain of power. Clearly, in the two theories under discussion, the 
state is able to exercise the function of distinction because it acts as an exoskeleton, 
establishing and maintaining the external form of the political community, which, by 
definition, implies a borderline between the inside and outside, both physically and 
symbolically. To that extent, the state clearly acts as a structure of intelligibility and 
determines the external form and internal relations of the political community. At the 
same time, the state is always a process and any definition available would only 
capture a momentary snapshot of an ever-changing political community. In essence, 
mutual causation takes place: the state is constantly being created by the citizens 
(because the state is only a snapshot of the political community) and the citizens are 
constantly being created by the state (because it serves as an authoritative 
representation of what the political community is supposed to be). 
The state also is seen as a crucial source of identification and the locus where politics 
happens. And yet, there is a crucial difference between the Spinozist and the 
Schmittian loci. For Spinoza, humans are not obedient by nature but can be made such 
if obedience offers a greater benefit than living independently (Bagley, 2008: 208). As 
a result, there has to be a rather strong identity between the state and the citizenry: 
after all, the state exercises a guiding role and orchestrates a ‗coming together‘ of the 
otherwise disparate individuals – essentially, it is a tool for individuals to harmonise 
relationships (Bijlsma 2014: 13-14). After all, the state has a single mind as long as it 
is guided by reason and thereby makes citizens rational (see e.g. TP, 313, Levene, 
2004: 165). Even in a democracy, that means absolute self-unification under the 
reason of state, determined through the general will. Spinoza‘s state, in particular a 
democratic one, operates under the logic of strong immanence, whence any movement 
within the multitude involves an analogous movement within the state-qua-
exoskeleton and vice versa – these movements are indistinguishable, especially in 
democracy as the most absolute form of government (see e.g. Hallett 1962: 189, TP, 
385). The Schmittian state, meanwhile, operates under the logic of weak immanence: 
although the same mutuality of determination exists, there is a lag, an incomplete 
identity between the state and the people (Schmitt 2008a: 272): there always has to be 
a deficit or a surplus which motivates any political action. Certainly, ever-present 
deficit is a core motivating force for Spinoza as well – if it was not, there would be no 
more conatus. But in terms of the state as an object of identification and determinant 
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of form, there is a crucial difference: whereas Spinoza presupposes the ideal of reason, 
which partly compensates for the abovementioned deficit (see e.g. Ethics IIp43, TP, 
303), guiding the citizens towards their better selves, for Schmitt, due to human 
existence being groundless, the development of the state is open-ended and, therefore, 
only the gap between the political community and its embodiment in the state can be a 
driving force (see Schmitt 2008a: 240-248). Hence, Spinoza and Schmitt constitute 
two very different modes of thinking, although neither can be seen as sufficient: both 
the Spinozist prescription of a singular standard and the Schmittian affirmation of 
underlying indeterminacy can lead to unlimited concentration of power and total 
marginalisation of the weaker party. Instead, a more dynamic model, which involves 
constant movement between the two extremes, must be affirmed: the distinction 
between the inside and the outside is groundless (Schmitt) but, once established, must 
be seen as singular and legitimised as a manifestation of sound reason or any other 
supreme ideal (Spinoza); nevertheless, due to its groundless foundation, this 
distinction must always be contestable once a gap between the political community 
and its form emerges (Schmitt) but, again, this contestation can only happen in the 
name of some absolute ideal, e.g. reason (Spinoza), which, if successful, becomes the 
new ordering principle. In essence, the state as form and object of identification 
oscillates between status quo and contestation, consent and dissent, the constituted and 
the constitutive. Notably, here Schmitt is seen as a representative of the constitutive 
thrust and Spinoza – of the constituted one. In this dynamic, the basic engine of 
ordering as process is already taking shape. 
And yet, preconditions for the state also suggest a complex relation to essentialism. 
For Spinoza, the state is about strength in numbers: whereas in the natural condition 
humans are effectively powerless, having organised themselves into a state, they 
acquire collective power and right (Ethics IVp18s, TP, 296). Schmitt, meanwhile, sees 
pre-existing homogeneity as a conditio sine qua non of the state (Schmitt 2000b: 299; 
2008: 255). The Spinozist state enjoys natural formation, whereby commonality 
emerges through the affective capacities of individuals, creating a shared social world 
through numerous interactions and is, at first glance, more inclusive. And yet, 
although in principle anybody can join in, there still remains the guiding principle 
which both dictates association and prescribes the principles of that association: 
reason. Meanwhile, for Schmitt, a founding act needs will of some collective body 
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and a consciousness of ‗we, the people‘: essentially, it is a miraculous fiat. But this 
also means that the Schmittian political community can only be really known after 
their ‗we, the people‘ has acquired an institutional form. In terms of a fully developed 
theory, again, one should read the two accounts in a movement, further indicative of 
ordering as process: an inclusive moment of origin, whence commonality is derived 
from constant interaction, albeit with a prescribed telos (Spinoza), is, through the 
founding act, ex post facto solidified into quasi-objective homogeneity, which is seen 
as having always already existed (Schmitt). Here, as in the previous movement – and 
as in any future sequence – an element of belief in the ultimate guiding principle is 
paramount. Towards the end of this chapter, that belief will be analysed in terms of 
political theology. 
Since, for Spinoza, there is an external ideal (reason), the state is contingent upon 
producing the greatest collective good possible – otherwise, citizens cannot be 
expected to obey (TTP, 199). In that sense, Spinoza constructs his theory with a very 
clearly defined public interest in mind. After all, the state is not an independent 
variable – it is, rather, the exoskeleton of the collective body of citizens. Therefore, 
anything the state does, must be done with the citizens in mind. On the surface, 
Spinoza here proclaims the primacy of the constitutive, before subjugating it again 
under the singular criterion of reason. Meanwhile, for Schmitt, who constructed his 
theories on a deliberately groundless terrain, one simply must obey because the only 
choice is between order and anarchy, between Christ and Antichrist (Schmitt 1996: 
15-16; see also Balakrishnan 2000: 224-225). State laws are as they are and must be 
observed because they are laws. The very existence of the state is a good in itself, 
since it allows ordering of the world and of one‘s self. Thus, Schmitt is on the 
constituted side at first sight; and yet, at a deeper level, he allows for more constitutive 
contestation by denying objective prescription, such as reason. Nevertheless, one 
could again establish a movement, corresponding to the process of ordering: the laws 
of the state must be obeyed simply because they are laws since there cannot be any 
deeper grounding (Schmitt) but in order to acquire support, it is always better if they 
pass for some common good (Spinoza), although any state order can be contested if 
one is prepared to take the risk (Schmitt) because otherwise there would be just a 
basic duty to observe (Spinoza). 
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Certainly, one of the crucial challenges of the modern globalising world is the coming 
together (and, often, clash) of different, sometimes even incommensurable, 
worldviews, based on ideological, cultural, or religious assumptions. Also, migration 
is changing the faces of states and of communities within states. Finally increasing 
demands for recognition and self-determination (individual and group) are a feature of 
today‘s polities. Hence, a non-essentialist account of relatively stable coexistence 
must be suggested. According to the perspective advocated in this thesis, there is no 
inherent reason for privileging any of the worldviews brought together by 
globalisation, as well as those that have naturally developed within a particular state, 
other than the fact that people happen to hold them. However, the constitutive-
constituted movement developed in this chapter helps refute that ‗anything goes‘: 
those worldviews do ground (individual or collective) existence and, therefore, 
solidify into beliefs, acting as banners in the tragic struggle for primacy. A worldview 
that happens to be victorious (nationally, regionally, globally, or across groups 
without traditional spatial definition) solidifies into the ordering principle of the 
relevant political community (or agglomeration of political communities or a group of 
like-minded states) but can always be dislodged by competition (since neither is 
inherently better), with this competition itself then solidifying into a new ordering 
principle – very much in line with the Spinozist-Schmittian movement and correlative 
ordering as process. Hence, the proposed model enables one to combine both 
groundlessness and commitment. In addition, there is also fluidity: although the 
dominant group establishes its myth of foundation as one of collective origin, ex post 
facto ascribing foundational homogeneity that has to be believed in, once the structure 
of the political community changes significantly due to internal or external reasons, 
that foundational myth is to be challenged and a new (essentially biased) account is 
instituted as the objective origin. Hence, there is constant movement between strong 
belief and strong contestation, directly signalling political ordering as an always 
ongoing process. 
The state is also the originator and guarantor of rights for both Spinoza and Schmitt. 
For Spinoza, this is because people are strong enough to claim rights only when they 
combine their power (TP, 296). Meanwhile, for Schmitt, any normative content is 
only known ex post facto, thus any rights exist only once a certain group has 
successfully established them through political struggle, entrenching them in the state-
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form (Schmitt 1998: 231, see also Kahn 2011: 155-156). And yet, there are 
differences as well. For Spinoza, people appear to have certain rights and freedoms in 
the private sphere (especially in monarchy and aristocracy) but not when public 
matters are concerned (TTP, 252; see also Prokhovnik: 2004, 204). The only public 
freedoms that are acknowledged relate to situations when the state strays away from 
the ideal of sound reason, and even then citizens only have the right to point out any 
shortcomings but not to try and rectify things (TTP, 252-253). Within the confines of 
the state, citizens collectively claim the same thing and strive for the same norms – 
and that is what everybody gets. Schmitt, meanwhile, is less equivocal. By positing 
complexio oppositorum as the ideal for a modern state, Schmitt hinted at 
representation as lending concrete manifestation to something that is otherwise 
elusive, if not immaterial (Bates 2006). In other words, the state is a common political 
expression of otherwise disparate societal groups. Political theology is, therefore, the 
overarching and overwhelming belief in the concrete political order that provides the 
otherwise absent unity. As soon as the existence and nature of the ‗friend‘ group is 
questioned – i.e. the figure of the enemy appears – any lower-order differences and 
squabbles become irrelevant. In other words, homogeneity is predicated in 
existentially threatening situations. Essentially, substantive homogeneity is needed, 
first and foremost, in order to provide the basis on which the community would be 
able to unite when encountered with otherness and to showcase a common way of life 
which would differ, even if trivially, from that of others. This removal of universality, 
coupled with the understanding of ordering as a process, points towards a solution to 
the aporias of competing rights claims in the increasingly globalised world: instead of 
singular universal entitlement, one should see them as the result of contestation within 
political communities. Once somebody attempts to claim a certain right, one has no 
other choice but to actively take on the status quo with the risk of becoming public 
enemy should the claim be unsuccessful. And only those claims that are successfully 
established become rights – others remain just false opinions. That, certainly, does not 
preclude the spread of certain claims beyond state borders as other groups might see 
successful claims as inspiration. A number of victorious groups can even attempt to 
solidify their gains through international agreements and conventions. That, 
nevertheless, should not preclude one from seeing the groundless origin of any claims, 
the precarious nature of any status quo, and the possibility of political communities 
legitimately deciding to follow a completely separate path. However, a critique of 
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universalist aspiration (of e.g. rights claims) does not necessarily lead to a critique of 
content, especially from a perspective internal to the claim: as the constitutive-
constituted movement of ordering as process indicates, such content has to be believed 
in and upheld just as strongly as if it actually was universal. 
And yet, as established in the first chapter, the fate of the state is not unproblematic. 
Hence, the question of Spinoza‘s and Schmitt‘s applicability arises. Spinoza, quite 
straightforwardly, was a theorist of the state. This should not come as a surprise, given 
that the sovereign state was reaching centre stage and achieved its Westphalian 
recognition during Spinoza‘s lifetime. After all, given the relative inadequacy of 
humans, whereby ultimate reason can never be achieved, the state, as a restraining 
device, plays an irreplaceable role in ensuring harmony and progress (see e.g. Levene, 
2004: 165). The only way to get rid of the state would involve all humans achieving 
sound reason that very closely approximates the infinite intellect of God. In that case, 
the state would no longer be needed because humans would agree in nature by 
themselves and lead unhindered life together – and there is hardly any indication that 
Spinoza believed this to be a realistic prospect. Meanwhile, moving to Schmitt, 
contrary to many mainstream interpretations, there is rather little in his writings to 
suggest that the state is a universal entity, which is somehow natural and should 
necessarily be preserved until the end of time – it is, rather, a historical phenomenon 
(see Marder 2010: 118-120). Even when the state is argued to be impossible to replace 
(see e.g. Schmitt 1985: 78), it is referred to as the locus of politics rather than an entity 
in and of itself. One could also see an inner shift of emphasis within Schmitt‘s 
writings: from the state in the early works to Grossraum and then to the partisan 
(although one could still argue that the state makes a somewhat low-profile comeback 
in Political Theology II). But all those objects of analysis are parts of a particular 
nomos, and nomos is about division and appropriation – hence, again, the principle 
rather than a particular form is paramount. 
From the above, it seems appropriate to suggest, then, that whatever form the locus of 
politics takes, must be related to some physical or symbolic division of the world. In 
addition, sovereignty and the political must and will remain for Schmitt. And as long 
as they remain, some embodiment of the political community – its constituted 
counterpart – will also exist, although the nature of that counterpart cannot be 
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predetermined. The criticisms of those who see the demise of the state have to be 
taken on board. Although it is unlikely that states, as formal institutional structures, 
would become irrelevant soon, they may be hollowed out, becoming merely providers 
of social care and public security for whoever resides within a certain territory but 
without the authority and norm-making power they used to enjoy. The decisions that 
matter may be taken elsewhere, and people may be pleading allegiance to other, 
formal or informal, political communities. And yet, the principle of division, of there 
being separate political communities that enjoy ultimate authority, is to remain. After 
all, human identity, as both Schmitt and Spinoza tell us, is a bounded one, and humans 
need help in choosing how to cover that deficit of existence. Such communities, 
dispersed geographically, would be organised around an idea or a set of ideas (since, 
if the territorial-institutional structure of the state is to be discarded, there is no other 
basis) and, consequently, the question of belief and that group‘s own theology 
becomes paramount. As a result, the Spinozist-Schmittian movement between belief 
and contestation is to become, if anything, even more important, providing both inner 
dynamic of such communities and a way for them to differentiate themselves from 
other, equally dispersed, communities. In other words, membership would be 
attributed through joint participation in the process of ordering. 
For Spinoza the only way to get rid of the state is for all humans to achieve sound 
reason that very closely approximates the infinite intellect of God. In that case, the 
state would no longer be needed because humans would agree in nature by themselves 
and lead unhindered common life together. However, he did not see that as a likely 
outcome. Schmitt, although less predetermined on a particular form, still stipulates a 
necessary locus of politics, characterised and shaped by sovereignty. The Schmittian 
nomos is of particular relevance, since it ties developments in political communities 
and global developments in mutually affective ways. Certainly, nearly every nomos, 
past or present, that Schmitt could analyse was connected to division and 
appropriation. And yet, in the Nomos of the Earth, there are several possible openings. 
Definitely, nomos primarily is about land appropriation; although, increasingly, other 
domains, like the sea or the air (from today‘s perspective, one could add the 
cyberspace) are added to the equation, for Schmitt, still ‗a land-appropriation of the 
earth‘s soil remains fundamentally significant‘ (Schmitt, 2003: 80). Presumably, then, 
even if one talks about a globalised order, from a Schhmittian perspective, there must 
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be some relation to territory and its appropriation. But that might not be as 
anachronistic as it might sound: after all, one could think not only about concentrated 
appropriation of traditionally conceived states but also about dispersed appropriation 
in a globalised order, whereby scattered groups are activated on issues, identifications, 
and loyalties rather than geography but, nevertheless, still possess a physical location. 
Equally, however, geography can be preserved as the basis uniting disparate 
populations that find themselves within the same geographic confines into a 
minimally conceived state. After all, the future shape of the nomos was anything but 
certain for Schmitt (2003: 351-355).  
Would the above allow some form of global unity, especially in terms of global 
democracy advocated by some modern theorists? Certainly not as far as Schmitt is 
concerned – not only, for him, no global order would be able to destroy the 
necessarily conflictual human nature without destroying itself (Schmitt 2003: 354-
355) but also that would directly contradict Schmitt‘s own understanding of 
democracy as based on inclusion and exclusion For Spinoza, meanwhile, there would 
be no major theoretical objections, since all humans have the same ideal telos of 
reason. He would certainly have had doubts about the feasibility of such projects but 
not about their theoretical grounding. After all, that would correlate well with his 
single substance argument. Similarly, Spinoza‘s theory is much better compatible with 
state obligations erga omnes, international concern with domestic populations, and the 
very status of the state as an implementer of global strategies and rights regimes. After 
all, he already had set forth a telos for the state – reason and freedom (both meaning 
the same thing) – and this modern trend could be seen as merely an extension of the 
argument and its extrapolation to the global. With Schmitt, of course, matters would 
be very different. For him, nothing can replace the existential will of the political 
community, the content of which cannot be prescribed from outside. That will is the 
cause, the essence, and the conditio sine qua non of ordering. Moreover, because of 
the necessarily conflictual nature of humans, it cannot be circumvented by 
presupposing a global popular will. Would that mean that Spinoza is, in some way, 
more ‗modern‘ than Schmitt? Throughout this thesis, it has been presumed that there 
is some kind of inner deficit of self-identity that makes any presence, more or less, 
groundless. Such thinking does not give any normative preference for a single global 
mode of ordering. Quite to the contrary, a variety of different, albeit sometimes 
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overlapping, modes of ordering based on shared existences of the respective political 
communities would be a more logical conclusion. With this premise in mind, a 
cosmopolitan universe of meaning would be impossible and undesirable. After all, 
since humans are, following both Spinoza and Schmitt, essentially void spaces 
surrounded by a shell of desire and imagination, human-centred order would only be 
just another name for a void-centred order. Consequently, a cosmopolitan universe of 
meaning would merely be a cosmopolitan void. 
The modern state is also often seen as no longer unitary in terms of population and 
falling short of its previous nature as a container of social processes, an entity lacking 
power and efficiency, losing control over numerous issues and often even being 
disaggregated. Although that might appear somewhat paradoxical from the canonical 
perspective, Schmitt is not incompatible with that view. Certainly, there is a crucial 
caveat: despite admitting that state homogeneity is never sociological homogeneity, 
Schmitt always insisted that unity must be maintained at the political level: in other 
words, despite being different in many ways, citizens must collectively support the 
state and its order and actively uphold it. Even in a globalised world, then, as long as 
political bonds of some sort are maintained, the state would be fit to survive. Spinoza, 
on the other hand, would struggle with that, since for him, there is a more immediate, 
strongly immanent, relationship between the state and the political community. From 
that perspective, there is something to learn from Spinoza as well: the state is the 
actual producer of homogeneity (which fits with even the Schmittian precondition of 
groundless existence) but, once established, that homogeneity must pass as natural and 
primordial. That also perfectly correlates with the story of state foundation laid out 
above and, therefore, constitutes continuity throughout the lifespan of the state. 
All in all, Spinoza and Schmitt, in different ways, both provide support for a critique 
of some of the present theories of the state. In that interplay, they also introduce some 
correctives. They show that the state always expresses something more than itself – 
the demos – even if in today‘s world that demos might be constituted somewhat 
differently. The model arrived at through constant movement between Spinoza and 
Schmitt lends itself very well even to non-essentialist modern demoi: from groundless 
distinction between the inside and the outside in Schmitt to its ex post facto passing as 
something natural in Spinoza back to groundless existence as a natural source of 
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contestation (because one order is not inherently better than the other) in Schmitt, and, 
finally, to the fact that even contestation must be carried out in the name of something 
more than mere contingency (Spinoza). The same movement between actual 
groundlessness and the need for certainty (or, rather, belief) is also apparent in the 
case of any actually existing order. And there also is a crucial lesson to be learnt about 
the composition of the state: following Schmitt‘s analogy between the state and the 
complexio oppositorum of the Church, one has to talk about political homogeneity 
only, that homogeneity being activated once the friend-enemy tension looms. But 
even then, once again, that homogeneity is the consequence of a top-down process, 
the results of which only retrospectively pass as something existential. If the state is 
able to unite citizens under a common telos, exclusivity of identification and social 
action might be a thing of the present as well as of the past. In fact, in case of both 
foundation and perpetuation of the state, top-down homogeneity must ex post facto be 
made to pass as something natural and existential. In terms of global unity, 
obligations, and democracy, these goals are achievable only when some single 
overarching telos is presupposed, such as reason in Spinoza. But Schmitt is, in fact, 
more consistent here: since the only essential thing about humans is that there is a 
deficit at the very centre of existence (and there is one for Spinoza as well), no single 
telos can be presupposed. As a result, immaterially of the (non-)survival of the state-
qua-institutional structure in the long term, one might still presume continuous 
existence of bounded communities of some sort, able to claim ultimate loyalty and 
identification. In such conditions, a plurality of orders seems to be a more likely and 
desirable outcome, leaving ordering a constrained, rather than global, process. 
What many critics of the state forget is that the state is not something externally 
imposed upon citizens. Rather, as shown by the Spinozist-Schmittian dynamic, the 
state is a shifting concept, not only immediately related to the community but, 
essentially, inseparable from it. Unfortunately, as Steinberger (2004: 8) notes, the 
‗state versus civil society‘ distinction ‗has become an absolutely central preoccupation 
of contemporary political thought‘. What remains, then, is the state as an apparatus of 
rule and coercion. If one adopts this ‗straw man‘ representation of state, then it surely 
has no chance of survival. And yet, this thesis purports to show the erroneous nature 
of such arguments. Instead, a notion of the state that treats it as ‗the entirety of 
political society‘ and pits it in opposition to anomie (Steinberger 2008: 9-10) is to be 
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embraced. After all, the state is created by the citizens, just as the citizens are created 
by the state. As the political communities change and become more global and 
fragmented, the state will have to adapt in a way that reflects the new way of existence 
of political communities which may be dispersed, not always bound by the formal ties 
of citizenship, or may even be partly ad hoc (whereby, on some issues, only part of the 
formal community participates but, on other issues, global support and concern 
seemingly expands the state‘s political community). Even if the state passes into 
something else, there will still be some corpus mysticum, endowed with ultimate 
dignity. 
Of course ‗[s]tates have always been partial and constrained‘ (Smith 2009: 265). But 
there is, nevertheless, a need for some locus of ordering and political struggle, and this 
locus cannot be universal. The state may no longer be strictly about one patch of 
territory with a citizenry that is necessarily fixed and known in advance but, as the 
proposed model implies, political communities still must have some exoskeleton and 
common referent – essentially, a locus of politics. 
 
4.1.2. Sovereignty 
The conceptualisation of sovereign power in Spinoza and Schmitt is, certainly, closely 
interrelated with the community-state nexus. For Schmitt, the sovereign power is an 
entity in and of itself, proceeding from the groundless existence of human beings. 
Sovereignty, therefore, occupies a dual position: it is both inside the political 
community, transubstantiating the community‘s mode of existence into its mode of 
ordering, and outside it, because it is impossible to suspend order while remaining part 
of it. For Spinoza, meanwhile, the sovereign‘s power is a function, proceeding from 
organic self-association rather than some independent essence: it is ‗entrusted‘ to a 
particular authority (TP, 297). Sovereignty is, effectively, a power inherent in political 
ordering: both a power to carry out the transformation and the power unleashed by it. 
Quite clearly, then, ‗sovereignty emerges as a relation between the state and 
individual members of that entity‘ (Bargu 2011: 145). But, even more importantly, 
this is a relation that operates both ways. 
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Only if sovereignty is misperceived as simply being somewhere out there can it be 
seen as ‗necessarily unjust‘, simply signifying ‗a power to abuse people with 
impunity‘ (Endicott 2010: 245). In so doing, the political community would merely 
abuse itself: after all, sovereignty is the political community‘s relationship with itself. 
Sovereignty, seen as a relationship, is also something more than just an organised 
fiction or a purely legal concept because it simultaneously proceeds from, makes 
visible, and shapes a political community‘s collective existence. Thus, it is equally 
wrong to claim that sovereignty is only enabled through external conditions – the 
latter perspective implies seeing the external dimension of sovereignty only. 
Sovereignty is certainly partly fictitious in the sense that it must always refer to 
something more than itself. Indeed, the very principle of the core elements of ordering 
referring to something more than themselves is crucial to the model of ordering as 
process and can be directly related to Spinoza‘s conatus: by striving to persevere in 
existence, humans constantly confer upon the objects of their desire the dignity of 
compensating for the deficit of existence (Ethics IIIp6; ST, 73-74). In this particular 
case, due to the added value of embodying a demos, as long as some political 
community exists, sovereignty cannot become anachronistic even though, with the 
transformation of communities in the era of globalisation, one might agree that the 
exclusivity of state sovereignty is no longer (fully) sustainable. If sovereignty is the 
power to turn a political community‘s potentiality into its actuality, then non-state 
bodies can do that as well. That is especially the case when, on a certain issue, the 
borders of the community do not strictly coincide with particular state borders or 
when a state in question is part of an international organisation, capable of making 
binding decisions (as more or less all states are today). Hence, sovereignty is to be 
seen as fluid: rather than being tied to a particular holder, it represents a particular 
relationship between entities, individual as well as collective. Essentially, sovereignty 
is an attribute to be arrogated in the course of political struggle and, due to that 
fluidity, is part of the process of ordering itself: in fact, the position of the sovereign is 
determined in the process of ordering. For Spinoza, sovereignty is all about the ability 
to establish the external form and internal arrangements of the state and, therefore, 
simultaneously of the political community (TP, 309). Since the state establishes unity 
and homogeneity and determines the collective path towards ever greater reason, the 
sovereign turns that ideal into concrete order. Unless one is dealing with democracy, 
the distinction between the sovereign and the multitude is very clear. In democracy, of 
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course, the multitude is the sovereign and, thus, sovereignty cannot occupy an almost 
external position. Instead, the process turns onto one of immanent causation whereby 
the multitude, its form (i.e. the state), and the sovereign decision that leads from one 
to the other (both ways) are simultaneous. In a somewhat similar manner, the 
Schmittian sovereign decision establishes the will of the people thereby creating unity 
(Schmitt 1985: 9). And yet, as with the state, there is a fundamental difference: 
Spinoza‘s criterion for unity (reason) is outside the political community (TTP 205; see 
also e.g. Belaief 1971: 22-24) while, for Schmitt, only the inside – the political 
community – can determine itself (Schmitt 2014: 118-119). As a result, Spinoza‘s 
sovereignty is a natural attribute while Schmitt‘s – an existential one. In effect, 
Schmitt‘s sovereignty is the locus where the power of the community coalesces, a 
means of the community‘s self-determination. It both fences the community from the 
outside and provides a gravitational pull that keeps the community together: in effect, 
then, it is simultaneously at the centre and at the borders of the community. To that 
extent, one can see the immanent nature of sovereignty in both Spinoza and Schmitt, 
albeit, as is the case with the state, Spinoza‘s is a very strong immanence (there is no 
separation between sovereignty and the political community in democracy), while 
Schmitt‘s is weaker, allowing for some distance between the community, the state, 
and sovereignty. In Spinoza‘s democracy, meanwhile, there is no mediation and no 
critical distance – after all, democracy is the most absolute form of dominion (TP, 
385). If left unchecked, such immediacy is at the risk of implosion, i.e. of the entire 
community being crushed by its own self-referentiality and absence of even a 
theoretical possibility of difference. And yet, it also signifies the (unachievable) aim 
of belief-based ordering: the quest for universality and, through that, objectivity: 
unanimity in pursuit of a supreme telos. Nevertheless, this quest for universality is 
only acceptable when combined with Schmittian groundlessness, thus rendering any 
objectivity contestable and always only to be achieved (but never present) – after all, 
as has already been argued, any supposed objectivity is only a certain partiality 
imposed through the sovereign decision. Here, once again, the constitutive-constituted 
tension is manifest: belief in (Spinozist) strong immanence of sovereignty-to-be 
challenges the belief in strong immanence of sovereignty-that-is, weakens it in 
revealing the gap between the community and the attribute of sovereignty (i.e. 
revealing the hidden weak immanence of the Schmittian type), only to then occupy 
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dominant position by instituting the belief in its own strong immanence before being 
challenged by yet another belief. That is again, the engine of the process of ordering. 
Certainly, sovereignty would, then, easily be seen as an antidote to global managerial 
thinking, both conceptually (because it is quasi-metaphysical as opposed to rational-
economic) and functionally (by being community- rather than universality-centred). 
Sovereignty thus understood takes pride in its particularity because that is as far as the 
process of ordering gets. Any globalist pretence to universality is just a different 
particularity, even though a veiled one. Only now sovereignty as responsibility can 
really be conceived as one of an ethical subject, i.e. of a political community that can 
choose a course of action and, therefore, is responsible for that action. In effect, then, 
the Schmittian-Spinozist framework does offer some support for the pro-sovereignty 
side of the modern debate. But there is potential for change as well. As already 
indicated in the discussion of the state, for Schmitt (and, to some extent, Spinoza), the 
political community and not the state is paramount. If the community finds an 
alternative way to express and uphold its form, the state could get relegated. 
Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the state-sovereignty nexus was broken and 
sovereignty became an attribute of some other communities, united by an idea other 
than that of the state. But as long as these communities needed internal and external 
form (hence, potentially indefinitely), they would need sovereign power to acquire 
and maintain it. 
Definitely, democracy currently is the name of the game. And yet, totally immanent 
democratic sovereignty, whereby any decision is always already willed by the entire 
community and, therefore, made by all and for the benefit of all – thus not leaving any 
space for contestation, deviation, and difference – is a frightening prospect. There is a 
need for a stumbling block, a residue of otherness – the constituted power – to 
establish some critical distance between the community and the norm, whence 
something that already is could legitimately have been different. But, at the symbolic 
level at least, democracy cannot operate in any other way: it cannot present itself as 
something completely arbitrary but only as a will of all – that is its source of 
legitimacy. And yet, this need for some otherness and incommensurability also creates 
an opening for yet more interaction. Certainly, one source of difference is the lack of 
internal homogeneity, whence the political community is in turmoil against itself 
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(stasis) – something that Schmitt would predict, and the reason why his system is not 
a closed totality. But, in a partly Spinozist fashion, this difference can also come from 
outside, as a contrast with some criteria that do not exclusively belong to the state and 
the political community that underlies it. In that sense, sovereignty is a borderline 
concept in two ways: first, it constitutes a borderline (and, indeed, frontline) between 
internal forces and, second, it constitutes a borderline (frontline) between the forces 
inside and those outside the political community. The latter inside-outside tension is 
not a clear-cut friend-enemy distinction because that outside is not in itself purely 
external (although it might be declared such through a sovereign decision) but, rather, 
a pool of possible friendships and enmities that can be constantly rearranged. 
Sovereignty, then, implies constant renegotiation of these borders and decision on 
where any lines are to be drawn. And yet, freedom remains a problematic concept. In 
completely functional terms, one has to side with Spinoza in that freedom is the ability 
to follow the demands of reason without any hindrance (see e.g. Ethics IVp66s). But 
then, of course, the definition of reason is paramount. And here, contrary to Spinoza, 
it has to be argued that reason as such does not exist – instead, in purely political 
terms, (public) reason is what is decided by the sovereign (thus, once again, returning 
to Schmitt). And this, in turn, means that an alternative and challenge to the prevailing 
reason is, at least, always a possibility. Once again, the movement is from a 
Schmittian imposition of a groundless standard to solidification into a Spinozist 
objective standard (reason or anything else that holds supreme value) to unavoidable 
inadequacy and deficit that leads to change into yet another solidification of a (new or 
prevailing old) standard. 
Nevertheless, the above allows for some transnational normativity to manifest itself. 
After all, there is currency in the argument that people now participate in multiple 
different communities and projects, live under different authorities – all 
simultaneously. Sovereignty, as indicated, does refer to the border between norms 
emanating from the political community itself and those norms trying to enter it from 
outside. Those outside norms can certainly alter the balance of power within the 
community or create new identities that subsequently challenge the status quo. And 
yet, the political community itself must have the last word on its form and order, i.e. 
whether to accept the ‗guest‘ norms or not. Of course, the political community itself is 
no longer straightforward: it can be a national community, a regional community, a 
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community dispersed across various locations in the world etc. But some political 
community, as already established, must exist anyway. At the same time, it seems 
unlikely that the constitutive power would be directly channelled to the global level, 
making it the locus of political ordering and precluding the need for intermediary 
sovereign authorities. As already demonstrated, the nature of humans as beings 
characterised by a deficit of self-sufficiency makes any world community neither 
desirable nor possible. If that world community was to materialise, one would live in a 
Spinozist totality without the Schmittian correction: any struggle against the status 
quo could only be a struggle against humanity and reason. Meanwhile, if the world is 
likely to remain composed of multiple political communities, even if ever-changing 
and overlapping ones, one should, if looking for some form of global normative 
coherence, delve into the relative power of the political communities and respective 
sovereign authorities: since sovereignty is a floating quality, any dispersion of 
agreement corresponds to the dispersion of power-qua-right – that, again, is an 
integral part of the process of ordering. To that extent, any calls for resistance against 
sovereignty as such, emphasising constant creativity or some other allegedly 
subversive qualities are nothing else but an integral part of the sovereign struggle par 
excellence. After all, sovereignty being the borderline that divides the outside from 
the inside, it relates to both sides of the divide and, therefore, strictly speaking, there is 
no outside of sovereignty. 
Determination of sovereignty‘s limits is, however, rather complicated. Due to the 
close intertwining of the state and the political community, contradicting the 
authorities would mean, in Spinoza‘s view, contradicting oneself and acting against 
one‘s own interests (see e.g. TTP, 253). Still, one should not imagine the sovereign as 
completely unlimited. Faithful to his right as power doctrine, Spinoza maintains that 
any commands are limited to what people can do and have an interest in doing (TP, 
310). Any power depends on its effectiveness, and it cannot be effective if the 
citizenry is not kept in mind or else the sovereign power would simply destroy itself 
(which is inconceivable following the conatus doctrine). And that effectiveness cannot 
be achieved by brute force – instead, Spinoza prefers winning the hearts and minds of 
the subjects (TTP 210). In this sense, Spinoza manages to formulate a theory of 
limited power without any normative preconditions (although the norm of reason is 
subsequently superimposed). In a similar fashion, Spinoza appears quite confident that 
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the sovereign authority will pass reasonable laws – after all, it is in that authority‘s 
interest to do so, since only reasonable laws strengthen both the state and the 
sovereign authority. That clause is certainly desirable given that the sovereign has the 
monopoly of right to decide on what is good and bad, what laws are to order the 
communal life, and how those laws are to be interpreted. By using these prerogatives 
contrary to reason, the sovereign would grow weaker and, ultimately, lose the power 
and right to command. It is, therefore, in the sovereign‘s own interest to stick with 
sound reason or, from a more critical perspective, with what passes as reason. 
Schmitt, meanwhile, is more open-ended. For him, sovereignty truly is a borderline 
concept which occupies the groundless division between the inside and the outside 
and decides on who belongs to the community and who does not, i.e. on the 
community‘s order and on its friends and enemies. Sovereignty itself is a threshold 
between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, nomos and anomie. Since the friend-enemy distinction itself 
is groundless in the sense that it cannot be resolved by any universal criteria, the 
sovereign decision is a miraculous fiat that establishes order ex nihilo, setting a point 
of reference that holds meaning in place. Sovereignty is, indeed, a ‗liminal concept‘ in 
a sense that ‗when illegality becomes extreme, it can convert itself into a new standard 
of legality. One sovereignty is replaced by another‘ (Kalmo 2010: 114) while, equally, 
if such conversion is unsuccessful, the old standard of sovereignty reasserts its 
authority with the challenger remaining outside the borders of legality. Certainly, only 
one of the two faces can prevail at a time, especially when they clash in a state of 
exception. Therefore, sovereignty should, as already indicated, be conceived of as an 
attribute: only ex post facto one can say that either the law-preserving or the law-
making force had been sovereign all the time, depending on which one was 
successful. But that is almost a restatement of Spinoza‘s right as power doctrine: the 
ability (power) to decide determines the right to do so. Still, this seemingly arbitrary 
nature of sovereignty does not diminish its importance in any way. On the contrary: 
the constant renegotiation of the symbolic borders of the political community – the 
essence of sovereignty as a borderline concept – also means that neither sovereignty 
nor political struggle can be eliminated or externalised. The process of ordering must 
simply continue. Hence, seeing modern sovereignty as a fluid relationship gives the 
concept a renewed raison d‘être in an increasingly globalised world. Here as well, the 
crucial tension between Spinoza and Schmitt remains the usual one: sovereignty as 
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orientated towards an external standard (e.g. reason) or based on pure ability to 
decide, both simultaneous and constantly challenging one another, representing the 
constituted and the constitutive respectively. 
Next, for Schmitt, the struggle over sovereignty undoubtedly contains a tragic 
element: one has to take sides but, since the foundation is groundless, neither side is 
inherently better than the other. That clearly echoes the non-essentialist approach to 
rights outlined in the discussion of the state. The stakes are high: once identified, the 
loser-qua-other becomes (or remains) outside of law and, effectively, has always 
already been such. Losing always means having been wrong. But choosing not to 
contest the status quo is no less tragic because one then has to obey instituted 
contingency – non-resistance is a form of tacit consent. Certainly, that contingency 
must not pass as such – instead, it must be seen as something more than it actually is, 
namely, the ultimate standard of order – and, consequently, politics does not turn 
everyone into a Hamlet, at least not into a conscious one. Here, as ever, Spinoza 
comes into play, offering the criterion of reason as a placebo to cure the anxiety of the 
tragic. An ultimate criterion is needed for both the constitutive and the constituted 
thrusts, making any choice seemingly natural. On the other hand, siding with an 
alternative to the status quo is not inherently better either – it only means siding with 
another contingency, although one is not necessarily aware of it. In fact, real political 
struggle can only be a struggle between different sets of beliefs in a quasi-religious 
sense, whence any constituted theology is being challenged by a constitutive theology, 
which if successful, solidifies into a new constituted one, only to be challenged by a 
new constitutive one. The price to pay for losing, as already indicated, is the 
determination that one‘s belief had always been nothing but heresy. In this way, again, 
Spinoza and Schmitt, when taken in turns, account for constestability (groundlessness) 
and stability (external criteria), the constitutive and the constituted, and show how the 
perpetual process of ordering is animated. 
As ever, for both Spinoza and Schmitt, human beings are characterised by a deficit of 
existence, which is the cause of constant desire to fill that gap or, at least, to cover it 
up. In fact, for Spinoza, humans are automata of desire that construct reality out of 
pleasure. Therefore, moving to Schmitt, the core question of sovereignty is who 
decides what legitimate satisfaction is and, therefore, who controls desire. Two 
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different outlooks can be constructed out of this. The outlook of the constituted is the 
conflation of a certain mode of desiring with a quasi-objective standard, such as 
reason (Spinoza). Meanwhile, the constitutive has to expose the decision on the 
existing status quo as groundless and arbitrary and, therefore, open for contestation 
and ever new sovereign decisions (Schmitt). But, once constitutive desire is pitched 
against the status quo of desire, the former starts acquiring quasi-objective grounding 
itself, becoming fixed once the alternative way of desiring becomes the new status 
quo via a sovereign decision, while the old status quo then appears to always already 
have been groundless. In this case, Spinoza again is the agent of the constituted while 
Schmitt is the agent of the constitutive. And, again, one encounters the ever-recurring 
kernel of belief: any order must be believed to be something more than it really is. 
After all, sovereignty rests on both auctorictas and potestas. If no potestas is left, 
sovereignty collapses immediately because the order it maintains can no longer be 
protected. If no auctoritas is left, sovereignty will unavoidably be challenged and the 
only tool the sovereign will be able to employ is sheer power – this is a bloody 
outcome but no matter how much blood is shed, pure power without legitimacy will 
not be able to maintain itself indefinitely. For a power to maintain itself, it must be 
coupled with belief – Schmittian practice must robe itself with Spinozist imagery. 
Sovereignty is, indeed, contingent but only on that inner relationship (and inner stasis) 
as well as on the relative strength of one authority on comparison with another (e.g. 
national vs supranational) but not on fulfilment of some preset criteria. Or, if it is 
dependent of externally preset criteria, then the norm-setting body must admit its own 
nature as a higher-order sovereign, the implication being that it itself is but yet another 
instituted particularity trying to pass as universality. 
Spinoza and Schmitt, read in an alternating sequence, help resolve what otherwise 
would be a crucial aporia of sovereignty: if sovereignty relies on transcendence, as it 
has to in order to be effective, it faces an impossibility of being what it is, because the 
most it can rely on is merely the form of transcendence, failing to provide an ultimate 
external point of reference (see Mininger 2010: 150-151). Sovereignty would then be 
trapped in the impossible position between the inside as immanence and the outside as 
transcendence. Instead, the dynamic model proposed in this chapter implies that 
sovereignty is always attached to one of the two poles (but never to both and never 
permanently) and constantly pulled both ways by the permanent tension between the 
185 
 
two, i.e. caught up in the midst of the process of ordering, the latter, of course, being 
the core object of the thesis. Hence, sovereignty is neither something inherent nor 
something superimposed but rather a scene for enacting the (often tragic) drama of 
democratic politics (see Martel 2012: 3). Sovereignty itself should, indeed, be seen as 
an attribute that states (and other actors) try to arrogate to themselves. That is not 
some modern innovation. After all, this was the case even in the heyday of 
sovereignty when sovereign equality was, in fact, an attribute of the most powerful 
European states. Their sovereign equality was based on the fact that they were able to 
grab an approximately equal amount of the attribute of sovereignty. Other states and 
territorial structures have always been less sovereign to the degree to which they were 
weaker. This is what constituted the difference between a colony and the imperial 
mainland or a client state and a patron state. That was, in practice if not in theory, also 
the case during the Cold War era. Today, meanwhile, states have increasingly turned 
to acting collectively, as it were, pooling some aspects of their sovereignty together 
within international organisations. Such organisations, then, become centres of gravity 
by themselves, attempting to pull the attribute of sovereignty in their direction. 
Alternatively, if a sovereign state is weak and some bodies within it grow in relative 
strength, these units can claim more and more sovereignty to themselves until they are 
the real and full possessors of authority. That, certainly, goes contrary to the principle 
of territorial integrity, which has been one of the cornerstones of post-World War II 
international order, although in favour of a much more obscure principle – that of self-
determination. But that is, again, an instance of the paradigmatic constitutive-
constituted tension. In this context, it is useful to apply Spinoza‘s right as power 
doctrine (Ethics Ip11s; TP, 292)  – perhaps rebranded to sovereignty as power – to the 
composite bodies of states, international organisations, and other actors that acquire 
ever more of the attribute of sovereignty, once again seeing sovereignty as an 
attribute. In a nutshell, every entity has as much sovereign right (i.e. possesses as 
much of the attribute of sovereignty) as it has power to claim and uphold it. However, 
it must be stressed that any fluidity of sovereignty must also be a constitutive fluidity. 
That necessarily involves an existential decision over the shape and form of some 
collective body that has successfully arrogated the power to make that decision: 
ordering must be of any by some body, and the two always go together. 
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As per both Spinoza and Schmitt, the origin of political life is irreducible plurality, 
which requires a decision on competing claims. This plurality also opens up a power 
struggle: who decides and what the content of the decision is going to be – essentially, 
whose particularity is to become the new universality of a new political theology. The 
main difference between Spinoza and Schmitt is that while, for the former, the process 
of ordering has neither beginning nor end, for the latter, both points are clear: ordering 
moves from Genesis to the Last Judgement. And yet, despite that, it transpires that 
Schmitt still manages to maintain a more open outlook of how this process is 
supposed to flow by refusing to prescribe anything but those two points. This is why 
Schmitt is satisfied with a decision which, in effect, justifies itself, while Spinoza 
resorts to rational grounding. Nevertheless, both, quite paradoxically, dislocate 
sovereignty from the centre: as already shown, sovereignty is an attribute, arrogated 
by those who ultimately have the power (and, therefore, right) to do so and, as has 
now become evident, that attribute belongs to the process of ordering. 
But, as ever, there needs to be something more than merely arrogation of an attribute. 
Sovereignty, in order to be effective, needs to be of a corpus mysticum, guided by 
something beyond understanding and questioning. It needs to represent a conflation of 
the entire political community with all its authority and something more than it 
actually is or could be – not only representation but also a larger purpose of that 
representation, an imaginary telos that lends added dignity to the decision, elevating it 
to sublimity. Here one has to return to the necessary kernel of belief: it is the same 
idea that lends both the state and the sovereign power their authority. At this point, 
one must ask, with Agamben (2011: xii), ‗Why does power need glory?‘. The answer 
is that Glory, ‗the acclamative and doxological aspect of power‘ is, in fact, ‗the central 
mystery of power‘ (Agamben 2011: xii). What transpires, then, is that ‗the center of 
the governmental machine is empty‘ (Agamben 2011: xiii). That, indeed, is a clear 
expression of power and authority structured around the core emptiness, completely in 
line with the Spinozist-Schmittian perspective. From the perspective of applicable 
political theology, then, ‗[i]t is not so much that the effects (the Government) depend 
on being (the Kingdom), but rather that the being consists of its effects‘ (Agamben 
2011: 142). That is, manifestly, a restatement of immanent causality. The added 
dignity necessary for the constituted not only must underlie government as the object 
of belief – it can only be manifest through that government because, in fact, there is 
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nothing behind government but yet another attempt to cover the deficit. Thus, again, 
the Spinozist-Schmittian movement is paramount: from struggle on a groundless 
terrain (Schmitt) to rationalisation-qua-belief (Spinoza) to openness for contestation 
because nothing built on groundless terrain can be stable (Schmitt) to either new or 
renewed stabilisation as the only viable and reasonable outcome (Spinoza). In short, 
the sovereign decision prevails simply because it is sovereign decision but it simply 
cannot be ‗sold‘ as such – it needs a more impressive packaging. But the movement 
between sovereignty-as-presence and sovereignty-as-potential is completely inherent 
in the process of ordering. 
In today‘s international order, emphasis on International Criminal Law, Responsibility 
to Protect, etc. seeks to create temporary outsides of the international community 
which only serve to confirm the ‗us‘ of that community and to strengthen its own 
theology. But by portraying power and sovereignty as autonomous, bearing (almost) 
no relation to the political community, these approaches oversimplify the existing 
problems. It is not that authorities operate in a vacuum. Instead, there are conditions in 
the constitutive-constituted nexus that allow them to act as they do. That also serves as 
at least a partial explanation of why international interventions have such a poor track 
record of long-term success and why post-authoritarian and post-conflict transitions 
tend to be so complicated and dangerous. Either the political community (or its part 
that matters) approves what is happening under a particular regime or there is no 
political community at all and, therefore, no referent of intervention or transition (but, 
in the latter case, there is also no sovereignty – just sheer power). If sovereignty is 
taken to be the borderline attribute that stretches across the inside and the outside of a 
political community, then the very notion of sovereignty as an externally prescribed 
‗Responsibility to Protect‘ loses its purpose. After all, self-protection (and one has to 
keep Spinoza‘s conatus in mind here) is an inbuilt element of the internal and external 
attributes of a political community‘s sovereignty. 
 
4.2. The Content: Law and Politics 
There is, once again, a core tension between contestation and belief in both law and 
politics, best reflected through Spinozist-Schmittian movement. It is law that provides 
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ordering with its content, thus determining what a political community is and what it 
is not, i.e. providing it with form. But, at the same time, law itself is the product of 
that community, arrived at through the process by which the community finds out the 
truth about itself – politics. Law here stands for something more than the community 
can ever be – a well-ordered and integrated whole – and that is both its source of 
appeal (law becomes an object of quasi-religious belief) and ultimate downfall 
(because it cannot live up to that promise). The ability to grasp the nature of law, 
therefore, requires the ability to conceive presence and absence simultaneously. 
Politics, meanwhile, refers to the constant inner dynamic of the political community, 
in which multiple particularities compete for the status of the embodiment of the 
entire community. However, no effective claim can be formulated in the name of a 
particularity – instead, a domain of political theology is opened up. Such inner 
dynamic of law and politics only further points to ordering being a process. 
 
4.2.1. Law 
The essence and presence of law can, at first sight, seem paradoxical, especially in 
terms of its relation with the political community to which it applies. For example, 
Honig (2009: 15) sees a chicken-and-egg dilemma in lawmaking, whereby ‗In order 
for there to be a people well formed enough for good lawmaking, there must be good 
law, for how else will the people be well formed? [but] Where would that good law 
come from absent an already well-formed, virtuous people?‘ However, there is an 
answer to that: once one begins to see the process of ordering as constant movement 
between the constitutive (the people) and the constituted (law), whereby both are 
mutually reproduced, a gradual process opens up through which ordering sediments. 
Another related problem is that of stability and change. In order to fulfil its constituted 
stabilising promise, law itself must be stable in both its form and representation of the 
political community but simultaenously mutable enough to reflect the groundlessness 
of social existence. Finally, there also is the problem of observance: if law is but a 
moment in the flow of social significations, then how does it merit observance but if it 
is something to be observed unconditionally, how is one to account for any change in 
law? Here, again, the Spinozist-Schmittian reading-as-movement is crucial in 
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understanding the tension and interrelation between contestation and belief that 
animates the process of ordering. 
For Spinoza, law is, essentially, a substitute for reason, a tool to make sure that people 
act as if they were reasonable (see e.g. TTP, 57). In so doing, it harmonises relations 
within society since, it must be remembered, reasonable people necessarily agree with 
one another. Its norm-setting function ensures that any tension between the collective 
conatus of the state and those of individuals is well-managed and that the community 
proceeds towards ever more perfect reason. This harmonising function is also 
highlighted by Schmitt: law is the expression of the political community‘s internal 
order and, just like another constituted element, the state, it is an incarnation of that 
community‘s will. Since the fallen nature of humanity leads to unavoidable conflict if 
humans are left on their own, law does introduce coherence which is partly artificial 
and partly organic (because it follows from substantial homogeneity of the political 
community). The crucial difference is, of course, Schmitt‘s negation of reason or any 
other external criterion: in effect, everything that is decided is law and that suffices for 
it to be binding. As Spinoza sees it, law, as long as it leads towards reason, can force 
people to be free (because reason is freedom) and, therefore, to act against law is to 
act against one‘s own true interest. This attitude is a crucial premise for any 
theological thinking about law because it implies an unquestionable higher criterion, 
the ultimate benevolence of which cannot be doubted. Meanwhile, for Schmitt, the 
individual must decide to observe the law instead of blindly following universal 
norms – thus an instance of tragic choice is created (see e.g. Schmitt 2007b: 28; for a 
discussion, see also Meier 1998: 11, 14). After all, without this ability to act 
otherwise, there could be no friend-enemy distinction. That decision is not always 
open and straightforward – often it happens in the form of tacit consent. But the 
crucial, existential, choices cannot be made by recourse to any ultimate criterion: the 
demands are simply too irreconcilable, hence leading to a groundless tragic choice. 
However, such groundlessness at least introduces some openness. Schmitt might have 
lamented that ability to choose, tracing it back to the Original Sin, but nevertheless, it 
was, for him, an empirical fact of life. But once the choice is made, there can be no 
further doubt. The belief in the ordering principle must constantly be affirmed through 
an incessant recital of the creed or, in the case of law, constant observance. Here, as 
ever, the incessant movement between form and appearance is evident: law must be 
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open to all possibilities (Schmitt) but, once some of those possibilities are selected, 
they must be seen as objective and believed in (Spinoza) but, since ultimate fixity and 
rigidity, whereby any status quo is deemed final and incontestable, is neither desirable 
from a normative perspective nor feasible in communities built on a groundless 
terrain, the instability of any ordering must be acknowledged and the possibility of 
contestation reintroduced (returning to Schmitt), albeit keeping in mind that any result 
of that contestation will again need to acquire the added dignity of something more 
than itself (returning to Spinoza). Hence, both stability and change are accounted for, 
further revealing constant movement within the process of ordering. 
In terms of political organisation, for Spinoza, law functions as a point of reference 
which allows the people to know what their general will is at a certain time (TP 302, 
383; see also Balibar 1997). For Schmitt as well, whatever is law at a certain time, is 
always already willed by the political community and expresses its mode of existence 
(Schmitt 2008a: 70, 125, 131-132). Especially for Schmitt, law prevails only as long 
as it reflects the self-determination of the political community. Once that is no longer 
the case, the community has to again decide on its own form. In effect, both authors 
propose a very similar scheme of transformation from constitutive will to constituted 
form, even though their approaches to external criteria differ. In this way, a second 
source of added dignity is presupposed: not only dignity accrued from some ideal 
form (and any present form must be considered ideal or, at least, superior to any 
alternatives) but also dignity accrued from the collective body of the community. 
Belief in legal order is, essentially, the political community‘s belief in itself. The 
community aggrandises itself to the position of the ultimate criterion, to the status of 
some metaphysical presence that appropriates and divides the symbolic and the 
material worlds. To that extent, the voice of the people truly becomes the voice of 
God. The corpus politicum and the corpus mysticum are intertwined, giving the 
political community both physical presence and power that exceeds any presence. In 
Spinoza‘s theory, the theological nature of law is even further strengthened by the fact 
that, especially in democracy, law needs quasi-prophetic mediation in order to be 
promulgated: the political community prophesises about itself. Schmitt, clearly, 
allows for more distance between the community and its law but does not do away 
with the quasi-prophetic moment. For Spinoza, a democratic multitude (because of its 
absolute and immediate character) itself speaks the law-qua-its-own-being into 
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existence while Schmitt postulates the need for a sovereign decision which is never 
fully identical with the political community as such (if there was full identity, there 
would be no politics; but a degree of identity must, nevertheless, exist because 
otherwise there would be no substantial homogeneity). Still, in both cases, the 
political community is the source of ultimate truth which is revealed through law as 
the substance of ordering. 
The simultaneous creator-created relationship of the political community and its law 
definitely brings together the social theories of law that often either simply see law as 
a set of codified relations within a society or posit law as fully a creator of society by 
establishing a distinction between those who observe certain norms and those who do 
not. Here, once again, the same paradigm becomes clear: sharing a core premise (that 
there is a causal relation between law and society), the two strands of theory 
exemplify the two core thrusts observed throughout this thesis: the constitutive one, 
putting law in a subservient position, and the constituted one, making society 
dependent on pre-existing law. A Schmittian-Spinozist reading-as-movement allows 
seeing both interpretations not only as commensurable but also as mutually necessary: 
only by operating together they can account for both the prevalence of political 
communities as units and for their constant change in relation to internal and external 
circumstances. The above, nevertheless, does not say anything about the grounds for 
both stability and contestation or, rather, the presence or absence of ultimate grounds. 
To understand the latter issue, a Spinozist-Schmittian analysis-qua-movement is once 
again needed. 
Notably, for Spinoza, there is nothing ‗natural‘ in human law – essentially, nothing is 
forbidden by nature, except what people cannot do anyway (TP, 294). In the same 
vein, there is no necessary relationship to moral norms, except to the extent that law 
and morality are both based on reason. Certainly, keeping in mind that Spinoza keeps 
back door open for a quasi-objective redefinition of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ (Ethics IVp24), 
an absolute law-morality distinction cannot be sustained. And yet, there is no direct 
transference from one domain to the other: any overlap is mediated by reason (a moral 
norm is codified in law not because it is a moral norm but because it is a command of 
reason). Thus, while natural law or moral law would presuppose norms that simply 
exist, Spinoza‘s law, even if it is to be moral, must be made such by humans 
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employing their faculty of reason. The same absence of any ‗natural‘ elements of law 
also applies to Schmitt‘s doctrine. Here, correct interpretation and application of law 
is seen as a practical, rather than abstract-philosophical concern (Schmitt 1985: 35). 
Thus, not only reason but also any other normativity is disregarded: it is concrete 
situational decision that matters and not universal norms. In that sense, the flexibility 
and mutability of Schmitt‘s law and the aspiration towards universality of Spinoza‘s 
law must constantly check one another: law must be simultaneously oriented towards 
an ideal which is believed in, hence fostering observance, and groundless to allow for 
any change. But that drive for change must be made in the name of another 
universalist aspiration which is, in practice, just as groundless as the previous one. 
Evidently, both Spinoza and Schmitt are at odds with the positivist theories of law, 
albeit in different ways. Spinoza‘s law lacks the independence that the positivists 
ascribe to law: albeit there is no natural contend of the legal system, the ultimate 
criterion of reason constrains the independence of legal thinking. Admittedly, to an 
extent, Spinoza could be thought of in parallel with Kelsen in terms of reason as the 
Grundnorm. And yet, whereas Grundnorm is internal to law and mutable, reason is 
neither. In fact, Spinoza sounds more like a Dworkinian interpretivist than a Kelsenian 
positivist. Schmitt, meanwhile, despite his emphasis on the absence of any 
predetermined content of law, is easily classified as an anti-positivist, especially 
because of his polemic with Kelsen. And yet, he is quite close to the other, Austinian-
Hartian kind of positivism, postulating a rather strict independence of law and the 
importance of a founding decision. After all, Schmitt‘s decisionism was, clearly, 
closer to the Anglo-American common law than to the continental civil law. Schmitt, 
of course, presents legal independence in a radicalised form, getting rid of any rules of 
recognition and leaving bare sovereign decision as the sole mode of change and 
inclusion of anything from outside. Yet, at the same time, that outside is strengthened: 
it is not the case that law decides by and from within itself that a certain external norm 
be recognised but, rather, the outside irrupts the flow of law by forcing itself to be 
recognised by arrogating the sovereign decision. This having been said, positivism in 
itself does constitute an important means of understanding the functioning of law by 
coming close to the movement already outlined: from the relative openness of the 
common law branch to the rigidity of belief in the Grundnorm to, again, irruption of 
openness because only that allows any change in the Grundnorm, as Kelsen himself 
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has permitted. And yet, this movement only approximates the Spinozist-Schmittian 
one, concentrating on the inside (i.e. the status quo). That, arguably, is due to 
positivism being, essentially, a theory of appearance, of how the legal process and 
legal change must look like – a tamed vision of change (Hart) and a reinforced 
presence of stability (Kelsen), proclaiming that law simply exists and is capable of 
independently determining itself in terms of both its own preservation and change. 
Just as well, for both Spinoza and Schmitt, law cannot simply be somewhere out there 
waiting to be discovered: it must be created, even though, to be more precise, the 
political community both creates law and is created by it. Since, as already indicated, 
a reference to the community imbues law with added dignity, law essentially assumes 
its dignity from something that is simultaneously created by it and, therefore, can in 
effect, be called the source of its own dignity. As ever, there is a two-way reciprocal 
relationship where the inside and the outside, relations of causation and arrogation 
defy traditional dimensional logic like a Möbius strip. 
In Spinoza‘s case (see e.g. Levene, 2004: 165 for a discussion), law is not only an 
internal matter (a product of the community) but also an external one (approximation 
of the infinite intellect of God). Here Spinoza, as already seen with the state and 
sovereignty, inadvertently demonstrates the need for law to be seen as something 
more than it actually is and to thus shroud itself with ever more dignity. And Schmitt 
adds his own mystique: law comes about through the exception-qua-miracle, in which 
the underlying Being of the community momentarily becomes manifest. In this way, 
law, once established, through its very presence becomes a crucial weapon in the 
theologico-political struggle: it upholds the order and provides content to be believed 
in. As often happens, Schmitt is more straightforward about that theological aspect, 
and thus opens ground for contestation. Spinoza, then, once more gives an example of 
the theological nature of ordering in action in support of the constituted. 
In Spinoza‘s theory, law is of fundamental importance because an association 
becomes a collective body only through its ability to pass laws and uphold them. Law 
both is created by a political entity and makes a political community into an entity 
itself. In essence, law is the defining feature of ordering, its most immediate and 
visible manifestation. And for Schmitt, there is, strictly speaking, no way of getting 
out of law because some kind of order always exists, even in an exception: the present 
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law and an aspiring law-to-be, divided by an instance of sovereign will (see e.g. 
Schmitt 2014: 118-119). Seen from this perspective, even the position of the 
sovereign appears to be less paradoxical than commonly thought: it is neither 
something outside law nor the force of law without law but, instead, always relates to 
a present law: if the status quo prevails, that is quite straightforward, while if the law-
to-be prevails, then it turns out that the latter had always been the real, present, law 
(and, therefore, real sovereignty must have always related to it) and the former status 
quo had been just a case of mistaken identity. After all, for Schmitt, there must be law 
at any time because law is a crucial weapon against disorder of the Antichrist. If 
sovereignty did not refer to the always already present law, it would not be able to 
carry out its katechonic function. For both authors, therefore, law is the crucial and 
defining presence – which is very much in line with the argument put forward in this 
thesis. 
Schmitt, as it is well-known, refers to a few rather cryptic lines of St Paul: ‗And you 
know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in his time. For the 
mystery of lawlessness is already at work: only he who now restrains it will do so 
until he is out of the way‘ (II Thessalonians 2.6-7). The function of the Katechon (the 
‗he who restrains‘ of the letter) adds metaphysical dignity not only to particular laws 
(or political order more generally) but the very presence of order as such. In fact, once 
such approach is adopted, law does not even need justification: it suffices that it is and 
is effective, because the alternative to even bad laws is worse still. Justification is not 
necessarily rendered superfluous in this way – rather, political ordering is simply 
given an extra weapon to defend itself. Something quite similar can be found in 
Spinoza as well: for him, law is needed in order to uphold reason and restrain the 
human tendency to stray away from it (see e.g. TTP, 199). On this occasion, Spinoza 
and Schmitt can be read together, showing that both metaphysical and rationalist 
arguments can signal an identical process of shrouding the order that is with (quasi-
)metaphysical dignity simply because it is the order that is. 
Nevertheless, the ‗impurity‘ of law must still be kept in mind: each group will 
formulate a claim from a transcendent or quasi-transcendent perspective, seeking 
justification either in reason or in some other higher cause. This plurality of ultimate 
causes is not only expedient in terms of political mobilisation, since it is open to 
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potentially competing standpoints, but also desirable normatively, because if there is 
no distance, no alienation between the political community and its law, then 
fanaticism is the most likely outcome. As it has been shown, this overstated 
immediacy forms the essence of Spinoza‘s unconsciously theological theory. 
Meanwhile, in order to better understand Schmitt‘s political theology, it is useful to 
read him as a reader of de Maistre. For the latter, ‗to conduct himself well, man needs 
beliefs, not problems‘ and, therefore, ‗[n]othing is more vital to him than prejudices‘, 
i.e. ‗any opinions adopted without examination‘ (de Maistre 2001: 111). As a result, 
‗[g]overnment is a true religion; it has its dogmas, its mysteries, its priests‘ (de 
Maistre 2001: 111). Schmitt‘s understanding of theological thinking in political 
ordering is, in principle, the same. Theological thinking and the necessity of belief (or 
‗prejudice‘) are corollaries to groundless existence: when no option is inherently 
better or more strongly grounded than the other, one can only resort to belief. And that 
belief, moving back to Spinoza‘s theory, does not have to be openly metaphysical 
(e.g. in a transcendent God in Heaven) but can have other objects as well (reason 
included). Thus, despite Spinoza‘s own struggle against prejudices, reason might only 
be the name of an especially appealing prejudice. Furthermore, some (see e.g. 
LeBuffe 2015) even suggest that Spinoza himself might not have been as critical 
towards prejudice and politico-religious conflation, if only for reasons of political 
expediency. But, even then, any entrenched constituted belief in law must always be 
checked by upcoming constitutive beliefs in alternative law – that is a clear 
implication of ordering as progress. 
In this respect, it might be useful to bring back some of the legal theories outlined in 
the first chapter, namely, interpretivism and natural law. It could be argued that the 
rationalist tradition of natural law, with its emphasis on reason as a means to 
determine the natural content of law, is quite well aligned with some key features of 
Spinozism as, in a way, does interpretivism, stating that once the relevant norm is 
established, single correct answers could be given. Certainly, interpretivism is 
somewhat more open than natural law theories, since it concentrates on what is 
collectively deemed to be the relevant norm. Thus it is, in part, transcendental-
interpersonal, whereas natural law is fully transcendent. Spinoza‘s intellectual love of 
God and the situation that Dworkin puts his Judge Hercules in correspond in some 
fundamental ways; most prominent among them are quasi-ideal knowledge, quasi-
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ideal consideration, and decisions that are fundamentally right. Evidently, there can be 
little contestation in both interpetivism and natural law theories or, if there is, that 
contestation is only towards better and truer law but not in terms of any alternative 
demands; in other words, no otherness is permitted. To that effect, the two theories 
can be seen as an inversion of the Kelsenian Grundnorm-based positivism: here, 
again, one encounters a basic norm which acts as a source of validity but, contrary to 
Kelsen, that norm lies outside the legal system. As a result, one can easily see two 
strategies in which the constituted power can add the extra dignity to its law, making 
it more than it is: either the belief that law is internally coherent, producing meaning 
from its own sublime centre or the belief that law is validated from outside, by an 
equally sublime centre that stands above any human particularity. That effort, as ever, 
needs a Schmittian counterbalance in order to preclude self-serving rigidity. 
In fact, if one needs to locate Schmitt as being close to any of the modern theories of 
law, a form of pragmatism would, perhaps, be the obvious candidate. Certainly, that 
would not be the pragmatism of Rorty‘s liberal ironists who are always able and 
willing to doubt anything (Schmitt would deplore that, seeing in the ironist attitude the 
worst vices of liberalism). Rather, one might see an overlap in the more basic attitude 
that law is based on a paradigm that exists here and now ant that any foundation is, 
ultimately, groundless – in short, what effectively passes as order, is order (that has 
already been observed in the discussion of Schmittian sovereignty). Schmitt would 
not, perhaps, even be very much at odds with some of the affiliated theories, like the 
economic analysis of law. Certainly, sympathising with their emphasis on competition 
and conflict in an environment of scarce resources, Schmitt would, nevertheless, 
accrue to law a somewhat stronger stabilising role, limiting the competition of 
interests and standpoints because, if left unchecked, it could threaten the political 
community with dissolution (and it also has to be remembered that Schmitt strongly 
advocated separation and independence of domains; hence, he would not be 
comfortable with the conflation of law and economics). Strangely in terms of 
Schmitt‘s own convictions, although not in terms of subsequent appropriations, 
Schmitt is, as well, close to some principles of critical legal scholarship. As well 
known, for the critical theorists, law only objectifies underlying power relationships. 
A very close relationship between law and power is something that prominently 
features in Schmitt‘s writings. As already emphasised, the presence of any normativity 
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rests on the power to make it actual. And yet, Schmitt never espoused the negative 
attitude characteristic to critical theorists: for him, that was just a diagnosis, a 
dissection of what actually is, rather than a tool to criticise society. Again, the two 
contrasting thrusts that operate simultaneously, permanently holding one another in 
movement and in tension, are evident: the (rather Spinozist) interpretivist and natural 
law constituted thrust and the (rather Schmittian) pragmatist and critical constitutive 
thrust, with the Schmittian-Spinozist movement providing a framework on which 
those otherwise competing theories can be placed. Once again, one needs to start with 
power that establishes effective order, which then solidifies into an object of belief 
but, being groundless, can be dislodged by another, which, in turn, will need its own 
structure of belief. 
Nothing of the same sort could be said about the realist theories of law, with their 
emphasis on decisions being determined by external factors and personal choices. 
Both Spinoza and Schmitt would have found that too seditious, although Schmitt 
might have approved the claims that there always is more than one possible option 
and any choice is determined through preference for a particular end. While the latter 
might resemble quasi-decisionism, Schmittian law is, nevertheless, an integrated 
framework that can only be replaced in its totality and not a set of do-it-yourself 
options. Hence, law, once established, is for Schmitt, determinate enough (or, if not, is 
made determinate through the sovereign decision) to act as a criterion even in a 
decisionist system. As far as deliberative theories are concerned, the ideal of free flow 
of arguments where the best one wins and becomes law would not be judged kindly 
by Spinoza and Schmitt either. Spinoza would disagree on the grounds that law must 
be guided by reason and not unpredictable deliberative encounters, although the 
general principle of collective improvement clearly echoes his theory (as do the more 
rationality-inclined versions of deliberative theory, such as Habermas‘); Schmitt, 
meanwhile, would see only constant chatter without the ability to make a decisive 
choice. Both of those modern theories, in effect, are over the top: on the one hand, 
innovation without fixity (realism), producing an unduly radicalised constitutive 
thrust, and on the other hand, the ultimate legitimation of the status quo because it is 
easier to contest some sublime external point which upholds order than to challenge 
oneself (because, by implicitly participating in deliberation, one is, effectively, part of 
the agreement). But the basic tension between the constitutive and the constituted 
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poles prevails.Arguably, in today‘s world, the unity of law has been rendered 
problematic by internal pluralism and transnational norm-making (Krisch 2010: 305-
306). But here one has to remember the borderline nature of sovereignty and its 
quality as a floating attribute. Such tension and contestation within law makes 
sovereignty-qua-borderline ever more relevant. Certainly, ever greater fluidity is both 
the condition of and the solution to the modern increasingly globalised world (Krisch 
2010: 307). And yet, points of reference are still needed, arbitrary as they might be, 
and these points of reference need to be objectivised in the name of something. Hence, 
law retains close ties with the local and particular. This is illustrated by the difficulties 
faced by international transitional administrators trying to impose their understanding 
of law over local legal cultures (May 2014: 100). Certainly, modern law takes place at 
the frontier between the national and the international. Just as sovereignty is now 
more than ever about the borderline between the inside and the outside, not only in 
terms of internal content but also of pressures from the inside and the outside of the 
community, law is caught within those multiple loci of decisions. Regardless of its 
origin, law still relates (as it must do) to a certain political community, although the 
relevant community might transcend particular state borders – at least that is how is 
(and must be) presented. However, such transnational law poses a challenge: on the 
regional and, especially, on the global level, even the law that poses as the 
embodiment of a certain community‘s values (e.g. international criminal law as 
expression of global consciousness) is, in reality, the creation of expert panels or, at 
best, state representatives, thus only ex post facto presuming the existence of some 
community. 
Notably, the principle of law-making is the same as that of sovereignty (after all, as 
both Spinoza and Schmitt suggest, sovereignty is about establishing particular laws): 
power and right is one thing. As the transformation of state, sovereignty, and law 
illustrates, the current globalising thrust seems to favour the constituted by creating 
ever larger spheres of ordering that are much easier to rule through governance (in 
terms of centralised prescription of norms, a fair amount of managerial thinking, and 
dispersion of communities) than through government (political struggle characteristic 
of political communities). The added constituted dignity of the general will, universal 
norms, rationality, or simply, of there being no other way clearly seems to be having 
an upper hand. Thus, from a normative perspective at least, a constitutive counter-
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thrust is needed. That, however, need not be some form of cosmopolitan, globalist 
constitutive thrust leading to global democracy – any project on such vast scale would 
only mean ever larger exclusion of smaller groups rather than inclusion of 
everybody‘s interest. In fact, such thrust would only serve to add even more extra 
dignity to the oversized constituted, lending it more legitimacy. There needs to be a 
counterbalance, thus, again, returning to the Spinozist-Schmittian movement: an 
increasingly interconnected and globalised world does need some order that not 
necessarily transcends particularisms but, rather, provides a framework for their 
interaction. Therefore, criteria that claim to transcend any specific situation, and their 
corresponding dignity, are required (a Spinozist moment). But, at the same time, law 
has to be realigned with particular communities that are able to determine their own 
mode of existence and, when encountering the regional/global level, appropriate any 
common ordering in their own particular ways, again, with their own appeal to extra 
dignity (a Schmittian moment). This counterbalance, however, is not necessarily 
directed against integration as such but is certainly needed for balance between the all-
encompassing constituted and the unavoidably smaller-scale constitutive. In other 
words, integration on regional and global levels is, quite probably, a necessary feature 
of today‘s world. And yet, the regional must always be held in tension by the 
communal or the national (and vice versa) while the global must be held in tension by 
the regional (and vice versa). Only through such constant flow of legal norms, of 
power, and of the attribute of sovereignty that moves and whirlpools in all directions 
can a bearable non-universal and yet integrated ordering be conceived. Hence, those 
promoting a certain ‗de-noming‘ of the world (see e.g. Mignolo 2015) only repeat the 
fallacy of the advocate of ‗global society‘ or ‗international community‘: both poles are 
actually necessary and undisputed primacy of or preference for either cannot be 
asserted. 
In fact, right as power must be seen as a fundamental principle of law, especially 
when being interpreted from the perspective of a movement between groundlessness 
and dignity, referring simultaneously to Spinoza and Schmitt. Ultimately, despite the 
fact that the principle of rule of law has become part of the common sense globally to 
the extent that it is often treated as an end in itself (May 2014: x, 82), any justice is 
victor‘s justice, the rule of law being ‗tied up with the articulation and mobilization of 
political power‘ (May 2014: 83): victorious international community judges the 
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vanquished according to its own liking in international criminal law, victorious 
society judges the loser according to its own standard in domestic law, a victorious 
societal group judges the loser (the new internal enemy) according to its own standard 
of ordering – that is unavoidable. And as long as that its name is not spoken, justice 
can pretend to embody the universal – become the sublime object of the theological 
thinking about law. But as soon as the name is spoken, a challenge is mounted. Of 
course, anyone who objects the legal order must be punished (at least as long as the 
law retains its effective power) – punishment is part of law‘s appeal to be more than 
just a particularity of one group. Law is, after all, a force that strongly affects people‘s 
decisions, providing them with a considerable incentive to choose or not to choose a 
given alternative (Chong 2000: 210-211) – as Spinoza would have it, law intervenes 
in the chain of causation. Sanction, therefore, is crucial for symbolic reasons no less 
than it is important for practical ones. 
Part of the common-sense understanding of the rule of law is that it ensures 
‗independence and dignity of each citizen‘ (MacCormick 2005: 12). And yet, that is 
precisely what the rule of law cannot do since law cannot provide something equally 
to all; instead, by its very nature, it has to favour some more than others. That raises a 
question of why law is actually obeyed. Neither a cultural-sociological explanation of 
obedience to law, whereby people obey law because they have developed a culture 
that fosters observance of normative requirements or nurtures temperamental 
characteristics that contribute to observance nor a rational choice explanation that sees 
rule of law as solution to conflicts of interests within society whereby it is beneficial 
for everybody to observe rules, provided that everybody does the same (see e.g. 
Przeworski 2003: 114) can provide a full picture. Instead, observance of law must be 
based on a co-created belief in norms that represent something more than the norms 
themselves – the presence and the dignity of the community itself. Crucially, law is 
not primarily its positive content. Instead, ‗its basic reality – in every society – 
consists in the drama of its continual enactment and re-enactment; and that drama, 
with its ritual, its tradition, its authority, and its universality, manifests and effectuates 
not only the legal principles and policies but also legal values, legal emotions‘ 
(Berman 1974: 74). The latter interpretation contains both the absoluteness of 
Spinozist democracy (the community simultaneously orders and obeys itself) and the 
Schmittian point of internal-external (borderline) gatekeeper – the sovereign decision 
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and the law thus produced which subsequently assumes the dignity of the 
community‘s presence. For a theology to be complete, voluntas (political authority) 
must pass as ratio (moral authority) and the two have to become indistinguishable. 
Ratio represents the inevitably unsuccessful drive to rationalise law as an expression 
of the nation as community; voluntas, meanwhile, represents the power relations 
within a society (Cotterrell 2006: 166-167). As Berman (1974: 13) insightfully noted, 
‗law and religion share certain elements, namely, ritual, tradition, authority, and 
universality‘. Here, ritual signifies ‗ceremonial procedures which symbolize the 
objectivity of law‘, tradition refers to ‗language and practices handed down from the 
past which symbolize the ongoingness of law‘, authority stipulates ‗reliance upon 
written and spoken sources of law which are considered to be decisive in themselves 
and which symbolize the binding power of law‘, while universality denotes ‗the claim 
to embody universally valid concepts or insights which symbolize the law‘s 
connection with an all-embracing truth‘ (Berman 1974: 31). These qualities ‗connect 
the legal order of any given society to that society‘s beliefs in an ultimate, 
transcendent reality‘ (Berman 1974: 25). This transcendent reality must not 
necessarily deal with God traditionally conceived: it can be reason, the economy, or 
an apotheosis of the human being (with the characteristic expression of human rights) 
itself. What matters is that, ‗unless people believe in the law, unless they attach 
universal and ultimate meaning to it, unless they see it and judge it in terms of a 
transcendent truth, nothing will happen‘ (Berman 1974: 74). Of crucial importance is 
the structure of signification, and by the aforementioned alignment, law and the 
fundamental existence of the community are coextensive, as prescribed by Schmitt. 
However, to complicate the Schmittian model, law and community are in a two-way 
reciprocal relation of determination. Indeed, not the mere passing of laws (or the 
ability to do so) but the effectiveness of laws determines authority (Raz 2009: 173). 
That is also a Spinozist principle: unless people observe law and live by it, law 
effectively does not exist. As a result, one yet again needs that constant movement 
between the two poles: contestation enabled by groundlessness and solidification 
enabled by belief. That which is groundless must acquire sublime dignity and yet that 
groundlessness must always return to haunt it. Once again, the process of ordering 
manifests itself as an ever-ongoing one. 
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To conclude, law – and by that here is primarily meant public law – is a momentary 
stabilisation of conflict and, although this moment has to be seen as authoritative, it 
only reigns over a conflictual terrain. As a result, those who seek to overcome this 
precarious foundation ‗in the name of some higher universal truths are likely to ensure 
only that the future will be marked by confusion, disappointment, and the generation 
of new forms of conflict‘ (Loughlin 2010: 465). And yet, confusion, disappointment, 
and conflict, all ensuing from appeal to higher truths, are necessary conditions and 
results of ordering. If that was not the case, no change would ever happen. Rather than 
being seen in a negative light, confusion, disappointment, and conflict must be seen as 
both natural, ensuing from the deficit of existence at the heart of the human condition 
and the groundless foundation of any status quo, and positive, ensuring that no 
particular order is entrenched unassailably. Once one embraces the Spinozist-
Schmittian reading-as-movement, encompassing both contestation and quasi-religious 
belief, the above no longer appears as a paradox, and the process of ordering can again 
be seen as constant movement between groundlessness and certainty. 
 
4.2.2. Politics 
For both Spinoza and Schmitt, politics has a competitive premise, although the 
authors differ in their solutions. For Spinoza, human essence is desire as expressed 
through conatus: a desire for elusive perfection, aimed at removing or, at least, 
covering up the deficit of existence. And politics is a practice of managing that desire, 
the ultimate goal being collective perfection and striving towards ever greater reason, 
with the political community imposing the commands of reason upon itself. But 
despite that competition, one also has to see politics as a constant attempt to make one 
out of many. Certainly, there are several ways of creating a singular community, and 
politics is, clearly, about winning over the hearts and minds of the population and not 
just brute force. Politics is about joint participation in a common project, but that 
project always has a goal ahead of it: reason. Meanwhile, in Schmitt‘s writings, the 
competitive element is more pronounced. Since, for him, there are no first principles, 
everybody must be ready to fight for everything. After all, there are no natural 
grounds to solve conflicts – politics is about differences that simply cannot be 
reconciled. Politics revolves around an empty centre; and yet, despite this absent 
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fullness, something must be. This leads Schmitt to the tragic nature of politics, 
whereby one has to choose on an undecidable terrain without any criteria to ground 
the decision, except for one‘s belief. In terms of agency, it is up to ‗political 
entrepreneurs and social groups to form new coalitions which can unseat the dominant 
ones‘ (Spruyt 1994: 192). If such political entrepreneur intends to promote a point, 
(s)he has to take a risk. After all, if (s)he loses, (s)he has always already been incorrect 
and, therefore, a public enemy. But if (s)he wins, (s)he has always already been right. 
The victory element is, of course, crucial since, as already seen, only one order can 
prevail at a time and that, again, plays into Spinoza‘s understanding of power as right. 
Admittedly, for Schmitt at least, the price to be paid for non-normativity is that, 
effectively, anything goes, as long as it is willed (or can be presumed to have been 
willed) by the people. In fact, Schmitt, despite being a lawyer himself, clearly prefers 
the political (constitutive) process over the legal (constituted) one, arguing against 
judicial review and in favour of the more immediate political will (Schmitt 2015: 
130). Schmitt‘s own political allegiances can serve as a stark warning of the dangers 
involved. Arguably, Schmitt himself was not a cynic – after all, he did very explicitly 
claim that everyone must believe in something that holds normative value. But the 
fluidity of the content of any norm does not preclude any outcome, terrible as it might 
be. In part, this risk can be mitigated through the constant movement between the two 
ideas, one of openness to competition between different beliefs and the other of belief 
in a singular rationality, i.e. the constitutive and the constituted thrusts. With the 
political process oscillating between the two thrusts, both can check one another.  
Crucially, if the terms ‗reason‘, ‗progress‘, or others are merely halos of dignitas 
accrued by the established order, then risk – in fact, the tragic – is an unavoidable 
element of politics. The tragic nature of politics deserves some clarification. Certainly, 
politics is sometimes seen as driven by excess, something that exceeds life, e.g. good 
life (see e.g. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997: 134). That is, however, only partly 
correct. Politics is certainly about excess in a sense that one always strives for 
something more than actually exists, i.e. excess is always the goal in mind. 
Nevertheless, precisely this desire for ever more than exists pinpoints that the actual 
reason behind politics is a deficit of existence, the absence of fullness. The tragic 
opens up with the unavoidable differences in conceptions of good life, and those 
differences only exist because there is no grounding for any proposition of what this 
204 
 
‗more than actually exists‘ should be like. This constant futile expectation of fullness 
is a necessary illusion of the human subject, corollary to his/her incomplete 
subjectivity but, simultaneously, a conditio sine qua non for potential change. The 
central deficit of existence is usually masked with a generic symbol, capable of the 
added dignity of something more than itself. For example, Laclau (2001: 72) sees any 
‗order‘, ‗unity‘, ‗revolution‘ etc. are, essentially, ‗the name of an abstract fullness‘ that 
cannot have its own authentic content since that fullness is unachievable. Effectively, 
‗[t]his relation, by which a certain particular content overflows its own particularity 
and becomes the incarnation of the absent fullness of society is […] a hegemonic 
relationship‘ (Laclau 1996: 72). But, even though hegemony for Laclau is a dynamic 
concept, it still involves a prioritising of the constituted: the political community is, 
effectively, acted upon, although not without its own involvement. The Spinozist-
Schmittian framework-qua-movement, meanwhile, takes a step further by showing 
both the constitutive and the constituted as equal accomplices. One might see the core 
element of belief – the theologico-political kernel – as a necessary exaggeration of a 
partiality of a group through added dignity (one must not interpret it as a deception 
because ‗deception‘ would imply that there is some hidden ‗truth‘ somewhere) but the 
origin of that belief is immanent, albeit sustained through a partly transcendent 
stabilisation. That is the core difference between the hegemonic and politico-
theological approaches. 
A rather crude and mechanistic rational choice scenario of electoral politics might 
prove useful for illustration purposes: ‗[e]lections authorize compulsion‘ and 
‗[a]uthorized to coerce, the electoral winners promote their values and interests 
against those of electoral losers. Hence losers lose.‘ (Przeworski 2003: 130). This 
interpretation brings electoral democracy to the tragic account of politics: the one that 
loses the sovereign struggle for fundamental depictions of the political community, is, 
by that very loss, rendered misguided and an adherent to an interpretation of the 
community that has always already been false. And yet, a Spinozist maxim brings in 
the necessary moderation: the winners‘ right to compel, even after a comprehensive 
victory, extends as far as their power does. Depending on the balance of power, the 
result of the sovereign struggle, including its electoral form, can be anything from 
modest reform to a complete overhaul of the system. It is, thus, completely erroneous 
to imagine political freedom to be ‗the absence of domination‘, meaning that ‗a person 
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is free to the extent that others do not stand over him or her, able to interfere at will 
and with relative impunity in his or her affairs‘ (Pettit 2005: 87). Politics is always 
about the possibility or threat of domination – hence, the tragic nature. Politics could 
be seen as a struggle for not being dominated but achieving this condition necessitates 
dominating others. The freest politics can get is when everybody has equal chance to 
dominate others – that is, if one dares to take risk and embrace the tragic. 
Nevertheless, neither embracing the tragic nor shying away from happens without 
reason: ‗[p]eople will not give their allegiance to a political and economic system, and 
even less to a philosophy, unless it represents for them a higher, sacred truth‘ (Berman 
1974: 73). In other words, the high stakes game of politics would be impossible 
without political theology. But, with the absence of a centre of political power in 
democracy, ever more elaborated political theology is needed to mask that deficit. 
For Spinoza, politics happens at the point of indistinction between the collective 
conatus of the state and those of the individual members of the state. Indeed, the two 
manifestations of conatus are both separate and indistinguishable: every member of 
the political community has his/her own conatus, which refers specifically to their 
own person but, since a significant amount of their power and ability to persevere in 
existence is transferred to the common pool of the state, there is unavoidably an 
overlap with the collective conatus. This overlap enables politics as a collective 
phenomenon. However, the overlap is never fully complete (although democracy, 
arguably, reaches that almost entirely), meaning that there always is a need for 
something more than already is, causing the state actually to progress towards reason 
instead of stagnating. Since the natura naturans and the natura naturata cannot be 
identical, neither can be their political equivalents, the constitutive and the constituted 
powers. And yet, politics is a striving towards closure and order – after all, politics is 
an endeavour to establish agreement in nature and collective proceeding towards 
reason. The collective conatus of the state is, therefore, a striving to keep the 
community together (and thus persevere in existence) – not at all dissimilar in its 
structure from the individual one, although, of course, different in its complexity. 
Moreover, since desire – the central motivating force – is insatiable and conatus never 
ceases, there must be a constant demand for renewal. The only question is that of 
possible alternatives. And Spinoza is all about constant regeneration of political forms 
but, notably, following a singular model that is always already agreed upon as the 
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general will as well as with the ultimate telos of reason. Any alternative is both 
unreasonable and a misjudgement of one‘s own true interest – Spinoza can easily be 
read as a forerunner to Rousseau in this respect. 
For Schmitt, meanwhile, every outcome of the political process reflects the always 
already present Being of the political community. Only the will of the constitutive 
power can decide on the question of existence. Thus, the entire corpus 
politicum/mysticum is the ultimate point of reference and thus seems to lead to 
immanent causation. But, as already established, Schmitt‘s is a weak immanence and 
rests on the impossibility of either complete representation or complete identity. There 
is always a mixture of both and, although the community has the power of 
acclamation (which is a decisive power), that will of all must be transcended into 
existence through some medium instead of imposing itself directly. As Schmitt sees it, 
the function of government is to transubstantiate the general will into real order. The 
sovereign, then, becomes the medium through which the people speaks but is never 
fully identical with the people, even in democracy (Schmitt 2008a: 248). As a result, 
there always remains a degree of critical distance between the political community 
and its order, and sovereignty remains a borderline concept, separating presence from 
pure potentiality. Meanwhile, in Spinoza‘s democracy, everyone transfers their power 
and right (almost) completely, although that is not technically even a transfer because 
it happens from the private self to one‘s enlarged, collective, self (Sacksteder 1975: 
134). Moreover, since democratic politics is a completely collective endeavour, it 
must also be about complete agreement within the community. Hence, whatever is 
willed, is willed by all and is in the true interest of all. Finally, because, in democracy, 
the sovereign and the multitude coincide, all checks and balances are removed. Here 
lies the core difference: for Spinoza, the existence of a political order is, or should be, 
in the true best interest of all, leading towards reason and ever greater perfection, 
while for Schmitt, no alternative can be inherently better than the other but is, instead, 
legitimised through its success only. Both approaches require complete fidelity but on 
different grounds: order as the progressive fulfilment of the self (Spinoza) or order 
that suspends all questioning through its groundless dignity in a moment of tragic 
choice (Schmitt). For Spinoza, order is the communal existence (strong immanence) 
while, for Schmitt, order is based on that existence but simultaneously conditions it 
while both remain suspended on a groundless terrain (weak immanence). Yet again, 
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Spinoza‘s approach is based on metaphysical certainty, which must be added to the 
model of ordering as process because nobody can bear constant weighing of options 
that are equally impossible to weigh, and thus people have to believe that their choice 
is the best one for them. Meanwhile, Schmitt‘s approach, based on presence rather 
than preconditions, is needed to counter the rigidity of certainty and to reintroduce the 
field of potentiality that constantly lurks beyond the borders of presence. 
For Schmitt, the entire political community is in the corpus mysticum/politicum, its 
more-than-itself, similarly to the way in which, for Spinoza, everything is in God. To 
that extent, Schmitt (2008a: 267) is able to adopt the maxim ‗The voice of people is 
the voice of God‘: it is, ultimately, a tautology but it also implies that the stasis which 
Schmitt reads into the nature of the triune God is equally at the heart of the political 
community. Hence, there is the need for prophecy to break the deadlock of stasis and 
to speak a particular instance into existence – in other words, the need for a sovereign 
decision. Prophecy and miracle are, of course, closely related; in fact, prophecy itself 
is a manifestation of supernatural power, a gift that confirms or, rather, confers a 
status. Characteristically, prophecy is completely natural for Spinoza: a prophet is 
merely somebody who has superior knowledge but has to convey it in a way 
understandable to the lay people (TTP, 27). In the latter case, that prophecy needs to 
be part of politics, only signals absolute ignorance of the political community; if it 
was not so ignorant, rational argument and adequate knowledge would prevail. Both 
authors, in fact, rely on belief in at least some essence: Schmitt tries to overcome 
groundlessness by opting for institution of an instance within a process as 
miraculously prophesised (and, through that prophecy, established) by the sovereign 
while Spinoza, as ever, relies on true knowledge that can be accessed. Certainly, 
because democracy, for Schmitt, is premised on an always already existing 
homogeneity, the prophesised general will is singular and always already present. The 
outcome is the same as the one reached by Spinoza. And yet, the premises are 
opposite: Schmitt starts from homogeneity and the general will merely exemplifies it, 
although there is no prescription as to what content exactly the general will (and, 
therefore, the underlying homogeneity) should assume, while Spinoza starts from 
heterogeneity but sees the general will as proceeding towards homogeneity through 
the singular goal of reason as perceived clearly by the sovereign-qua-prophet. Here, 
notably, one encounters movement within the respective theories: from the constituted 
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towards the constitutive in Schmitt and from the constitutive towards the constituted 
in Spinoza. Now, for the first time, they have to be read in parallel in order to see how 
any supposed homogeneity is only the result of a process that starts with heterogeneity 
and can only be believed in but not grasped empirically but also in order to see how a 
supposed imposition of reason is but a quasi-prophetic flash of something 
ungraspable. 
The homogeneity-heterogeneity tension clearly raises the question of membership in 
the community. For Schmitt, formal categories (e.g. citizenship) are not enough 
because the core defining traits of the political community are its common 
consciousness, common existence, and common participation in politics, all referring 
to the nature of underlying homogeneity. This take on relations clearly serves as an 
impetus to rethink the traditional forms of attribution of membership in the political 
community, not only abstractly but also with regards to our own times. An obvious 
question is, of course, what happens to those who do not participate, either because of 
their indifference or because they have no right to participate directly, e.g. are not 
citizens. Those who choose not to participate are, in essence, not members of a 
political community but its subjects. They are still part of the state and the law 
because they are subjected to it and, through their inactivity, give tacit consent in the 
Lockean sense. However, not having full rights does not prevent one from being part 
of a political community and, indeed, even of the constitutive power. As long as a 
person identifies him/herself with the political community and the processes that take 
place within it, (s)he has a stake in what is happening, and uses any means available to 
him/her to affect those processes. Here, Spinozist affective capacity is clearly 
illustrative: somebody who disposes oneself to be affected by others and to affect 
them in turn has the more reality-power-perfection the more intense these affective 
relations are while somebody who does not take part in affective exchanges, strictly 
speaking, has no reality whatsoever. The latter constitutes a heterogeneous 
connection: the more relations and points of contact one has, the more fully one 
belongs to a community. Still, in both cases (passivity as choice and passivity as 
exclusion), belonging to a political community (and, consequently, political existence) 
is a question of being and not a question of prescription. 
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The membership-as-affective-capacity principle does call for a review of formal 
regulations of participation. One has to acknowledge that ‗[n]ew modalities of 
membership have emerged, with the result that the boundaries of the political 
community, as defined by the nation-state system, are no longer adequate to regulate 
membership‘ (Benhabib 2004: 1). There must be a re-evaluation of political 
communities in relation to all sorts of newcomers, whereby individuals without 
participatory entitlements (e.g. migrants) are to be acknowledged as full members of 
the political community as long as they identify with it and strive to affect others 
while simultaneously disposing themselves to be affected in turn. And these reciprocal 
affective relations would also suffice for ex post facto attribution of quasi-Schmittian 
homogeneity because not only such relations provide for sufficient interconnectedness 
and integration but also any sovereign decision on the actual form and shape of the 
political community would be transmitted and internalised through the affective 
network of the national political community. Also, a Schmittian principle of 
distinction would remain in place, albeit in a different form: not between citizens and 
non-citizens but between participants and non-participants. Certainly, the rules for 
recognition of the status of a ‗citizen‘ always imply some constrains on how political 
action can be performed, these rules and the ensuing limitations being non-neutral but 
rather supporting the status quo and the existing relations within a political 
community (Tully 2008: 149). But, while this observation has to be affirmed, it should 
not necessarily imply a critique: the system of participation is always biased but it 
cannot be otherwise (e.g. the model proposed here would be biased against the 
‗idlers‘): one simply has to choose whether to conform or not and that is part of the 
tragic nature of politics. In short, membership in a political community and 
participation in its own process of ordering are inseparable. 
By now, it is evident that politics must be seen as a struggle involving high stakes. 
Recognition of a new group or introduction of new attributes of the political 
community‘s mode of existence can only take place through standing up for change 
and not through reference to some abstract norm. In fact, both Spinoza and Schmitt 
show that rights and privileges exist only politically. But the Schmittian perspective is 
more radical in maintaining that if a certain group is about to promote a norm, it must 
take the risk of actively contesting the status quo on a groundless terrain. Just as it was 
the case with sovereignty – itself a power to enact such change – if such group 
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succeeds, then it must have reflected an otherwise neglected aspect of the political 
community‘s existence. That does not mean that the victor is standing on a firmer 
ground than the loser – in fact, as Honig (2009: 47) emphasises, ‗Our moral clarity 
regarding identities or forms of life that were once but are no longer excluded is a 
product of political victories […] Those victorious political actors created post hoc 
the clarity we now credit with having spurred them on to victory ex ante‘. Neither 
victory nor loss in the political struggle refers to any universal essence but simply to 
the community‘s mode of existence. If a norm is refuted, it is not because of its 
essence (indeed, it might be successfully implemented in another political community) 
but only because it has nothing to do with the Being of that particular community. 
Therefore, the losers of the political struggle only truly become public enemies if they 
refuse to acknowledge their loss, resorting to strategies that further challenge the order 
and well-being of that political community. Otherwise, their overarching commitment 
to the general identity of the community is preserved and they, therefore, remain a 
loyal opposition which does not, in the strict sense, challenge the necessary substantial 
homogeneity of the political community. Like the Augustinian emphasis on the 
Heavenly City leaves the question of inclusion in the earthly city immaterial (Johnson 
2007: 184), the added dignity implicit in political theology transcends all differences – 
it is enough that the whole political community shares the same core belief. As long as 
that is the case, the politico-theological complexio oppositorum prevails, making a 
common process of ordering the central uniting feature of the political community. 
Certainly, the above approach, when taken to its extreme, can have the opposite effect 
to the one desired: instead of encouraging dynamism, it can lead to relativist passivity 
because, ultimately, anything goes and one alternative is as good as the other. That, 
definitely, is neither what Schmitt himself envisaged nor something desirable from a 
normative perspective – in fact, this would signal the end of politics. As a result, an 
irruption of belief is, once again, necessary since ‗[w]ithout reference to the sacred, 
violence would be just that – force and bloodshed. The sacred transforms violence 
into sacrifice and imbues it with meaning, value, and function, by establishing a 
communicative link with the profane‘ (Bargu 2011: 145). The ‗sacred‘ truth is an 
extremely powerful rallying cry and source of identification which inspires political 
action and, when coupled with sacrifice, helps impart sacredness on the cause or entity 
that claims to possess truth and demands sacrifice (Bargu 2011: 145). In other words, 
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the tragic and the sacred coalesce to form the core of political struggle. However, 
since absolute immediacy of meaning, self-sufficiency, and self-identity are 
impossible, this messianic moment is an illusion, even if, arguably, a necessary one. 
The catharsis of the resolution of a tragic political drama is never enough, never as 
purifying as expected and, consequently, leads to yet another drama – after all, the 
deficit of existence at the heart of the human condition cannot be eradicated. 
Therefore, stasis as politico-theological struggle retains its relevance, constantly 
referring to ‗the One which tends towards the manifold, and the manifold which in 
turn tends towards the One‘ (Cerella 2015: 49). And, as unwillingly demonstrated by 
Spinoza, the necessary belief that grounds the ‗real‘ exception can be rationalised and 
transposed to a completely new domain, such as reason, thus rendering political 
theology extremely versatile. Hence, in line with the argument put forward in this 
thesis, the movement between contestation and belief is, again, the core animating 
principle of the process of ordering. 
Traditionally, as Schmitt (2014: 92) notes, ‗[t]he dictatorship of reason was rooted in 
the distinction between the enlightened philosopher and the people who needed to be 
enlightened‘. This is still part of legitimation for the constituted power today, 
especially with regards to universal norms. Spinoza, as already shown, clearly falls 
into that patronising trap. His task was, clearly, to get rid of all superstitions and 
mystifications (see, in general, Deleuze 1990). However, he only opened the door to 
other mystifications, as any rationalist (or anybody else who presupposes a universal 
ideal) does. When he claims that‗[s]omeone who has a true idea knows at the same 
time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt about the truth of the matter‘ (Ethics 
IIp43), this can be only be read as an exaltation of a subject of ideological hegemony. 
Such mystifications only make truth claims differently from more explicitly belief-
based ones: an appeal is made to reason-as-belief (or human-nature-as-belief or any 
other supposed essence) as opposed to plain belief. Although in Spinoza‘s writings 
religion dissolves itself into morality (Gallicet Calvetti 1968), by that same move 
reason achieves a quasi-religious metaphysical intensity. Even in the case of 
Spinoza‘s emphasis on reason, whence he contrasts rule of reason with political 
theology, one first has to believe in reason in order to subscribe to this kind of 
thinking. It is not accidental that Spinoza opposed scepticism despite having many 
affinities with the sceptic tradition: his own philosophical premises fundamentally 
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rested on belief in their supposed self-evidence, and therefore any possibility of 
questioning beyond a certain point had to be removed (for a discussion, see e.g. 
Popkin 1979: 240-241). Indeed, truth is self-referential and self-legitimating in 
Spinoza: a true idea is its own standard, and adequate knowledge needs no sign or 
confirmation other than itself (for a discussion, see e.g. Mark 1978: 44). Naturally, 
then, as Hampshire (1978: 44) notes, there can be no ‗Big Bang‘ moment in Spinoza: 
everything must belong to the common order of nature. That is why Schmitt must 
come into play: to demonstrate that anything that actually is, must have been 
somehow established because there is no such thing as natural order and that 
immanence and transcendence must come together. One cannot properly oppose the 
people as a hegemonic creation by pitching against it the multitude as organic self-
articulation on the plane of immanence without any hegemony whatsoever as Hardt 
and Negri (2009: 169-170) do. Despite its self-articulation and self-organisation, the 
multitude is not an antithesis of the people, because it needs hegemonic articulations 
to constitute itself. Even though the initial move might be bottom-up, once any proto-
centres of articulation begin to develop, the formation of the political multitude or 
multitude-qua-people becomes a hegemonic struggle, which is both top-down and 
bottom-up. This introduction of alienation of power is even desirable, because politics 
of complete immanence would no longer be politics (since, as already established, 
politics is driven by alienation and deficit of existence) but ultimate tyranny. On the 
other hand, it is not that Schmitt‘s theory, taken on its own, can provide a panacea: as 
already indicated, it would only make the tragic of being unbearable; as a result, 
politics needs illusions, superstitions (in the sense accorded by de Maistre), or 
hegemonic constructs – and Spinoza‘s rationalisation of belief is highly illustrative 
here. 
As stressed by Schmitt, ‗[t]here always are concrete human groupings which fight 
other concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, and peace‘ 
(Schmitt 1985: 37). Abstract principles do not clash and one side cannot be seen as 
representing something universal simply because there cannot be anything abstract or 
universal, at least in politics. Any struggle is one between concrete groupings with 
their concrete ideas as expressions of their particular modes of existence, although 
they certainly rely on the added dignity that the reference to something universal 
provides. This dignity has twofold importance: it not only serves as a rallying cry and 
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seemingly bypasses the tragic choice by purporting to offer a ready-made answer but 
also renders the competing proposition a non-value. This quest for universality, once 
again, has to do with human desire for fullness, i.e. constant striving to fill the deficit 
of existence and to appear to oneself (and to others) as a complete human being, fully 
immersed in one‘s own humanity. Of course, as seen from both Spinoza and Schmitt, 
humans can form bonds as long as they are imperfect. They become united in their 
imperfection. Completely perfect self-sufficient beings would be contained within 
themselves, and any social component would thus be irrelevant or at least superfluous. 
Therefore, as long as politics is perceived to be about communities and collective self-
ordering, a somewhat negative perspective on human nature must be presumed. 
Indeed, politics is enabled by groundlessness and deficit of existence and not by self-
sufficient certainty. As far as politics is concerned, the self must be in the other, either 
positively, in a relation of friendship, or negatively, in a relation of enmity. However, 
both relations are organised around ideas, not around people: a particular embodiment 
of the friend or the enemy might change (perhaps even routinely) but the ideas 
conferred upon them are rather stable, changeable only by an existential decision. 
Therefore, those ideas must be framed in terms that transcend particularity – and this 
once again comes back to the Spinozist-Schmittian movement. 
The circular solution outlined above is crucial in providing a viable answer to the 
question of ordering. On the one hand, there is the potential overdetermination of the 
constituted which is always implicit in Spinoza. A telos is always already present and 
universal and the only substantial question of politics is how to best achieve it. The 
politics of reason involves rather limited existential questioning and, consequently, is 
about the status quo at the fundamental level of organisation. Furthermore, the way it 
is framed by Spinoza, the politics of reason is an elitist affair. But even if one 
repositions reason as widely accessible, such politics is very much about hegemonic 
entrenchment of norms. On the other hand, there is the challenge of populism when 
constitutive phobias and passions are transferred to the constituted element directly 
and without balancing, either by a populist political force itself or through the effects 
it has on established political forces. This immediacy of the constitutive existence of 
the people being transcended into existence by the sovereign is very much what 
Schmitt embraced as the ideal of democracy ever since his early writings on 
dictatorship (see Schmitt 2014). But one could (and, normatively, perhaps should) 
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also adopt a more nuanced approach and take part in an exercise of risk management: 
losing some of the immediacy of ordering for the sake of keeping some of the 
radicalism at bay. This is by no means an ideal solution since not only dangerous but 
also beneficial demands might be upset if they run against the constituted power. That, 
again, constitutes an element of risk – as any political choice does. As a result, the 
tragic is not bypassed – it is, rather, an ever-recurring element of politics. But only if 
the two drives of ordering are perceived simultaneously, as constantly holding one 
another in tension, with the actually existing order always moving from the 
constitutive to the constituted and back again, some of the dangers implicit in both 
approaches can, at least potentially, be avoided. There can be no perfect balance 
between the two and, certainly, no solution that would satisfy everybody. One pole or 
the other will have some primacy and strive to establish itself, presumably through a 
politico-theological nexus. And yet, that inner tension will, nevertheless, produce 
some form of ordering. But to understand that tension itself, one has to return to 
Schmitt‘s stasis of one God that is, nevertheless, a Trinity. 
For once, the theological element of politics might be taken literally, and a precedent 
in Christian theological thinking could be employed. The Nicene solution to thinking 
one and three simultaneously was that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are to 
be seen as three persons, or hypostases, of the same substance (ousia); as for person, 
of course, ‗persona‘ was the mask worn by actors in Greek dramas and thus refers to a 
certain character that is played while ‗hypostasis‘ refers to a particular mode of 
existence – in essence, the three parts are to be seen as different performances or 
manifestations of the one (Urban 1995: 61-62; Brown 1997: 525-526). In the domain 
of political theology, the constitutive and the constituted are, then, two hypostases or 
persons of one ousia – the political community. The essence of political theology is 
not that there is a decision which establishes an order at the beginning of time through 
a transcendent fiat. There would be no politics if that was the case. The essence of 
political theology‘s appeal and its true function in political life is that it provides the 
aforementioned metaphysical certainty over and over again. Political theology 
functions as if there was a decision at the beginning of time, as if there was a 
transcendent fiat (or a secular Big Bang – see e.g. Freeden 2013) which had 
established the present order once and for all, and that happens every time a sovereign 
decision is made. Political theology provides certainty and belief, thus temporarily 
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hiding the messiness and impurity of the political world, its groundless nature, and the 
perpetual deficit of existence which animates change. In short, politico-theological 
thinking is a solution to the problem of stasis: a supposed irruption of ousia that 
claims to leave no question unanswered. The Truth, the ritual, and the higher purpose 
that momentarily mask the deficit of existence and allegedly fix the two hypostases of 
ordering in their respective places is always already present and always already 
demanding to be believed in. But even then, one thing is certainly notable: as the 
introduction of stasis in Political Theology II illustrates, ‗even in the firmest, most 
organic, perfect, and natural of all unities, the possibility of faction is inherent and 
ever threatening‘ (Bargu 2011: 152): the hypostases of ousia never completely 
coalesce into one (because then there would be ousia only, accessible in itself) but are 
in a standoff of varying intensity. One could definitely hear an echo of his thinking in 
Spinoza‘s world of things qua different manifestations of a single substance, each of 
them possessing its own conatus and thus easily coming into conflict so as to almost 
nullify each other‘s right and power and, hence, existence (Ethics IVp3). Antagonism 
is thus an integral part of every unity. Crucially, ‗the political is not only the breaking 
of form by the disorder that never vanishes but also disorder in search of a form‘ 
(Cerella 2015: 48). And yet, as it has been stressed numerous times already, politics 
needs something more stable than pure contestation (e.g. of the agonist type), at least 
on the surface level. Perhaps, quasi-agonist politics must aim to pass at least as 
deliberation, i.e. people need to believe that outcomes are (relatively) stable and 
determined by the power of the best argument, as if there was one, or if one desires 
even more stability, as politics based on a purely transcendent principle, or as serving 
a natural or a moral purpose that is beyond questioning in its exquisite and exclusive 
sublimity. The alternative, as Schmitt correctly saw it, would be Hamlet‘s madness. 
Schmitt‘s is, primarily, a theology of order. And yet, the potentiality of an ever new 
decision means that no existing order is absolute. But simultaneously, it is an anti-
Messianic theology (that is not to be confused – it needs a Messianic appearance, i.e. 
each order must appear as the ultimate one, in order to appeal to people but cannot be 
Messianic per se): anyone who poses as a redeemer, having the recipe for the ultimate 
unquestionable order is, in Schmitt‘s view, an agent of the Antichrist (Schmitt 1996: 
15-16). There is a pronounced difference between the Antichrist and the sovereign-
qua-Katechon (that includes both the existing sovereign and the potential sovereign-
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to-be): the Katechon upholds the order of this world against the Antichrist but this 
order is more of an organised disorder – it is about the maintenance of high stakes that 
make politics. The Antichrist, meanwhile, purports to bring an end to all conflict and 
to the tragic need to choose – the negation of any friend-enemy distinction. As ever, 
where Spinoza sees purposeful striving towards reason, Schmitt sees only instituted 
contingency. In fact, whereas, for Spinoza, humans intently seek particular ways in 
which to follow their conatus, Schmittian politics is much more compatible with a 
political community haphazardly seeking any satisfaction that would compensate for 
the otherwise groundless existence and, apparently, instituting just about any order 
that becomes available. Once again, both outlooks must hold one another in 
permanent tension while any actual condition oscillates between the two poles, thus 
fuelling the process of ordering. 
Indeed, it is the possibility of conflict inherent in a present order and not the conflict 
itself that lies at the heart of the political. In fact, violence breaking out is only the 
sign of one (revolution) or more (war) states failing to manage the political. It is a sign 
of the sovereign‘s failure to decide or decide adequately, the result of which is radical 
questioning of the sovereign authority itself, either from inside or from outside. This 
is, however, no longer a ‗social‘ act (Schmitt 1985: 33) – it is an open clash of naked 
political wills. A ‗social‘ political act, by inference, would be a controlled adjustment 
of demands and, possibly, redefinition of sovereignty. This, however, is different from 
a compromise. For Schmitt, only a temporary balance can be instituted. Indeed, 
whereas compromise indicates a mutually acceptable outcome, for Schmitt, only a 
bearable conclusion can be reached – otherwise there would be no more deficit of 
existence, and the political would lose its meaning. Of course, if the conflict at the 
heart of the political expresses different existential natures of the parties to the 
conflict, no resolution of that conflict can be completely acceptable if it does not 
establish the requirements of the side concerned fully. Any other outcome would 
require sacrificing part of one‘s existence. As a result, the political tension can only be 
diffused but never eliminated. That is an alternative to a Spinozist imaginary of a 
coming together of sorts: certainly, because reason is universal, an outcome equally 
applicable to all is unavoidable. But this Spinozist outlook is, nevertheless, needed to 
legitimise and uphold that interim conclusion by making it look as something more 
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than it actually is – conferring upon it the added dignity of the general will, an 
expression of ultimate truth, or both. 
Although politics, in terms of manifestation rather than substance, is most evidently 
present in the circumstances described by occasionalist theorists like Rancière (1999, 
2009, Rancière 2010) – i.e. ‗real‘ politics, understood as major struggle, often appears 
to be occasional – this is a very limited perspective. An apt analogy would be one with 
the tectonic activity of the Earth‘s crust: although it is most clearly visible when 
earthquakes strike, this does not imply that the tectonic plates do not constantly move. 
On the contrary, they not only move but, even more importantly, are constantly 
building up the pressure that will ultimately cause a new earthquake. Politics is, thus, 
ever-present and not merely occasional. And, although in normal situations politics is 
not always about high stakes and existential conflicts – that would make social life 
impossible and any stability unachievable – the potential for fundamental change must 
always lurk in the background. 
To an extent, Spinoza does represent the drive for prognostication and ultimate, 
supposedly self-evident, values that can, nevertheless, be approached creatively. 
Schmitt, in that respect, is, again, a closet pragmatist, at least to a degree. For him, like 
for pragmatists, there is no ultimate truth (except, in a supra-political level, the 
redemptive truth of Christianity) but only paradigms that temporarily condition our 
thinking about what truth is. And yet, differently from pragmatists, Schmitt would 
vehemently object the need to be constantly open to the possibility of one‘s subject 
position being proved false. The possibility is certainly there since one can be proved 
false by a new sovereign decision but until that happens, steadfastly holding onto 
one‘s belief is a must. Alternatively, Schmitt could, perhaps, be read as an ally of 
Laclau in seeing particularities posing as universalities in a way not entirely dissimilar 
from hegemonic articulation. In fact, if a sovereign decision is to be effective, it has to 
pass into a hegemonic practice. After all, in line with the view expressed by Freeden 
(2013), politics is, essentially, a quest for an ever-elusive finality (a view which is as 
strongly Schmittian as a liberal thinker like Freeden would allow himself) although 
(as demonstrated by the Spinozist counterbalance) any instance within that quest must 
be believed to be one in which the more-than-particular speaks, i.e. it needs to be 
imbued with an added dignity. Politics cannot be about some public consensus over a 
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conception of the good or some collective virtues because both consensus and virtue 
are the products and not the determinants of politics. Rather, Spinozist-Schmittian 
politics might be seen as an a-rational choice game in which individuals indeed 
struggle to further their interests under conditions of relative scarcity but what they 
consider to be ‗rational‘ or ‗right‘ action is an internal product (neither taken from 
somewhere nor exportable outside) of the game itself rather than part of the rules. 
Nevertheless, the basic model of a new norm disrupting supposedly normal life, 
forcing a decision to either switch to the new or stick with the old depending on 
incentives available (see Chong 2000: 210) is certainly very much in line with the 
Spinozist-Schmittian outlook proposed here. To a significant extent, the political 
process is a bargaining game (as put forward in Doron and Sened 2001) between the 
constitutive and the constituted, just with the stakes being raised to an existential 
level. And yet, it would be futile to look for some stable ‗rules of the game‘ that, by 
themselves, structure the outcomes – instead, bargaining simply happens ad hoc. The 
most important thing, however, is that this bargaining is a permanent process and not 
just an occasional exception. What is more, such bargaining never leads to some sort 
of agreement or a stable set of outcomes – there can only be intermediary conclusions 
that become contested at the very moment they are formulated, first and foremost 
because this is a zero-sum game, always producing suboptimal results for most 
participants. In equal measure, ideals of substantive justice, good life, etc. are, in the 
fashion of Spinoza‘s reason, legitimation strategies for the constituted rather than 
criteria that point towards the best interest of all. On the other hand, such legitimation 
is, as ever, necessary in order to maintain some shape and form of the political 
community and to provide the different sections of the political community with their 
own sources of identification as well as rallying cries when faced with the tragic 
choice of politics. But at the same time, of course, the politics-as-dissent models need 
to be brought in as a counterbalance, i.e. as something that precludes any 
rationalisation of instituted contingency from becoming overly entrenched and thus 
maintains the creative constitutive thrust which always is at the forefront of change. 
Hence, yet again one encounters what could be seen as the basic tension and 
constructive opposition that animates the process of ordering – one between the 
constitutive and the constituted thrusts, ceaselessly creating the conditions for both 
creativity and limitation. 
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To conclude, a world without certainties and without grounding is the necessary 
precondition of the political (Biset 2012: 54), seen as ‗the tragic tension that runs 
throughout history, the dramatic coexistence of form and breakthrough, peace and 
war, order and disorder‘ (Cerella 2015: 48). However, to get the full picture, it must 
be stressed that the political space is always caught in-between two potentialities, both 
equally dangerous: relativism, whence no stakes are simply high enough for an 
existential decision to be made, and self-referential fixation, whereby a particularity is 
so strongly articulated as universality that all possibilities of contestation are removed. 
Instead, the political space must always be incomplete (and, therefore, open for 
contestation) and yet upheld in a relatively ordered condition. In a sense, Spinoza and 
Schmitt help construct a layered structure of oppositions: Spinoza stresses natural 
organic self-association which stems from human nature (for a discussion, see e.g. 
Umphrey 1976: 48), while Schmitt postulates a groundless (and yet, substantially 
homogeneous) community, the essence of which is based on sovereign decision 
(Gross 2007: 149). Simultaneously, however, Spinoza can be read as totalising and 
prescriptive, setting forth a predefined standard of reason as the basis of state order 
and, therefore, discarding any alternative as unreasonable, i.e. unworthy. Schmitt, 
meanwhile, although potentially oppressive due to his emphasis on sovereign fiat, 
could also be read as siding with liberty much more than Spinoza does: the decision 
does not have any necessary content and thus anything can be decided. In terms of 
politics, as it is usually the case, Spinoza and Schmitt represent two very different 
modes of thinking, both of which are prevalent and necessary, albeit on different 
occasions: when considered separately, they reflect what the picture must look like, 
i.e. how communal life must ideally be perceived, for either the constitutive or the 
constituted pole. But when read together, they reveal politics more adequately – in 
terms of constant productive tension and continuous reproduction. This process of 
continuous reproduction, in turn, would not be possible without political theology, 
which turns ordering into a quasi-religious experience. After all, as Agamben (2009: 
18-19) notices, ‗one can define religion as that which removes things, places, animals, 
or people from common use and transports them to a separate sphere‘ although, at the 
same time, ‗what has been ritually separated can also be restored to the profane 
sphere‘ to make room for something new. Any particular political theology is bound 
to sooner or later lose its appeal. That happens, as Walzer (1992: 69) puts it, through 
‗a slow erosion of the old symbols, a wasting away of the old feelings they once 
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evoked, an increasingly disjointed and inconsistent expression of political ideas […] 
until finally the units cease to be accepted as intellectual givens and the references 
cease to be meaningful‘. Nevertheless, there cannot be a vacuum in politics (or, if 
there is one, it means disintegration, with the potential of turning the political 
community into a failed one). Hence, ‗since men cannot orient themselves in the 
political world without unit and reference symbols, the systems are replaced even as 
they are called into question‘ (Walzer 1992: 69); in other words, a new political 
theology takes the place of the old one. That is the constant tension involved in 
politics as a theological struggle and a core element in the Spinozist-Schmittian 
movement. A political event (an instance of divination-profanation) is always caught 
in the process of political ordering while the process itself is constantly being renewed 
through these events that are always caught in reciprocal (in fact, quasi-immanent) 
causation. All in all, in line with the core argument of the thesis, ordering has, by now, 
been clearly shown to be a process rather than a static thing. Hence, the Rota Fortunae 
of ordering keeps on moving, becoming perpetuum mobile. 
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Conclusion: Answering the Question of Ordering 
This thesis has advocated ordering as a process. It has been argued that, instead of 
analysing order (which itself is always partial) as a given thing, one has to concentrate 
on constant movement within political communities and the contradictory – 
constitutive and constituted – forces that impact on it. The process of ordering was 
explored under its core attributes: the state, sovereignty, law, and politics. Sovereignty 
has been taken to refer to a political community‘s independent power of ordering, 
while politics is a necessary precondition of sovereignty because it determines the 
content of the ordering decision; sovereignty, in turn, is a necessary precondition of 
politics because it both protects a given community‘s political process from 
interference from outside (external sovereignty) and ensures that political process is 
ultimately translated into political ordering (internal sovereignty). The state denotes a 
certain referent – the citizens of the state and the territory of the state – and, in 
addition, provides an institutional structure through which ordering can take place. 
Law, meanwhile, provides ordering with content and makes tangible the political 
order which exists at a particular time (i.e. a snapshot within the process of ordering). 
Law also creates the necessary conditions for politics (politics is the struggle over the 
content of law) and politics creates the necessary conditions for law (law is the 
product of politics). Similarly, sovereignty, it is argued, creates the necessary 
conditions for the state (because the state could not exist without the autonomous will 
for it to exist) and the state creates the conditions for sovereignty (because not only 
the sovereign will must be of somebody and over something but also it needs a 
spatial-institutional structure to effectively establish itself). It is thus possible to 
establish two sets of opposing and yet complementary concepts, seen here as different 
elements of ordering: its institutional/formal aspect, composed of the state and 
sovereignty, and the content of ordering, i.e. law and politics. 
Another important claim made in the thesis is one about the two core authors – 
Spinoza and Schmitt. Although conventionally perceived as incommensurable, they, 
in fact, complement each other, accounting for different sides of the process of 
ordering. As a result, they are best read in a constant movement whence the ideas of 
one check and clarify the ideas of the other. The ideas of both presuppose a certain 
deficit at the heart of human existence: for Spinoza, that is the inability to achieve the 
222 
 
ultimate perfection and intellect of God (humans can only endlessly strive to 
approximate it) while for Schmitt it is the result of the Original Sin and the ensuing 
loss of certainly and plenitude, forcing people to lead a groundless existence as a 
punishment. For both authors, this deficit and its correlate, lack of self-sufficiency, are 
what motivate the need for the state and law – essentially, these are prosthetic devices 
that hold human communities together and provide them with the symbolic and 
institutional means to live together – the alternative, for both Spinoza and Schmitt, is 
the Hobbesian conflict of all against all. As shown in relation to both thinkers, that 
deficit also has to be compensated for, at least at the cognitive level. This 
compensating act can be either through presupposing an ultimate standard of reference 
(reason in case of Spinoza), i.e. by establishing a structure of quasi-theological belief 
in a legitimating principle, or by embracing contingency within which there only are 
certain stabilising flashes (sovereign decisions in case of Schmitt). The latter 
approach, of course, provides for creativity and contestation, while the former – for 
stability and limitation. Throughout this thesis we have seen that both of these poles 
are necessary to keep the process of ordering in motion. Correspondingly, both 
authors manifest complementary views in relation to norm-creation within political 
communities and their institutional expressions. Spinoza, especially when it comes to 
democracy, presupposes (or has to be taken to presuppose) strong immanence, whence 
there is no distance between the community and its expression in a particular order; 
hence, whatever the content of ordering is, has always already been willed by the 
people. Schmitt, meanwhile, manifests weak immanence, whence the community is, 
again, always in the order it has produced for itself and imposed upon itself but the 
translation of the community‘s way of being into a particular order is always a 
mediated process and, therefore, some critical distance always exists. To that extent, 
Schmitt, again contrary to many mainstream interpretations, is to be taken to represent 
the constitutive thrust of ordering while Spinoza is to be seen as a representative of the 
constituted element. Since ordering has been demonstrated to involve both thrusts 
simultaneously, Spinoza and Schmitt are to be read together, in a constant 
constitutive-constituted movement. 
As it has been shown, the Spinozist-Schmittian movement is both horizontal and 
circular. It is horizontal because both the constitutive and the constituted essentially 
exist on the same plane, neither being a higher or lower order concept. But this 
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movement is also circular because no organisation can be entirely flat and, in terms of 
actual ordering, a hierarchy of arrangements and disparity of power is constantly 
present. With any change in political ordering, something moves upwards and 
something moves downwards, in terms of both ideas and individuals who choose (and 
that is the tragic choice of politics, although not always a conscious one) to align 
themselves with those ideas (i.e. to believe in them). To that extent, the Spinozist-
Schmittian movement resembles a Medieval Rota Fortunae, the Wheel of Fortune. But 
ordering is always also a spectacle. In fact, ordering is, and can only be, first and 
foremost performative. After all, there is no natural, objective quality or centre that 
determines the right and power (both, as per Spinoza, being one and the same) of 
ordering. Only as long as that performance goes on, the gravitational pull that holds 
the political community together still exists. 
As it has been shown, Spinoza employs strong immanence in his definition of the 
state: any change in the multitude automatically means an analogous change in the 
state structure. Schmitt‘s state is, meanwhile, defined by weak immanence: although 
change must, as well, correspond on both levels, there is a lag, an incomplete identity 
between the people and the state. Hence, while for Schmitt any drive for change is the 
result of that lag, a deficit of fullness, and is internal to the political process, in 
Spinoza‘s account, change is driven by the desire to approximate the elusive fullness 
of the intellect of God and is external to the political process. Hence, the state-qua-
intelligibility is groundless for Schmitt but based on a definite criterion for Spinoza. 
Yet, rather than seeing a straightforward opposition or attempting a synthesis, this 
thesis has proposed reading-as-movement: although the inside-outside distinction is 
groundless (as per Schmitt), it must, once established, be seen as objective (as per 
Spinoza); and yet, being groundless, this distinction is constantly open for contestation 
(Schmitt) but only in the name of a higher ideal, e.g. reason (Spinoza). In a very 
similar fashion, any law, being groundless, is to be obeyed simply due to the fact of its 
existence (Schmitt) but can only be seen as worthy of observance if passing for some 
higher good (Spinoza); and again, in a movement from Schmitt to Spinoza, being 
groundless, law is essentially contestable, although the challenger itself cannot be seen 
as equally groundless. Law must, therefore, move from endless possibilities to 
exaltation of some of them once they have been selected, back to unavoidable 
contestation to, again, exaltation of either the old or the new. Nevertheless, both the 
224 
 
present norm and the promoted norm must pass for something more than they actually 
are or can be – they must assume the added dignity of an object of belief. The latter 
struggle between exalted contingencies also takes place beyond the state: from the 
national to the regional to the global and back again. In line with the argument made 
throughout the thesis, once an actor attempts to claim a right or a norm, the only 
option is taking on the status quo with the unavoidable risk of becoming a public 
enemy should the struggle be unsuccessful – after all, in case of failure, the right or 
norm promoted turns out to always already have been false (in relation to that 
particular situation – the groundless nature of human existence precludes any 
universal correctness or falsity anyway). However, if the challenger succeeds, the 
relevant content turns out to have been always already present (again, in relation to 
that particular situation), only unduly ignored. That is applicable even to the demoi of 
today, characterised by their increasing fluidity and movement: the distinction 
between the inside and the outside of the political community is groundless (Schmitt) 
but ex post facto passing as something natural (Spinoza), hence, simultaneously 
highly contestable and yet defined in the name of something that is more than 
instituted contingency. Essentially, any particular order (i.e. a snapshot of the process 
of ordering) is, then, only an object of competition and not an essence in itself. In line 
with the reading-as-movement promoted in this thesis, inherent groundlessness 
protects any order from overdetermination while the necessary element of belief in a 
higher truth preserves high stakes and precludes ‗anything goes‘ relativism. Whatever 
form the locus of the struggle over ordering assumes, it must relate to some symbolic 
or physical (or both) division and appropriation of the world. In the future, that 
division might no longer refer to the state (just as the state has not always been the 
relevant locus) but the very principle of division must remain. That is a necessary 
corollary of the Spinozist-Schmittian movement that precludes universal fulfilment 
and dissolution of collective signification but also of the broader outlook 
demonstrated throughout this thesis as present in Spinoza and Schmitt, revealing 
humans as beings that must always strive for an unachievable fullness, meaning that 
partial communal significations are as good as it gets. 
The same Spinozist-Schmittian movement is just as clearly displayed in terms of 
sovereignty and politics. Here, again, one first needs to distinguish between the strong 
immanence of Spinoza and the weak immanence of Schmitt: absence of mediation 
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and critical distance between the constitutive and the constituted for the former and 
strong interconnectedness, although essentially non-identity, of the community, the 
state, and sovereignty for the latter. Hence, the movement revealed in this thesis is one 
between the organic universality of a strictly self-ordering democratic community in 
Spinoza and Schmittian groundlessness that renders universality and self-sufficiency 
contestable. Just as it was the case with the state, then, Schmitt provides a political 
impetus for change (change is predicated upon competition with no incontestable goal 
in sight) while Spinoza postulates an extra-political one (change only leads towards a 
preset goal, and that goal is the ultimate driving principle). Both, nevertheless, have 
been shown to be necessary: the political nature of sovereignty allows for contestation 
of any existing order while its extra-political appearance allows sovereignty to be 
authoritative. Both have to also keep one another at bay: political contestation, 
although allowing for bringing down a status quo that has lost its effectiveness, does 
not preclude any outcome, no matter how terrible, while the presumption of an 
external criterion, while characterised by the danger of unresponsive rigidity, also 
allows for normative evaluation. In a similar way, this movement has been 
demonstrated to be both the cause of and the solution to the tragic nature of 
sovereignty and politics. One has to always take sides either with the status quo or 
with the competition; but since any decision is groundless, neither option is inherently 
superior to the other: in fact, both are equally empty, and the choice is between 
contingencies only. Once again, should someone choose to contest the existing order, 
his/her ultimate status (as the norm-founder or the enemy), just as the status of the 
promoted norm or agenda, would hinge on the actual outcome of contestation. And 
yet, the element of belief in something higher and universal helps preclude the horror 
of this unbearably groundless lightness of being: contingency simply does not pass as 
such, and hence belief enables one to commit to a cause wholeheartedly. Any real 
political struggle can, therefore, take place only between different sets of such beliefs 
(after all, groundlessness cannot inspire real struggle and, in the ultimate case, 
sacrifice), with the constituted theology being challenged by the constitutive one, 
which upon victory solidifies into the new constituted but is subsequently challenged 
by the ever newer constitutive theology. Hence, the Spinozist-Schmittian movement 
accounts for both creativity and limitation. 
226 
 
Sovereignty, just as well, has been revealed as an attribute to be arrogated – after all, it 
is groundless and, therefore, not exclusive to a particular actor – in a way that follows 
Spinoza‘s right as power doctrine. Such arrogation of the attribute of sovereignty 
happens both internally to the state (as per above) but also, increasingly, 
internationally whence states, regional and global organisations, as well as other 
actors, either pool their power-qua-right together or struggle to assume as much of 
that attribute as possible. In both cases, however, sovereignty (or the proto-
sovereignty of a challenger) can only be effective if it acquires the added dignity of 
belief which renders the status quo (or one to be achieved) both natural and desirable, 
and always something more than itself. 
In short, as demonstrated in the final chapter, two elements are crucial for the question 
of ordering: the tragic and the theological. The tragic refers to the unavoidable need to 
choose between equally imperative and yet equally groundless demands, neither of the 
available choices being inherently better than the other. Effectively, one has to choose 
between groundless contingencies – that is, of course, a Schmittian category, taking 
into account the groundless existence of the fallen humanity and his political thinking, 
seen through his reading of Hamlet. When taking place on a collective scale, the tragic 
forms the backdrop of the political, the latter being a crucial precondition for 
sovereignty. The theological, meanwhile, provides imaginary closure to the tragic: one 
has to believe one of the demands to be the ultimate universal reality and thus beyond 
contestation, thereby hiding the impurity and complexity of everyday life. A central 
ordering principle has to be presupposed, providing a certain political telos with 
something more than it actually is or can be – presenting it as the answer to the deficit 
at the core of human existence. And, although political theology is more often 
associated with Schmitt, it is claimed in this thesis that, in fact, Spinoza manifests the 
practical workings of such theology, albeit, most probably, inadvertently. Both thrusts 
are crucial and can only be adequately grasped simultaneously, holding one another in 
tension and providing for the creativity (tragic contestation) and limitation (theology) 
in the process of ordering.
6
 
                                                          
6
 Of course, the term ‗theological‘ might appear problematic when discussing secular ordering. 
Certainly, the political-theological model advanced here is based on Christian theology – or, to be even 
more precise, Western (Latin) Christian theology – and, therefore, might well be directly applicable to 
the Western Christian and post-Christian modernity only. In that respect, this thesis is, admittedly, a 
biased project. This is certainly not to say that the desire for foundational belief in something is not 
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To reiterate, ordering has to be seen as a process – this has been the central claim of 
the thesis. To claim otherwise would be to fall into the trap of the constituted, seeing 
any status quo as natural and final rather than a momentary snapshot, thus manifesting 
a predisposition towards belief. At the same time, however, embracing pure 
contingency or even the tragic unavoidability of choosing between contingencies is 
also not an option – such awareness would make everyday life unbearable and any 
common fabric of a society impossible. At least certain presumptions have to be taken 
for granted even in today‘s society which is, arguably, more saturated with 
information and more sceptical than ever. As it has been maintained in the thesis, it is 
only through the constant tension between contestation and belief, creativity and 
limitation, that meaningful existence becomes possible. 
More than anything, the essence of ordering is to bring forth the ‗Truth‘ through a 
particular representation of the world, even though nothing else about that Truth is 
known or can be known because Truth is always the name of an exalted contingency. 
Therefore, politics is here claimed to be a struggle for and between such contingent 
representations that are transformed into actual instances of order through sovereignty, 
with a particular contingency being institutionalised through a system of law, the 
above taking place at a certain location within a certain political community (where 
the community and the location can be both concentrated and dispersed), defined by 
the state or some other structure. And this struggle is simultaneously conditioned by 
both the tragic and the theological: one has to choose between options that are, at their 
origin, contingent but simultaneously any options have to be believed in quasi-
religiously. Such interrelationship between the four core elements allows for a 
dynamic model of ordering – a Rota Fortunae of the constitutive and the constituted, 
creativity and limitation. 
The process of answering the question of ordering is thus complete, inasmuch as such 
closure is possible under conditions of groundlessness, i.e. inasmuch as the present 
author is able to arrogate sovereignty over his own thesis and pronounce the fiat of 
closure. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
present elsewhere – far from it. But direct application of the theory outside its original sources without 
due grounding in a different tradition would create more ethical issues than it would solve. It must also 
be stressed that no causal relationship is implied – the question of whether the political-theological is 
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